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Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University

Institute for European Studies

**The Transition Processes from Enemies to  
Partners and Politics of Cooperation in Western  
Europe (1945-1957)**

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of PhD in European  
Studies

Submitted by Shalva Khuphenia

Principal supervisor: Dr. Vasil Kacharava

External supervisor: Dr. Thomas Kruessmann



## Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that I have authored independently the submitted thesis: “Transition Processes from Enemies to Partners and Politics of Cooperation in Western Europe (1945 – 1957)”, that I have not used other than the indicated sources, and that I have clearly marked all material, which has been quoted either directly or indirectly from the used sources.

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## Abstract

The aim of the dissertation is to research and reevaluate the post-Second World War history of Western European Countries with the purpose of restoring the significance of federalism to the constructing of Europe. It reestablishes the federalism as a completely appropriate and empirically genuine factor in the general clarification of the European structure.

The dissertation forms the concept of the history of the recent European Union as the gradual development of a European polity: a supranational political structure with an intricate institutional establishment and policy-making systems situated in what can be named a basement of the transnational political society of deep informal political organization and governing system.

In the assurance to highlight the implication of federal ideas, impacts and its policy in the period of transitions processes in Western European countries after the Second World War, we remarked the current scholar connections between history and theory. In the dissertation we put above mentioned these apparently contrary disciplines in a connection, which handles to emphasize the significance of the federalists example. The empirical genuineness of federal ideas was proved throughout the dissertation, effects and policy in particular historical cases, and afterwards we link them with integration theories. Frequently the classic intergovernmentalist analysis of existing historical cases requires to be tested from a federalist aspect to provide a genuine alternative clarification including its own empirical proof. As it is known, intergovernmental approaches to deal with clarifying transition processes after the Second World War in Western Europe, with their limited accentuation upon the involvement of states and elites, adequately exclude opposing aspects.

The aim of the dissertation is not to alter history by exaggerating the concept of federalism. Rather, it was revived them to the developing historical analysis of recent scholarship, which had excluded them entirely from clarification. Our purpose, then, was to locate them in the puzzle of the accessible data; data which is barely unlimited to the methodological isolation of official documents and archives.

## Structure and Introduction

On March 25, 1957, the leaders of six European countries signed Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and starting European integration process. The European Union has now become the most successful example of institutionalized political and economic integration in the world. However, there is not political system, union or organization, which can be clearly understood unless it is set in its historical context. The functioning and structure of government institutions and passage of political efforts do not happen by chance. They are constructed and are continually being modernized by emerging events.

Writing about transition processes in Western Europe (1945-1957) and its consequences, European Union, is not less issue to these edicts than are long-term established nation-states and its description can't be acknowledged without reference to its historical sources or to the nature in which it behaviors. Ideas for European unity have been around for centuries, it is a persist theme in the deep and much violent history of the continent. The Holy Roman Emperors, Napoleon and others all tried, often in horrifying ways, to achieve a continental unity based differently on princely alliances, ethic coherence ideology or coarse power. Ever since the emergence of the modern state, political thinkers and philosophers have also imagined a united Europe triumphing over limited adherences and national interests, but the will to realize them emerged only after the catastrophe of the Great Depression, fascism and World War II and today's Europe is unique among above mentioned approaches. What it meant by European Integration? We mean the historical process whereby European nation-states have been willing to transfer, or more usually pool their sovereign powers in a collective enterprise. The European Union, making soft the nationalist ideology that had become the governing principles of European political development, the countries that composed the European communities, the base of the European Union, accepted to limit their own sovereignty, the indication of a modern nation-state, for support of supranational governance, economic integration and collective peace. Which today contents twenty-eight member states, which has a complex institutional structure that includes a supranational central administration (the European Commission), an elected Parliament, European Council, Council of the European Union, a Court of Justice and a Central Bank, is the outcome of this processes. Many American and European scientists of the European Community have chided "intergovernmentalist" accounts for emphasizing the duration of member state authority over the process of European integration. The institutional system and effort of the European Union can fragment a

direct line of modest back to the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community; however the concept and idea of a politically integrated Europe acquires a much longer before. The Second World War was a motivation for the revived idea in European unity. It provided to arguments that nationalism and nationalist conflicts, by turning into the war, had destroyed and made weaker the sovereign state as the authority and foundation of international order and political organization that a restoration and replacement for the state had to be found in an extensive continental community. "The European Union must be seen in the context of the forces that have made it and still making it. Some of these forces, notably ones of increasing political and economic interdependence have served to push the states together. Others - and long established assumptions regarding the importance of national independence and sovereignty are very much amongst these - have resulted in progress towards cooperation and integrations being slow, difficult and far from continuous" (Nugent, 1994).

Very briefly, we can say that roots of European unification could be found in the political and economic dilemmas confronting European countries, especially Germany and France, immediately after the Second World War. The war had ruined European national governments and economies in 1945 were enforced to address the responsibility and duty of economic reconstruction. At the same time European integration was also a response to a political legacy of the Second World War.

Many deep scars were left after the war in Europe. This included not only the eradication of a large part of the economy, population and production potential, but existence of foreign military troops in many countries. It was urgent to think about recovery from this situation for whole continent. Minds were open to radical change. The urgency of some form of European integration in a new way of thinking to regain the European political map became obvious. Three matters evinced the necessity of this new direction towards the European integration: Firstly, the Europeans alertness of their own weakness. Second World War had put a clear end to the traditional European world hegemony. The two new superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States of America had a very preferable strong political, economic and military might than the progressive group of European countries. Secondly, the view, that it was crucial important to avoid, by all possible power, coming back to a contest or crisis among European countries. Both World Wars had started as military clash in Europe and the continent of Europe had been the main bloodshed field in both. Actually, it was a main

issue and question of seeking a compromise between Germany and France, an accommodation that would be ratified by the United State of America. The European integration will be the only way to guarantee peace and development. Thirdly, the continued will of European citizens to create a fairer, freer and wealthier territory in which the international relationships were based of cooperation.

The empirical puzzle of matter in this dissertation is to clarify this specific result and to inquire how and whether the historical process of post-Second World War circumstances may effect on the contemporary institutions and players.

While writing about the politics of cooperation in Western Europe immediately after the Second World War, we examine post-war debates, which was obviously a matter of “High Politics”, as it was influenced by excessive and powerful intergovernmental discussions between national policy-makers, whose support for European Integration can be explained firstly in terms of recognized national interest. However, the experience of war had also created widespread revulsion towards nationalism and given fresh impetus to federalist movements, which argued that a nation-state system was a primary cause of International conflict (Lipgens, 1982). In post-war period European federalist’s movements established an influential “advocacy alliance” which pushed the question of European Integration to the front of political agendas all over Western Europe and whose ideas influenced main policy-makers such as Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet. Monnet argued “that there would be no peace in Europe if states reestablished themselves on the basis of national sovereignty with all that this implies by way of prestige politics and economic protectionism, the states of Europe must form a federation or a European entity, which will make them a single economic entity” (Fransen, 1965). “A compound polity compounded of strong constituent entities and a strong general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the people and empowered to deal directly with the citizenry in the exercise of those powers” (Elazar, 1994). In this context, “federalism aims to reconcile the parallel demands of greater political union – but not necessarily unity – of the whole and adequate guarantees for the parts; or, unity without uniformity and diversity without anarchy” (Watts, 1981). With the postwar circumstances corresponding “to those which often in the past have led nations to undertake the initial steps toward federation” (Bowie R. , 1987), the federal solution emerged as an inspiring remedy for Europe’s organizational problems. The ideal of a united Europe predated the specific postwar attempts, what makes them unique is that “the unity concept moved into the

foreground of popular thinking with both a practical and emotional appeal” (Bailey, 1948). As a declaration by the European Resistance Movement put in: “Federal Union alone can ensure the principles of liberty and democracy in the continent of Europe.” (Kitzinger U. , 1967) During the World War Two and immediately after many intellectuals consider to develop a new type of political system which would made easy collaboration between nation-states and safeguard of international peace stability. Some theorist concentrated on the fascinating product of this partnership, as an example cold be taken functionalism and federalism, while others concentrated on the background circumstances, which would be needed for the formulation of a new transnational political unity, considerable transactionalism and communications school. All of them in their own arguments influenced to the sophistication of later neo-functionalism experiments to analyze the process of European integration.

The roots of the post-war cooperation could be also found in the distant past. Several critics suggest that Europe is and has always been an identifiable and unique entity. As a confirmation of this idea, it is often disputed that Europe was the cradle of modern civilization and from this was developed the European value, value that pushed Western European nation-states transfer their sovereignty and national interest to the common approach. Major transformation has occurred in the political life of Europeans, something that is completely new in their history. Neighboring states were seen as potential enemies against each other and all of them must be ready for fight. But after the end of the terrible war in Europe, these neighbor countries become friendly with shearing common values and reason.

Discussing about the political transformation processes in Western European countries, the sovereignty argument could be also used to give other, a bit different, example of the importance and influence of both historical background and contemporary operational context in explaining and evaluating the transition processes and European Union. Many critics sign up to the idea that the nation-state, not an international organization, is the “natural” absolute political unit. However, the European Union member states were looking their sovereignties being regularly destroyed long before the European Community was established and since it was created, they have identified their sovereignties more destroyed by forces that are not an effect of the European Union membership. This loss of the power could not have involved legal relocation of sovereignty as it has been the example inside the community, but at the same time is has had a very similar consequence. It is obvious

that in an ever-enlarging range of decision-making sectors and policy, countries have not been capable to operate in isolation but have had to shape and modify to fit in with a framework of foreign impacts and influences. The European Union should not be considered as constituting a particular threat to the sovereignties of its member countries. On the other way, it could be understood as an experiment to face this threat by contributing a mechanism by which the member countries, if is not capable to recover their sovereignty, can at least advocate and recover authority over issues of decision-making by collaborating together at levels and in ways which fits post-war internationalism. It is pretty clear that after the World War Two, was very difficult to create harmonious collective policy-making structure, notably for those countries, which till today have been believed themselves to be special or great powers or to have appropriate interest, to have to give up sovereignty by converting decision-making authority to a multicultural and multinational organization.

The increasingly glacial international political climate was very important circumstance. Division of Europe between West and East after 1945 and the following Cold War between the world's two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, made a notification in Western Europe about its own delicate defenses and the existence of territorial ambitions of the Soviet Union. The consequence of this is a deep involvement of the United States of America in European affairs in the late 1940s. At the same time of the Political progress was started economic development through the initiation and launch of the European Recovery Programme (Marshall Plan). The following ideological bipolarization helped to stimulate Western European countries towards determine itself as an entity with shared interests. This changing atmosphere was operated by a general consideration over the unsafe state of the national economies, a consideration that assisted to develop a widespread assumption that economic reconstruction would require both collaboration on development and trade across the West European countries and foreign assistance from the United States of America. The start of the Cold War and its domestic political impacts encouraged the European movement, which named for European states, once at the focus of the international system, to join altogether in a more severe bipolar world system. As the Iron Curtain descended and the Cold War entered into the force, European integration came to be seen as a factor by which Western European countries could make their territory more secure, in deep cooperation with the United States of America against foreign Soviet Union aggression and domestic communist threat.

Western Europe's policy drew the USA deeper into the European domestic affairs and made it one of the key players in European Integration.

Until recently, it was possible to characterize the European Union as a classic model of federalism without federation. This implied that in its origins, construction and consequent advancement and its institutional system and expanding policy result it had dependably been the archive of federal impacts, ideas and strategies, without transforming itself into a formal federation. The European Union remains as an intellectual puzzle due to its conceptual complexity. However, and our hypothesis lies in, that it is a new federal model and it is based on the circumstances occurred after the Second World War in the Western European countries. Its transformation has been gradual and complicated, instead of being the result of a crucial historical moment.

In late decades, there has been a mentionable boost for writing on European history, however many questions still exist and needs academic research. This boosted amount of academic writings in European studies reflects the increased importance of the cooperation and integration process. From this great scope of academic literature, which now exists in the European studies, this dissertation focuses on four broad areas of work. The purpose of the first part is to provide base for an understanding importance of the international and regional cooperation generally. It includes statistics and policy, problem and research questions of dissertation. The revival of academic and political interest in cooperation has been associated with a numbers of development, those developments could be considered end of the Second World War and will of the Western European States to join for cooperation.

The second part of the dissertation dedicates to analyze the theoretical approach of transition process in Western European countries. In transformation periods, integration theory has provided a new vision into process of political and social transition on a regional or international range. Most successfully and evidently, this has been the example with Europe's integration process. The problem being examined in the dissertation is the transformation circumstances and routes of this transition process, and to be more specific, the scientific attempts to theorize about the dynamics and essence of the policy that is currently influences the political nature in Europe. This rational and intellectual route is very important to the study of transition processes and European integration, for it explains the basic structure of relations among a community of states and non-state players and institutions of governance as being component of an ambiguous, contradictory and as often admired actually debated

operation of polity formulation. The same chapter examines the qualitative research methodology, which is used in the dissertation, classifies the qualitative measurements of several characteristics. The research method is based on the theory of neo-institutionalism history. The reason of this part is also to evaluate previous researches with regard to end of the Second World War period in European history.

Third part of the work analyses and researches political documents, official statements of key policy-makers during transition and cooperation processes in Western European countries (1945-57). The aspects, which describe what effected to a post- Second World War transition processes and the early organizational responses to that transition are specified. Transformation after which countries have continued to have dispute in many sphere, and this has sometimes forced to pressure, however this disputes have been issues where use of military power was not necessary to solve the disagreement.

The aim of fourth and the last part of the work dedicates to present main results together with critical discussion; it outlines findings generated during the whole research process and characterizes new areas of research developed by realization of this doctoral dissertation.

## Literature review

The dissertation undertakes a selective but critical review of the existing political and economic literature on the origins, objectives, instruments and evaluation of the beginnings of European Integration process. The review is selective, as it does not aim to provide full coverage of the studies that have covered the European integration process.

From a geographical perspective, the European Union is by no means a “clear-cut entity” (Dawn R. Gilpin and Priscilla J. Murphy, 2008). Yet the promise of the EU arguably lies not just in the creation a larger-scale social and political space. As this vision appears to be in considerable trouble at the moment, the EU offers the possibility of overcoming some of the territorial rigidities of the modern state system (Dawn R. Gilpin and Priscilla J. Murphy, 2008).

The integration of the continent was first necessary for an apparently banal social-economic reason of post-war reconstruction under US “supervision” and economic globalization later on (Milan Bufon; Julian Minghi; Anssi Paasi, 2006). Before and after

the process of integration there existed several theories and thought about European integration, and this dissertation will be examine some of them, which is important for a clear view of European integration after the Second World War. Johanna Hannah Arendt and Karl Theodor Jaspers endorsed the project of European integration enthusiastically in the 1940s. However, Jaspers become more interested in “World Unity” than European unity. In contrast to Jaspers, Arendt was suspicious of world government. Freedom could only exist as a living political reality if national laws hedged it in. The 1954 French national Assembly’s rejection of the European Defense Community (EDC) and the political community with their trans-European representative institutions disappointed her greatly. Several years after she had this to say:

“The attempts to build up European elite with a program of intra-European understanding based on the common experience of the consecration camps have foundered in much the same manner as the attempts following the First World War to draw political conclusions from the international experiences of the front generations. In both cases it turned out that the experiences themselves could communicate no more than nihilistic banalities” (Arendt, 1973).

Thus integration did not follow common patterns of internal standardization: the challenge for contemporary Europe is to perform social, economic, and political integration while maintaining cultural diversities, and accordingly to offer after three centuries a new civilization model to the world (Milan Bufon; Julian Minghi; Anssi Paasi, 2006). The concepts of cultural identity and all the relics, prejudices, distrust, fears and old historical injustices still have a great influence on the integration processes of the European Union. These prejudices and historical injustices were often deliberately wheeled out by the political elite for the purpose of maintaining political power and uniting the nation in the face of external threats etc. (Guillaume Frechette and Hamid Taieb, 2014). European people still exist within the boundaries of the nation-states, where they bound themselves with cultural identity and prejudices that come from a historical perspective. Quenzel and Albert indicates a declining euphoria about the further transmission of sovereign national rights to the European Union among young people and find a growing skepticism against further EU enlargement (Jeremy Leaman, Martha Worsching, 2010). Johnson outlines, that “Europe has come to form the boundaries around webs of significance, and the idea of “Europe” is itself a shared mediating orientation. Perhaps the answer to creating a cultural space that is not xenophobic lies in turning inward, in searching within the cultural space of Europe to

find ways for culture and identity to be linked to the self and to humanity, rather than to territory or borders” (Jeremy Leaman, Martha Worsching, 2010).

The political integration process formally establishing a European level in the system of governance within the European state system has nonetheless moved forward for more than a half century incorporating this increasing collection of member states (Dawn R. Gilpin and Priscilla J. Murphy, 2008).

It is very important to mention here philosophers such as Charles Taylor (Charles Margrave Taylor-Canadian philosopher) and Jurgen Habermas (Jurgen Habermas - German sociologist and philosopher). Their works are worth mentioning in relation to developing European politics and its system. Taylor and Habermas, in contrast to Arendt and Jaspers have witnessed more recent developments of the EC/EU. Their strongly participatory view of politics makes them well aware of the weaknesses of this process. They exhibit cautious optimism. Habermas proposes a three-tiered system of institutions of decision-making at the national, transnational and supranational levels. However, the European Union experience continues to shape his more policy-oriented proposals, while his discourse ethics remains a reference for European Union scholars studying the EU democratic deficit (Hauke Brunkhorst, Regina Kreide, Cristina Lafont, 2018). Taylor draws lessons from the EU experience to solve problems much closer to home.

The emergence of the Cold War and its domestic political repercussions aided the European Movement, which called for European countries, once at the center of the international system, to join in an increasingly rigid bipolar world. As the Cold War intensified and the “Iron Curtain” descended, integration came to be seen as a means by which the Western Europe could strengthen its security, in close collaboration with the United States of America, against external Soviet Aggression and internal communist subversion. Western Europe’s vulnerability drew the United States deeper into the continent’s affairs and turned Washington into a “zealous champion” of European Integration.

The political system is much related to understanding of the identity of the European integration process. As an example, Muller-Harlin points that at the national level, the western part of divided Germany focuses on successful economics in the present and future; the past is excluded from any sense of “us”; on the European level, the past is reintroduced for the sake of a common future. He highlights, that in France it is the other way round – national pride springs from a vividly remembered past, and

the collective memory includes the most heterogeneous traditions (Muller-Harlin, 2003).

Since issues amenable to governance are manifest at different scales and in ways that are not necessarily spatially coextensive, a multi-scale, not completely hierarchical set of political-territorial structures has an important role to play (Dawn R. Gilpin and Priscilla J. Murphy, 2008) . Bodenstein and Ursprung call for a federal structure that becomes more decentralized as economic integration deepens – decentralization meaning that the number of lower-tier government’s should be increased rather than decreased and that the federal government’s policy responsibilities should be reduced and shifted to the provinces. Deliberative democracy remains one of the important issues on the EU agenda (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018).

## **Research Methodology**

The research methods of the dissertation are based on the theory of neo-institutionalist history. Rowlinson and Hassard highlights, that the first contribution of neo-institutionalist history would be to provide a more rigorous approach to historical research, ensuring that it conforms to the standards of source criticism and verification that are generally accepted by historians; the second contribution would be to highlight the potential for research using the documentary primary sources that historians are familiar with; the third contribution of neo-institutionalist history would be to shift the emphasis away from importing historical data and towards exporting theory to history. The “new institutionalism”, and in particular, the branch of the new institutionalism known as “historical institutionalism” has not only influenced the study of West European politics, but indeed, in some respects, this approach emerged out of the study of West European politics itself (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018). It is remarkable that the political science theory of historical institutionalism, which is best known for its studies of macro-historical radical and revolutionary changes and for concepts like “path dependency” (Triantafillou, 2017).

Historical institutionalism is “an attempt to illuminate how political struggles are mediated by the institutional settings in which they take place” (Sven Steinmo; Kathleen Thelen; Frank Longstreth , 1992). Institutions influence policy consequences, instead of just reflecting the dispersion of political power and inclinations. They are able to have a separate and intermediary impact on the policy path chosen. These institutions can go up against their own existence and provide to deciding and clarifying

subsequent advancements in post-Second World War developments in Western Europe.

The extensive range of science that comprises historical institutionalism is distinct and is settled within the following fields: international relations, comparative politics and history. Nevertheless, there are obvious shared characteristics over this scholarship, shared theoretical and empirical responsibilities that establish a logical approach. Steinmo and Thelen initially classified historical possibility and concentration to path dependency as fundamental shared characteristics of this scholarship (Sven Steinmo; Kathleen Thelen; Frank Longstreth , 1992). Therefore, Pierson and Theda accentuated three major factors required for historical institutionalism method: world puzzles, temporality and context (Pierson and Theda, 2002). These three factors establish a set of approaches to answer the major question of how once settled institutions affect the conduct of political players after some time – making this approach obviously specific from other methodologies in political science.

Historical processes are essential to this methodology, as the specific process of developments is set to be relevantly sequent, and transition process after some time is frequently and important variable in clarifying substantive results (Pierson, 2004). This methodology created the general idea of path dependence, noticing that processes occurred at an earlier period is essentially to form and sometimes decisively, effect to the processes occurs in the future period. “Path dependence” offers a useful tool to pursue this objective, given its core socio- historical construction (Triantafillou, 2017). Path dependence is that it is a process whereby what happened at an earlier point in time affects the outcomes of a sequence of events later on (Tarak Barkawi and George Lawson, 2017). The basic conception is that historic events or accidents – critical junctures – then act on the dynamic process of history, limiting future opportunities for alternative courses of action (Triantafillou, 2017). Path dependencies are shaped by „lock-in effects which shoehorn communities into positive or negative pathways of change” (Tarak Barkawi and George Lawson, 2017). Kuipers claims that path dependency is not just the notion that “history matters”; rather, path dependency theory explains how public policy and institutions get increasingly consolidated, legitimated and protected by the elites governing a policy sector, and that precisely this rigidity precludes inevitable large-scale reform (Farrer, 2018).

It is important to move beyond the nation-state approaches of the realist school of international relations to deal with comprehend the period we research in the European Union history. By forming new concepts of the history of European integration after the WW2 as the gradual development of a European level polity, in the dissertation it is proposed two advanced integrated scopes of research that won't just expand and enhance our consideration, but additionally guarantee on a very basic level to transform the approach it was understood before. It is contributed first, to examine in a more practically advanced conceptual way than it was formed previously, the advancement and aspect of the transnational political thought and society in the process: the establishment of structured and very informal connections below the supranational level, and the second, to form the concept of early European Community as a nascent political system.

It is offered the study of the possibility for interdisciplinary collaboration among political scientists and historians in European Union studies, a kind of cooperation, which could be significantly more productive than has been the example (Kaiser, Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union , 2007). It is demonstrated, that approaches of political science could be used effectively to instruct historical work on the European Union. Both ways, path-dependency and policy networks approaches are set up to valuable impact with a specific goal to clarify how participants in European Union history have cooperated and contended, and been matter to intellectual tensions and institutional passions, which forced their decisions and activities.

In order to demonstrate the sufficient capacity of cooperation between political scientists and historians in European Union studies, it is taken as a starting point the continuation of interdisciplinary and contends that it is important to reach a level beyond multidisciplinary to guarantee that a mutual research agenda can be produced. Taking into the consideration or following Newell's seven-step procedure<sup>1</sup> can give us valuable information (Newell, 2001). This process raises out a complex however fruitful process of cooperation between disciplinary aspects: problem determination;

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<sup>1</sup> - identifying conflicts in insights by using disciplines to illuminate each other's assumptions, or by looking for different terms with common meanings, or terms with different meanings;  
- evaluating assumptions and terminology in the context of the specific problem;  
- resolving conflicts by working towards a common vocabulary and set of assumptions;  
- creating common ground;  
- constructing a new understanding of the problem;  
- producing a mode that captures the new understanding;  
- testing the understanding by attempting to solve the problem.

assessment; settlement; formation of a mutual context; formulate an improved sense of the problem on that premise; construct a model of the problem that functions out of this new sense; and test the model.

## I Chapter: Formulation of policy, problem and research questions

While speaking about the importance of the international cooperation first should be examined generally the liberal institutionalism and internationalism as a substitute to realpolitik in International Relations, which has forced to intended debate since the Second World War about the effectiveness of liberal approach as a real alternative to realism approach. Liberalism idea declares that insistence should be implanted on international governance, politics and cooperation between states and multinational organizations as an approach of defining international system. Institutionalism points strengthen on the role that universal intentions play in the international relations and the capacity of international organizations to pull states to cooperate.

Robinson declares that international cooperation, itself, impossible to be classified as positive or negative, because it is a character of nation-states or humans relations that behaviors as a process to an end. In reality, the author comes up with that; this end is correctly, what regulates the value of a given act of cooperation. Institutionalism and internationalism have advanced as a major conceptions in the Libertarian school of the theory of international relations and had by the second part of the of the twentieth century become one of the powerful challenge to realistic approach of international relations system (Robinson, 1961).

Internationalism points out the role of the international society in international organizations. International society exists when “international actors, states aware of importance of common values and interests, structure a society in the impression that they believe themselves to be limited and obliged by a shared set of rules in their relationship between each other, and contribution in the working of common and shared institutions. The idea, on which the international society is based is cooperation between nation-states for common interests and intentions” (Bull, 2012). Liberal institutionalism proposes that in order to be peace and not military confrontations in international relations nation-states must cooperate together and in effect earnings some of their sovereignty to establish “integrated communities” to encourage economic prosperity and react to international and regional security affairs.

Liberal institutionalism spotlights on the ideology, which considers, that states are interdependent. According to Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane liberal institutionalism underlines four major aspects which makes institutionalism different concept from

realism approach. These covers: numerous connections which gives opportunity for cooperation among players across national boundaries and which raises links and the communication between state and non-state actors; all issues are equally taken into the consideration, that means, that there does not exist difference between “Low and high politics” unlike *realpolitik* in which the main attention is taken on military and security issues. Furthermore, in the frame of liberal institutionalism system countries pursue to achieve its aims and wills through international cooperation that is why states are less concerned about the benefits reached by other states in cooperative compromises. One of the enormous difficulties of cooperation in international relations and international system is non-conformity (R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, 1990).

The cooperation and issue of interdependence of states was very important, as it was the start of political and economic cooperation and integration in European post-war period. The impact of modernization is generally agreed to be a main point for this. “It has broadened the international agenda from its traditional power and security concerns to embrace a range of political, economic and social issues, and at the same time it has produced an interconnectedness and interrelatedness between states, especially in the economic and monetary spheres, that amounts to and interdependence” (Nugent, 1994). Within Western European countries there have been many regional aspects to this development of interdependence, two from this dimensions have been specifically important. First, “all significant Western European countries have, since the Second World War, seen their external trade become increasingly West European focused. The EC/EU “has played an important - although - by no means a sole - role in encouraging this trend: a trend which has produced situation today whereby all EU member states and potential member states conduct at least 50 per cent of their trade inside the European Union. Second: “monetary power” (Nugent, 2006).

All the time the international system the subject thing of negotiations and discussions between European states has become more various. Despite, as regional conflicts appearance, the case could not be magnify, international system have obviously become quite less centered upon traditional issues and have more and more concentrate on different policy issues, policies focused with the preservation and existence of the country have been involved by policies taking care more with the welfare and wealth and of its citizens. This adjustment in the content of system has been significantly remarked throughout western industrialized world, and above all in

Western European countries where a transition processes already have taken place. Of course, classic international order and ruling politics have not stopped existence, but they are just not as powerful or as outstanding as they were before.

The war ended in Europe in May 1945. It left the continent's infrastructure destroyed and its population split up by ideological conflict and nationalist antagonism. After five years, six western European nations, including France and newborn Federal Republic of Germany, had begun negotiations to start production of their leading coal and steel industries under the control of a "High Authority" with supranational decision-making powers. Many leading politicians and intellectuals were advocating the creation of a "United States of Europe" along American states by May 1950. Adenauer anyway believed that in 1945 "the unification of Europe seemed far more possible now than in the 1920s. The Idea of International cooperation must succeed" (Adenauer, 1953). In a famous public speech on 9 May 1950, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, declared the goal of a United Europe:

"Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries... The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe... this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace." (Duchene F. , 1994).

A limited set of states pushed toward further cooperation. "That political aim was to be achieved, not through unrealistic plans for complete political union, but through a strategy of gradual cooperation and integration of certain functions" (Mitrany D. , 1966). These could then later be followed by other functions. The first function chosen was of an economic nature, "which seemed the most practical and very good economic reasons were pushing in that direction" (Molle W. , European Cohesion Policy, 2007). This was necessary to be guided and accompanied by the creation of institutions in order to guaranty the endurance of the cooperation strategy. There have been disputes about the degree of which national governments needed to transfer powers to this organization, between advocates of two main concepts:

- Firstly, “an intergovernmental organization, were the representatives of the national governments take decisions by unanimity.
- A second, supranational organization, with an organ independently executes policies and prepares decisions. Were the representatives of national governments may take decisions by majority rule” (Molle W. , European Cohesion Policy, 2007).

Joining the German and French main industries under the High Authority was based on a supranational functional and cooperation approach. The course Europe took at that moment towards economic and political cooperation has followed since, consisted in the creation of a factual solidarity based in practical realizations. What were the main reasons for this success, where other attempts could not achieve? What were the main consequences of this success? The issue will be discussed below. Moreover “the basis for further cooperation had been enlarged as the social differences among European countries had gradually become less outspoken, a development that gained momentum in the post-war decades” (Kaelble, 1986) aspirations to political unity.

The roots of post-war cooperation and its importance could be explored also in the past period. As confirmation of this it is very often disputed that European continent was the “cradle of modern civilization” and from this advanced European culture and values. The first president of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein declares following idea:

“Europe is no creation. It is a rediscovery. The main differences between the formation of the United States of Europe and that of the United States of America is not that America did not have to merge a number of firmly established nation-states, but that for more than a thousand years of idea of a unified Europe was never quite forgotten...The advocates of a European federation know that Europe shares a sense of values: of what is good and bad; of what a man’s rights should be and what are his duties; of how society should be ordered; of what is happiness and what disaster. Europe shares many things: its memories that we call history; achievements it can take pride in and events that are shameful; its joys and its sufferings; and not least its tomorrows” (Hallstein, 1972).

As a consequence and result of cooperation and interdependence, a wide variety of financial and economic issues can thus no longer be limited to, national barriers. States are more and more sensitive to outside events and are increasingly unable to act in policy of isolation. They must have cooperation; have consultation and some would dispute integrate with one another in the interest of international and national economic growth and stability. European countries had to prepare jointly a reconstruction programme.

## 1.1 Policy

Here is a problem of fundamental emphasis because transitions and changes in the policy requires of the member countries establish definitive development phases in the activity of international organizations. To countermeasure this, the exercise committed to the institutions should be constitutionally extensive and thus competences of overcoming what Haas names “the built in autonomy of functional context.” ”Lessons about integrative processes associated with one phase do not generally carry over into the next because the specific policy context...determines what is desired by governments and tolerated by them in terms of integrative accommodations”. There is no dependable, cumulative process of precedent formation leading to ever more community-oriented organizational behavior, unless the task assigned to the institutions is inherently expansive, thus capable of overcoming the built-in autonomy of functional contexts and of surviving changes in the policy aims of member states” (Haas E. B., 1958).

This is an assumption principle, which is engaged in the conception of “spillover”. In its most common formation, “spillover” assigns to a situation in which a given process and action, linked to a definite reason, constitutes a situation in which the original reason could be guaranteed only by making farther actions, which is direction establish the farther situation and a demand for furthermore action, and so on. The concept shows that consolidate specific sector of economy, as an example we can consider Coal and Steel, will necessarily lead to the political cooperation and integration of other economics. It should be developed as it follows: the initial exercise and grant of ability to the central institutions establishes the situation or serial of position that could be managed with just by further growing the exercise and the allocation of major power and potency. The above-mentioned conception suggests that a circumstance has established in which the capacity of a member state to accomplish a

policy goals and objective may depend upon the acquisition by another member country of one of its policy intentions. The situation could show following features:

1. The flows of spillover are dependent upon the fact that backing for any given pace in consolidation is the outcome of a convergence of objectives and expected value. These often-competing goals give rise to competing actions and need, which could be a ground of further convergence leading to further cooperation.
2. Lack of agreement between governments lead-in to an enlarged function for the central institutions, let us say, member states delegated difficult troubles and problems.
3. At the stage of elite groupings, requirements and assumptions for further activities could be expressed because of partial behaviors taken by the central institutions.
4. The actions of central institutions may establish situations that could not be solved without further development of central institutions and without creation of the new central policy.
5. Far-reaching economic consolidation, which involves all sectors of the economy as it was in the European Economic Community (EEC), could offer great capacity for spillover between sectors. Disputes over further cooperation and integration in a given sector, which involves contrasting national interests, could be resolved by negotiations between such sectors.
6. Involvement in the Customs Union could evoke reactions of non-member states, a situation which at that time could form problems that could be solved only by further cooperation or by expanding and spreading the role of the central institutions (Lindberg L. N., 2007).

The path in which choices were made, in which irreconcilable circumstances were determined between the member states, would be of conclusive significance for political cooperation. Disputes between states could be resolved on the ground of “the minimum common denominator”, by “splitting the difference”, or by “upgrading common interests.” “The minimum common denominator type, “characteristic of classical diplomatic negotiations, involves relatively equal bargainers who exchange equal concessions while never going beyond what the least cooperative among them is willing to concede” (Lindberg L. N., 2007). Accommodation by “splitting the difference involves a similar exchange of concessions, but conflicts are ultimately resolved somewhere between the final bargaining position, usually because of the mediatory role

performed by a several institutions, or out of deference to third party pressure such as might be institutionalized in parliamentary diplomacy. This implies the existence of a continuing organization with a broad frame of reference, public debate, rules of procedure governing the debate, and the statement of conclusions arrived at by some kind of majority vote” (Lindberg L. N., 2007). Such intervening organs couldn't have the capacity to characterize the terms of understanding; they do participate in setting limited points inside which a definitive accommodations were reached. Accommodation on the grounds of “upgrading common interests, whether deliberately inadvertently depends on the participation of institutions or individuals with an autonomous role that permits them to participate in actually defining the terms of the agreement” (Lindberg L. N., 2007). It suggests greater progress and advancement toward political collaboration, for it demonstrates that: “The parties succeeded in so redefining their conflict so as to work out a solution at a higher level, which almost invariably implies the expansion of the mandate or task of an international or national government agency. In terms of results, this modes of accommodation maximizes...the spillover effect of international decisions: policies made pursuant to an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if the task itself is expanded, as reflected in the compromises among the states interested in the task” (Lindberg L. N., 2007). Political cooperation and integration, it could be characterized as a process or as a condition. It alludes to the possibility that disputes will be determined without brutality. The focal concept could be that of a “security community, which is a group of people which has become integrated, that is they have attained within a territory”, institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population” (Deutsch K. W., 2003). Political integration and cooperation as a condition have been condemned on the fact that they allow just a general discourse of the environmental factors affecting integration, and they do not provide the apparatus expected to make a reasonable distinction between the circumstance preceding cooperation and the circumstance prevailing during the procedure, in this way obscuring the role of social change. “Political integration and cooperation is a process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states. The end result of a process of political integration and cooperation is a new political community, superimposed over the preexisting ones”. (Haas E. B., 1958)

The significant change is being made conceivable by the new system of commonly accepted policy, which is the basic of the European Community. To achieve this policy after the Second World War should be established common principles and rules, which all member countries are committed to respect, and mutual establishments to watch over the functioning of this rules. States have applied this strategy inside their boundaries for centuries; however, they have never been yet applied between each other. This policy and method prompts to a totally changed way to common activities and action. Before, the countries not felt an unavoidable responsibility. Their commitment was entirely to themselves, not to any other common actions and interests. They had to and needed to depend on themselves alone. Relations took the structure either of dominance if one state was much stronger than the others were or of the exchanging of favorable circumstances if there was a balance of powers among them. This balance was fundamentally precarious and the concessions made in an agreement one year could simply be withdrawn the following. However, in the European Community, commonly accepted rules connected by joint establishments give each an obligation regarding the competent and effective working of the Community as a whole.

## **1.2 The Problem and Research Questions**

The need for some new sort of international framework was being generally campaigned before the First World War, in the measure in which the League of Nations discovered itself baffled in its attempts to avoid violence and to arrange peace. Some faulted this failure and disappointment on the irrationality and irresponsibility of smaller states, others rather the selfishness of the Great Powers. Still others ascribed the Leagues failure more straightforwardly to weakness in its own machinery and constitution: the best proper inebriants were there, however the political dose was insufficient. It was particularly among those who held this view that the thought of a wide universal federation started to be held into as another trust.

Federation appeared to be in reality the main option for a League, which attempted to connect various political units by democratic methods. It would mean an affiliation much closer than was the League and its backing along these lines underestimates it that the League failed as it did not go sufficiently far. In what way would federation go further? Federation would be a more serious and intensive union of a less expanded group; the established and constitutional ties would be closer. The requirement for the

pragmatic approach was all the more noteworthy in light of the fact that the Western European countries were so obviously in the time of historical transition. At the point when the state itself, whatever its model and constitution, were everywhere profound a deep political and social change, it was a great leadership not to constrain the new international experiments into some set natural structure. We attempt this request as a commitment to the study of conceivable courses in which men sometime might terminate war. From the outset it is evident the complexity of the problem. It is hard to relate “peace clearly” to other major values such as equality, “justice” and “freedom”. There are minimal common concessions to adequate different options for war, and there is much doubt in the use of the expressions “peace” and “war”. It could be started with the supposition that war is so dangerous that humankind must exclude it, must put it beyond serious possibility. The endeavors to do it may fail. However, in a human progress that wishes to survive, the focal problem is the investigation of international organization is this: How can men figure out to act together to eliminate with was as a social foundation?

Whenever a difficult political issue emerges, men turn to history for intimations for its answer. They do this knowing they would not find the entire solution there. Each political issue is unique and for history does not rehash itself. However, frequently it is possible find out situations in the past that are related to the one being considered. For the most part, with these suggestive analogies or harsh parallels, the problem is less to discover the facts, as it is to choose what is distinctive between those of the present and the historical facts. It is considered here the political communities. These regard social groups with a progress of political communication, some machinery of enforcement, and some well-known propensities of compliance. A political union or community is not is not so much ready to avoid the war inside the area it covers: the United States of America was not able to do so at the period of the Civil War. Several political communities do, however, dispose of war and the desire of war within their boundaries. Should be also mention, concentration upon the development of “security communities”, is one in which there is genuine affirmation that the members of that community would not have confrontation between each other physically, but will resolve their disputes in some other peaceful way. At the same time toward the term of integration, “the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community”<sup>2</sup> and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long

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<sup>2</sup> A belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point, that common social problem must and can be resolved by the peaceful processes

time, dependable expectations of “peaceful change”<sup>3</sup> among its population” (Deutsch K. W., 2003).

There are still those who might wish to stretch the significant importance of historical aspect of Western European cooperation and integration. Inter-state communications and relations in the nineteenth century are frequently seen as forecasting post-1945 developments insofar as peace persevered for much of the century and did as such, to some degree in any event, because of agreements and understandings between the major powers. The problem with this approach, however, is that it rather exaggerates the degree to which the nineteenth century was a century of peace, and it overstates to the degree to which the states did cooperate. The so called Concert of Nations<sup>4</sup> characterized an embryonic endeavor to practice strategic control through summitry and diplomacy, but that was during a period when conservative autocracies ruled major part of Europe and when many of today’s states did not even exist in their current forms. Later international relations were based on balance of power – which was not really in light of European trust and cooperation – as the method for trying to save the peace.

Earlier research designs were to some degree incoherently multilateral and relative, however it went actually beyond more constrained endeavors to clarify the European policies of independent states. Particularly by the states prompt move back, and by underlining the socio-economic inspirations of government policy on Europe, Milward offered an important concept to the issue about the history of the European Union (Milward A. , 2002). His examination of national and nation-state interests, or what he has named national strategies, still has significantly realist implications; however Milward has claimed that “the process of integration is not separable from the evolution of domestic politics” (Milward A. , 2002). However, his comprehension does not assess satisfactory explanation of the disputed political origins of national European policy in the more pluralistic post-Second World War democracies.

As well, Lipgens attempted to contribute the contention movements and the European movement to the European idea (Lipgens, 1982). He collected valuable sources from several European states, however at the decisive point, failed to set up connections with special purposes between these movements’ concepts and suggestions

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<sup>3</sup> The resolution of social problems by institutionalized procedures

<sup>4</sup> Is a set of political beliefs that emerged at the Congress of Vienna -from September 1814 to June 1815

and the certain process of basis Western European cooperation developments after the WW2.

With the purpose of improving the conceptual advancement of empirical source-based investigation on European Union history, it is argued here, that scholars of the European Union history connected more with the achievements of social scientist, some of whom have investigated the contemporary European Union as “multilevel governance” (Kaiser, 2009 ), with deep supranational and transnational measurements. Such a dialogue, here it is recommended, only with particular aims. Methodologically the scholars of history as a decisive tool to explain their more empirically directed investigation might practice concepts of social science. To improve the capacity and accuracy of their research and organize in a more sophisticated manner rather than simply classifying distinctive impacts that may have assumed a position in the integration and cooperation process. However, the theoretical and empirical research on the European Union as a political system and transnational society construction establish a characteristic purpose of starting point for a contemporary European Union history that pursue to form a concept of the historical development of these two measurements. Here it is recommended that two arrangements of social science theories and conceptions are specifically helpful for recreating the progress of the basis Europe polity after the WW2: network concentrated methodologies and institutionalist theories.

It is in the field of economic history that the most productive base for distinguishing long-term impacts and clarifications is to be found. From about the late eighteenth century national economic cooperation and integration began to occur, as boundaries to economic action within countries were destroyed. This served to advance, and thus was empowered, national political cooperation and integration which demonstrated itself in nationalism and in the rise of the sovereign state to the status of the “supreme collective unit”. From about the middle of century the accomplishment and successes of this internal political and economic integration, associated with an expanding interconnectedness in Europe which took after from the technological changes and economic development, brought about expanding inter-state cooperation to advance trade, competition and economic prosperity. For several historians European economy was being created:

“Europe’s industrialization proceeded relatively smoothly among other reasons precisely because it took place within what was in many essentials a single integrated economy, with a fair amount of movement of labor, a greater amount of freedom for the movement of goods, and the greatest freedom for all for the movement of technology, know-how and capital (Pollard, 1981).

However, in actuality, from the last quarter of the nineteenth century, states, for several of reasons, moved increasingly toward economic protectionism and in the meantime established and developed national consciousness and identities such as had not been seen in previous times. In the first half of the twentieth century, and especially between the World Wars, the European free trade system disappeared, as states tried to ensure themselves and tried to protect their economy to the detriment of others and as national economies were “increasingly reshaped along autarkic lines” (Balassa B. , 2014). Alongside these increasingly closed economic systems established and developed the ever intensified political competitions and tensions between the states that were noted earlier. The European historical experience thus emphasis the highly important, but frequently ignored fact that although economic liberalization and industrialization provides potential bases for the encouragement of agreements, interconnections and harmonious relations between states, they do not guarantee or ensure them. The powers of Europe went to war with their key and principal trading partners in 1914<sup>5</sup>. Besides, between the First and Second World Wars, economic connections did little to unite the nations or to act as a constraint on governments when distinctions developed in their points and strategies. This linkages and connections could be a preliminary period of post - Second World War political and economic cooperation. It is clear, that both of this periods have been highly important, however pre-1939 European history shows, that they do not have an impending logic attached to them. Much relies on their relationship to the circumstances of the time and, will now be explored and demonstrated; these were altogether very different in the post-1945 world from what they had been before the World War Two.

We examine here the distinction between 1945 and today to analyze what a colossal transformation has been occurring. After the Second World War, the nations of continental Europe were isolated and divided, their national resources were exhausted and, and in the greater part of them, the peoples had little confidence in the future.

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<sup>5</sup> Start of the First World War

During this period, these countries have lost their authority. And yet, after all these changes, the countries of continental Europe, which have battled each other so regularly in the past and which, even during peacetime, changing their economies as potential instruments of war, are currently united in a Common Market which is establishing the foundations of political union. For five years, the whole French nation had been trying endeavors to re-establish the bases of production, however it got to be clear that to go beyond recovery towards enduring extension and higher standards of life for all, the resources of single nation were not satisfactory. It was necessary to rise above the national framework. The need was political and at the same time economic. The Europeans needed to overcome the fear of mistrust born of centuries of quarrels and war. The people and governments of Europe still thought in the old terms of victors. If a premise for peace in the World was to be created, these thoughts should be eliminated with. One needed to go beyond the nation and the concept of national interest as an end in itself. Both these objectives could in time be achieved if circumstances were created empowering these countries to increase their resources by uniting them in a dynamic and large cooperation. And if these same countries could be made to consider that their problems were not more singularly of national concern, but were common European obligations. It is obvious, that this could not be done all at once. It was practically impossible to build a large dynamic cooperation and common market immediately but was important to create trust between recent enemies.

Obviously, Second World War irrefutable defines a turning point in the West European state system. Within a couple of years of the war ending states were cooperating and in a few instances and in several regards were even integrating, in a way that would have been unimaginable before the war. Fundamental to this transformation were a various variables resultant upon the war that connected to bring about radical changes in both the atmosphere of opinion and the impressions of requirements. Below is the formulation of research questions in order to examine the post-WW2 transition processes in the Western European countries:

- To what degree the transition processes have deep historical roots and to what degree they have been a response to post-1945 circumstances?
- What kind of political and economic system European movement was seeking after the World War II and which new order was suitable for the Western European states?

- Has there been a steady basic movement in an integration process or simply not coordinated reactions to the specific issues?
- What has been an outcome of general international impacts?
- What could be studied from federalism as an exact approach in evaluation of the European Union as a new federal model and how federalism could influence the future shape of the European Union?

The Second World War created a greater acknowledgment than had existed ever before that free and unrestrained nationalism was a cause for war, which in the post-1945 world was progressively seen as meaning mass annihilation. At the international level this reasoning was reflected in requirement for a bigger and more capable body than the pre-war League of Nations, and it had essential influence in the foundation of the United Nations in 1944. But the fact that the two World Wars had started as European wars, additionally yielded requests and moves for particularly European arrangement. Amongst the strongest supporters of this perspective were many of those who had been connected with the resistance movements of continental Europe, which, from 1943, had come to be connected through liaising connections.

Hence, a broadly shared optimism was created, that states could cooperate in joint organizations and obstacles of distrust could be broken down. On this ground, more than 750 outstanding Europeans gathered at The Hague in May 1948 and from their congress issued a call to the countries of Europe to create a political and economic union. This empowered discussions at governmental levels and in May 1949 by representatives of ten states of Western Europe, the Statute of Council of Europe was signed. Article 1 of the Statute declares:

“The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress. This aim shall be pursued through the organs of the Council by discussions of questions of common concern and by agreements and common actions in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters and in the maintenance and further realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Nugent, 2006).

Despite these grandiose desires, however, The Council of Europe was to be a disappointment to those who trusted that it could serve as the premise for a new

Western European state system. The problem was that its aims were too ambiguous. To some degree, that its decision-making structure was intergovernmental and therefore weak; but principally some of its members were not very much interested in anything that went beyond voluntary and limited cooperation.

In addition, we take into the consideration that the consequence of Second World War there is fundamental redrawing of the political map of Europe. In the West, there was no doubt of the victorious powers, Great Britain and United States of America, looking for or having a capacity to force anything on the liberated states. Regardless of, in Western Europe did not quite take on the form of a coalition, liberal democratic systems were soon settled, and not entirely different political thoughts were soon prevailing, in most of the states. Unavoidably this encouraged intergovernmental relations. The most important thought imparted by the governments was one, which stemmed specifically from the East-West division: “a determination to preserve Western Europe from communism” (Nugent, 2006). Not just the Soviet Union had extended its impact far into the European heartland, but in several Western European countries, local communist parties were commanding impressive and considerable support. The United States of America shared this anti-communist concern, and the support and encouragement, which it provided for the West European States after the war to cooperate was partly determined by a belief that such cooperation could have significant impact in serving to terminate the communist development.

A part for the United States of America in Western Europe for that period should not be seen as having been unwelcomed. American aid (General Marshall Plan) was not unwillingly imposed on the states, but rather, was effectively sought. At the same time, the degree of United States impact should not be overstated. By its political, economic and military influence and support the United States did apply integrationist pressures and did help to make a various advancements possible, yet the United States government wanted considerably more Western European interstate cooperation and integration than was to be achieved. Not all politicians or states shared this aspect, but amongst many of those who did it delivered a desire that the voice of Western Europe should be heard on the international stage and a belief that this could be attained just though unity and by speaking with one voice. For several smaller European states, which had infrequently practiced much threatened by larger neighbors, the chances of such cooperation were especially attractive.

At the end of Second World War, the way in which West European governments correspond and relate with each other has been transformed. As a component of this transformation, a key part has been played by new international governmental organizations. The end of World War caused numerous proposals and numerous courses of action have been set in a place, including organized cooperation and integration between the states. Different and more ambitious thought from this approach proposed to bring the entire Western European countries together in some sort of federal union.

Therefore, in spite of the fact, that the logic of circumstances and of political and economic changes has brought the states much more nearly together, there could be hard to say, to have been a shared and rational integrationist and cooperation power at work in the Western European countries in the post-war years. Far from the states being bound together in the pursuit of a common visionary mission, relations between them have generally been highly unstable and uncomfortable, based as they have been on a host of various needs and of diverse views of what is conceivable and necessary. In consequence, the development of cooperation and of integration has operated in various different ways and levels.

To analyze post-Second World War circumstances in Western European countries, the network concept with its starting points in public policy and comparative politics has specific favorable circumstances over other social science endeavors to form concepts of the European Union. Firstly, it is flexible theory and better capable to adapt contradictory empirical historical proof, for instance concerning the comparative conduct by the member countries over policy-making after the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and European Economic Community. A second considerable profitable position of the network concept is its connection with the governance to explain the European Union as a polity. In spite of the fact that networks can satisfy a various of objectives, the attention has been on clarifying public policy-making in domestic or international and supranational structures as a notably casual process if extend partnership and cooperation between different forms of the most transnationally formed actors. The examination of the historical roots of the European Union as a political system decisively needs a practical explanation of the political reality on this constitutional frame. How formal principles have been modeled, modified and supplanted with informal principles in the design of transnational and inter-institutional models of cooperation and decision-making exercised after all by participants joined in transnational social networks. Therefore, the transnational

politico-societal measurement is of principally considerable for the research of the informal politics of the European Union in historical perspective.

## II Chapter: Theoretical research of transition processes in Western European states after the Second World War

It is obvious that Germany's defeat would not automatically lead to the reformation of Europe according to the cooperation and integration. In the brief, exceptional period of general crisis, the classes which were most special under the old nation-state frameworks will endeavor, violently or underhandedly, to extinguish the thirst, the slants, the interests grabbing towards internationalism, and they will garishly start to remake the old state organ. In appearance, these states may well be extensively democratic and socialistic, but it would only be an issue of time before power returned under the control of the reactionaries. Nation-state ideas would again expand and state would again express its fulfillment as its particular presence in its arm strength. The most important obligation would be to change over populaces into armed forces. Officers would again command, syndication holders would again draw benefits from autarchy, the bureaucracy would keep on swelling. All the beginnings of conquests would wilt into nothing, in comparison to the need of again get ready for war. The inquiry which should first be determined, and if it is not then any other advancement made up to that point is insignificant appearance, is that of the termination of the division of Europe into national, sovereign states.

Once the horizon of the "Old Continent" is passed beyond, all the peoples who make up humankind grasp in a great vision of their common participation and cooperation, it must to be perceived that European Federalism was the single possible guarantee that relationships with American and Asiatic people can exist based on peaceful cooperation. This while anticipating a far off future, when the political unity of the whole globe turns into the likelihood. The isolating line between dynamic and reactionary parties no more takes after the formal line of more noteworthy or lesser democracy or of pretty much socialism to be organized, rather the division falls along the line, very new and significant, and that divides the party members into two groups. The primary is comprised of those who perceive of the fundamental purpose and ambition of struggle as the ancient one, that is, the triumph of national political force – and who, although involuntarily, play under the control of reactionary forces, letting incandescent lava of well-known interests set in the old molds and this permitting old ideas to emerge one again. The second are those who see as the fundamental reason the formation of a strong, universal, international state. They will coordinate popular forces

toward this reason, and having won national force, use it first and above all else as an instrument for attainment international unity.

## 2.1 Visions for European unification

Therefore, call for a United Europe drew the consideration of an extensive variety of political activists and leaders. Among those politicians could be distinguished main founders of that idea: Winston S. Churchill, Altiero Spinelli and Jean Monnet.

Consider to the United Europe Churchill delivered speech at Zurich University on 19 September 1946, he started this discourse with the refrain common to all the post second World War integrationist: “Europe must unite before war destroys the continent, its glorious civilization”, and perhaps great part of the rest of the World:

„Yet all the while there is a remedy which, if it were generally and spontaneously adopted by the great majority of people in many lands, would as by a miracle transform the whole scene and would in a few years make all Europe, or the greater part of it, as free and happy as Switzerland is today. What is this sovereign remedy? It is to recreate the European fabric, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, safety and freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe. In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes, which make life worth living. The process is simple. All is needed is to resolve of hundreds of millions of men and women to do right instead of wrong and to gain as their reward blessing instead of cursing“ (Churchill).

He called particularly for a “united states of Europe” drove by Europe’s former antagonist, Germany and France; however, he did not outline a detailed program for attainment unity:

„There is no reason why a regional organization of Europe should in any way conflict with the world organization of the United Nations. On the contrary, I believe that the larger synthesis can only survive if it is founded upon broad natural groupings. There is already a natural grouping in the Western Hemisphere. We British have our own Commonwealth of Nations. These do not weaken, on the contrary they strengthen, the world organization. They are in fact its main support. And why should there not be a European group which could give a sense of enlarged patriotism and common citizenship to the distracted peoples of this mighty continent? And why should it not take its rightful place with other great groupings and help to shape the

honorable destiny of man? In order to accomplish it there must be an act of faith in which the millions of families speaking many languages must consciously take part.

“I am now going to say something that will astonish you. The first step in the re-creation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany. In this way only can France recover the moral and cultural leadership of Europe. There can be no revival of Europe without a spiritually great France and a spiritually great Germany. The structure of the United States of Europe will be such as to make the material strength of a single State less important. Small nations will count as much as large ones and gain their honour by a contribution to the common cause. The ancient States and principalities of Germany, freely joined for mutual convenience in a federal system, might take their individual places among the United States of Europe“ (Churchill).

He disputed powerfully and simply for Europe to receive an ideal to guide its future. Progressively, Churchill appears to exclude Britain from its grand European project: „Our constant aim must be to build and fortify the United Nations Organization. Under and within that world concept we must re-create the European family in a regional structure called, it may be, the United States of Europe, and the first practical step will be to form a Council of Europe. If at first not all the States of Europe are willing or able to join a union, we must nevertheless proceed to assemble and combine those who will and who can. The salvation of the common people of every race and every land from war and servitude must be established on solid foundations, and must be created by the readiness of all men and women to die rather than to submit to tyranny. In this urgent work, France and Germany must take the lead together. Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America - and, I trust, Soviet Russia, for then indeed all would be well - must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe and must champion its right to live“ (Churchill), in this manner an vagueness toward Europe that remains strong in Britain today.

Altiero Spinelli elaborated his federalist vision of European cooperation and integration. His objective was a new Europe composed of individual states that had surrendered their sovereignty to common democratic institutions. It is considerable what made his idea of federalism more than just a definition of a European Federation, however, was his approach for accomplishing a United Europe? In Spinelli's perspective, overcoming resistance from national governments obliged a well-known pan-European movement that requested a United States of America – style

constitutional convention. This constituent assembly would request such democratic legitimacy that national governments would need to acquiesce to its wishes and confirm the new European constitution. Spinelli accepted that just an emotional jump to federalism would succeed in bringing together Europe. Functionalism's gradual approach would never establish institutions sufficiently solid to solve significant issues and democratic enough to make reaction to the people.

What distinguishes Spinelli's way to deal with European federalism from that of its previous supporters is his dedication to transform it into a dynamic and active movement with the political program. That is why his thoughts about a campaign strategy of the United States of Europe, which he had constantly considered as a first stage in the progress of unifying the whole world, are amongst the most essential, if not the most vital commitments for federalism. To outline the fundamental components of these thoughts is, a commitment to a clearer comprehension of the issues of the struggle for European Unification, which is still in process. For the reasons of amalgamation, in this part of the dissertation will be followed a logical rather the sequential or chronological course. Will not be traced the starting points of Spinelli's strategic ideas and concepts, however the fundamental theories that rose up out of his thought and activities. It could be classified as follows:

- the independent way of the development for the European federation;
- the European Constituent Assembly;
- the analysis of the inconsistencies of the functional way to deal with European unification.

The contentions in favor of the autonomy of the movement for the European federation stem from the conviction that the national democratic governments are, at the same time, the methods and the obstructions to European unifications. They are the methods because unification can only be accomplished as a consequence of an uninhibitedly arrived at decisions by democratic governments. This suggests the dismissal of two different ways followed here. Spinelli rejects any endeavors to united Europe by force and against which European federalists fought in the resistance during the Second World War. As an issue of principle he likewise rejects unification by violent and illicit means from below, in light of the fact that the federalist struggle takes place in Western Europe within democratic frameworks, which contribute, legitimate intends for even the most radical change. In addition, such unification comes from the historical development of European democracy.

Whilst European unification could be reached only by the free decisions of democratic national governments, by their very nature they represent hindrance to its achievement. As a direct outcome of the Second World War, which prompted the breakdown of the European nation-states, they are obliged to confront the alternative of “either unite or perish” (Pistone S. , 2014). Yet, at the same time, they are inclined to reject a veritable European federation including the irreversible transfer to significant parts of their sovereignty to a supranational authority.

With regard to this obstacle, one must clear up Spinelli’s important refinement between the permanent agents of executive power and those who handle political power temporarily. The strongest opposition to the transfer of the sovereignty typically originates from the previous in light of the fact that they would suffer immediate and generous loss of power and status. After all, the permanent agents of executive power were initially created to put into effect the unfettered sovereignty of the state and they in this manner turn into the natural protectors of nationalist traditions. For that time, wielders of provisional power, the circumstances were rather more complex for three following reasons:

1. Without permanent positions of power they had much more prominent chances of assuming a part within a more extensive European political framework;
2. They represented democratic parties with international programs which for the most part incorporate support for a European federation;
3. They were in direct touch with public opinion, which in countries suffering from the failure and crisis of the nation-state, was generally profitable to European unification.

This refinement was of great significance in considering procedures for the formation of institutions for European unity. Nevertheless, remains the fact that democratic national governments, by the very nature of their structures, are unfavorably disposed towards federal unification. Without ulterior reasons they were just liable to support the kind of unification which does not include the permanent transfer of power. A direct result from these structural issues: in particular, that the indispensable condition for exercising pressure of political parties and governments in favor of natural federal unification was the presence of an independent movement for a European federation, which had the capacity to convince them in favor of activity they would not, otherwise, take promptly on their own. As indicated by Spinelli, the essential components of such a movement should be:

1. It must not be a political party but rather an organization aimed at uniting all supporters of a European federation, regardless of their social background or political beliefs. “This is because of political party seeking natural power to achieve European unification would be fatally weakened by intending to transfer to supranational institutions substantial parts of the national power for which it would be competing” (Pistone S. , 2014);
2. It must be a supranational organization uniting all federalists beyond their national fidelity, “so as to imbue them with a supranational loyalty and enable them to organize political action at European level” (Pistone S. , 2014);
3. It should seek to set up direct impact on public opinion, outside national electoral campaigns, which would help it to apply powerful pressure of the European policies of governments. “One should remember that this has been the guiding principles of the European federalist movement from its inception in 1943” (Pistone S. , 2014).

The presence of a European federal movement with these attributes speaks to for Spinelli only a subjective condition for viable federalist activity. There was, however, requirement for objective conditions for a fruitful struggle, such as those provided by crisis within national political frameworks.

Spinelli was constantly persuaded that the establishment of European institutions, being depended to representatives of national governments or if they have the last word over the constituent procedure, cannot achieve to federal solutions, on the grounds that the propensity of every single such negotiations will be the protection of absolute national sovereignty at the expense of viable unification. Interestingly, in a constituent assembly, made up of people representing public opinion, a favorable attitude towards federal institutions is likely to be especially more grounded than national propensities. This has several reasons: (1) the considerable greater part of public opinion is agreeable to real unification and its representatives need to make account of this; (2) the parties and the principal democratic political patterns have an international orientation, which would be profitable to a European federation, and would, subsequently it created transnational groups within the European assembly, which was attempting to fortify pro-European attitudes; (3) those representing public opinion do not hold positions of power which are straightforwardly dependent on the maintenance of absolute national sovereignty.

Spinelli designed the concept of a constituent European assembly on the way the first federal constitution in history was drawn up. In particular that of the American constitution, worked out by the Philadelphia Convention in 1787<sup>6</sup>. The example of Philadelphia which, as indicated by him, ought to give the model to a European constituent procedure contains three key components:

1. "Governments of individual states have the basic responsibility for initiating the process by conferring the constituent mandate upon the convention, but refrain from interfering in its deliberation;
2. The convention acts by majority votes in drawing up the constitution;
3. the ratification of the constitution is entrusted to the appropriate constitutional organs of individual states, and it comes into force once ratified by a majority of them" (Pistone S. , 2014)

All through his federalist campaign, Spinelli never terminated to press for the reception of a constituent procedure of these lines. One needs to stress that for him the bottom line lay not in the structure but rather the substance of the procedure, to be specific to give the last word on the constitutional project to a parliamentary assembly. During the several stages, particularly after the Second World War, of his campaign he proposed different types of political activity, each adjusted to prevailing circumstances, to advance the constituent procedure:

1. a constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage with the sole mandate of drawing up a European constitution;
2. the transformation of the consultative parliamentary assembly into a constituent one, either by its own action or by mandate conferred upon it by national governments; (Pistone S. , 2014)

Spinelli's constituent concept originated from his belief that the functional approach to deal with European unification will not accomplish significant and irreversible unity. He never shared the conviction of the supporters of the functional approach that one can incorporate selected sectors of national activity without a federalist constitutional framework from the very beginning. Furthermore, this for two key reasons:

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<sup>6</sup> The Federal Convention, took place from May 25 to September 17, 1787 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to address problems in governing the United States of America, which had been operating under the Articles of Confederation following independence from Great Britain

1. By declining to begin with a supranational authority of a democratic feature, the principle of the national veto is retained. This would deny European institutions of the ability to overcome exceptional interests that that emerge from the activity of unfettered national sovereignty, and to guarantee the supremacy of the common European interest;
2. The inability and anarchy, which developed from the absence of common management of the free economies of advanced states and of their external and defense policies.

Monnet's specific strategy for uniting Europe by economic integration has constrained political scholars to be wary while attaching a specific name to him. While Spinelli was without inquiry the outstanding European federalist of the contemporary period, Monnet has been characterized overwhelmingly as the premier functionalist and only infrequently as an incremental federalist (Pinder J. , 1986). Spinelli's own particular criticism of Monnet's strategy have without a doubt committed to this to some degree obscured circumstance however it is likewise due to the numerous theoretical contentions which continue to encompass the idea of transferring from functionalism to constitutionalism, or as Spinelli suggested, to affirm the political element. The main purpose of his thought were fleshed out to acknowledge a substantive assemblage of consistent and associated themes and convictions which together place him in a tradition of political belief about European unity extending back several centuries. The overall purpose was peace at the same time, with a specific end goal to accomplish it, Monnet tried to change the nature of international relations by modifying the relations between peoples: "to unite men, to solve the problems that divide them, and to persuade them to see their common interest" (Monnet, 1978). The crucial issue for Monnet always remained the same: in what capacity people could be persuaded to approach the problem similarly, and to see that their goals are common. He expected to change men's attitudes by converting the very purposes behind their contention which implied a radical change of the political setting in which the contentions were traditionally set (Monnet, 1978).

Having elaborated the thought of transforming the setting inside of which conventional problems between states were generally found, Monnet was constrained to give that context a strong structure. Institutional advancement addressed the call for new activity. Monnet's confidence in the estimation of new standards and institutions was, similar to that of Spinelli, distinctive and profound established. The expectations,

which formed Monnet's approach to European integration, were the functional depreciation of the state; the threat of nationalism; the necessity to change the imperative of problems; and the requirement for new institutions with which to maintain the common interest. He also considered in what he called "a certain disorder" (Monnet, 1978) for national elites to be prepared to make the sort of settlements that they would not normally make under ordinary circumstances.

After this, Monnet appears to have been a proponent of federation while never having been a federalist. The key to comprehending the relation between federalism and European integration lies in Monnet's predictable way to federation, which remains the cause of proceeding dispute today: to be specific, the conviction that by creating particular functional connections between states in a way that does not specifically challenge national sovereignty, the ways to federation will be gradually open. These supposed functional connections were economic activities and they expressed in the initiative of the European Coal and Steel Community. This new type of sectoral supranational organization would be the establishment of the European federation, which would expand only gradually to connect with national elites in a process of common economic interest.

The exceptional clear clarification of how Monnet saw the way to federation contains the aspect of what afterwards came to the major theoretical contention about federalism and European integration.

Consequently, Spinelli acknowledged – unification could begin with successful and effective supranational powers being initially restrained to economic issues, while postponing their immediate maintenance in matters of external and security policies. Furthermore, this from the consideration that convergence in the latter sectors was at that point being affected by American leadership, however he generally focused on the requirement for genuine federal institutions which would guarantee the definitive augmentation of supranational powers from economic to external and defense policies. That is the reason he never stopped to demand on the constitutional approach, instead of the functional one, by requiring for a federal constitution from the beginning, acquired by a democratic constituent procedure. Spinelli's criticism of the functional method was not kept to a rationalistic and dogmatic preference for the constitutional approach. Initially he was certainly aware that the functional approach stemmed largely from the contradictory nature of the positions of national governments to European unification. As detached historical circumstances drive them to confront the

requirement for supranational unification, whilst they oppose giving up their sovereignty, it is common that they choose that an approach that postpones uncertainly the foundation of an authentic supranational authority. At the same time he perceived that, the functional approach may assist the constitutional process by uncovering the disagreements of the past that negatively affected on the federalist struggle. The confusion, which Spinelli ascribed to Monnet, was intrinsic in the functional methodology, which failed to deal with the organization of political power at the European level (Spinelli). This implied that the political center remained weak, without the ability to go much beyond what already existed and not able to adjust to new issues and forces experienced at the European level. Here the center moved to the role of the European institutions. For Monnet, institutions were essential however; his perception contrasted to some degree from Spinelli's in the scope to which he viewed their improvement as much the same as natural development emerging directly out of functional conduct.

## **2.2. Theorizing European integration and cooperation after the World War Two**

Academic research of the post-Second World War period in the Western Europe has extended to significant levels. The first level concentrated principally on the comparative influences of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism in clarifying the way of integration (Moravcsik, 1993). Currently, a new level of theorizing has needed to link European Union processes and consequences to expand examples of politics and considerable theoretical customs. Researches created from the theoretical expectations of realistic decision institutionalism can be put in this level, as can researches from the context of comparative federalism, and in addition those expressing on constructivist theory.

Talking about integration and cooperation hypothesis it is not exceptional, but rather more contested is an issue of how the hypothetical approaches relate with one another. There are two aspects of this issue. The primary identifies with the development of theories and the movement from one prevailing approach to another, and seen as a contribution to the history of European integration and cooperation studies. The second is concerned with the fit of theories, and is subsequently a contribution to theory- assembling in itself. Starting with the historical approach, "there are two factors that are often seen as influencing the development of theories, the academic and the sociopolitical context" (Rosamond, 2000). The scholastic context comprises of problems and debates that are pursued in the more extensive scientific

context of a specific field and in addition the legacies of past debates in the field itself. Of specific significance in this context are “paradigms that provide researchers with guideposts about how to conduct and present their studies” (Kuhn, 1964). The sociopolitical context, conversely, comprise of elements outside of academia, for example, the advancement and development of the object under analysis, the impact of sponsors on research agendas, or the discursive restrictions set by a specific political climate.

There are three fundamental functions of theory:

1. Theory as clarification of comprehension – “Although explaining and understanding approaches differ widely in the epistemological claims they make, and consequently in the methodologies they apply” (Hollis and Smith, 1990), they share a typical reason in the sense that they inquire how or why an event has happened. To that term, “they ask for reasons and causes for something to happen” (Smith, 2000). They diverge essentially in relation to the extent to which they consider their arguments generalizable or dependent on particular contexts, warranting various methodologies. The approaches in the first stage of integration theory, after the Second World War, have asked these sorts of questions, and most of them have learned towards the explanation variant.
2. Theory as analysis and definition – this may at first appear like a waste-bin category, however it is definitely not. Approaches in this category concentrate on the development of definitions and concepts with which to grasp specific improvements, practices, and institutions. They contribute classifications and labels. In that sense, understanding and clarifying approaches have to presuppose analytical and detailed approaches, in light of the fact that, the latter provide the previous with the concepts on the grounds of which events can be understood or clarified. Besides, “and underlying theory is an important part of any classificatory exercise” (Grigorevich, 1996).
3. Theory as critique and normative interventions - while approaches in the initial two classifications take the advancement of integration and cooperation pretty much as a given, different approaches address the route that the integration process, or a specific policy, has taken, or created principles and norms for the future of cooperation and integration. Either approaches in this category subsequently problematize a given development, or they create and develop normative alternatives.

Not only the purpose of theory that varies, as well as the area, or the object of specific approaches. Analyzing first member states integration policy is not the same, it is distinct from, although related to reflecting on the best institutional set-up for the European Community, and thus may be require a various methodology. These areas of theory are independent dimension on which theoretical approaches can contrast from one another:

1. Theory dealing with polity – incorporates to the political group and its institutions. Approaches falling into this classification would be those analyzing the way of the beast, those clarifying how the European Community’s institutional structure occurred, or those attempting to discover constitutional alternatives on the premise of normative considerations, to give cases taken from all three elements of theory.
2. Theory dealing with policy – incorporates the actual measures taken to handle specific problems, and theoretical approaches in this area compare and analyze their substance, or critically reflect upon them. This includes perspectives such as “policy style, the general problem – solving approach, the policy instruments used, and the policy standards set” (Richardson, 2006).
3. Theory dealing with politics – involves the process of policy – making and the daily struggles and strategies of political actors dealing with one another. It is about the negotiations between governments, the impact of specific interests groups, or the predominance of a particular style of how decisions are reached.

Two constitutive terms should be characterized. Firstly, Integration. One of the most influential neofunctionalist integration theorist once described integration as a process “whereby political actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas E. B., 1958). This is a broad definition, which incorporates both a political process and a social process. Not all scholars would combine both aspects in their definition, and there are reasons why Haas, from his point of view, underlines the social components of integration.

A less demanding definition offered by intergovernmentalists, originating from a various point of view inside of the range of integration theory, concentrates rather all the more narrowly on the formulation of political institutions to which member states

subscribe. For an overview of integration theories as the present volume endeavors to provide, demanding scope of both Political and social integration would have been far too demanding and would have prompted the exclusion of theoretical approaches otherwise seen as a fundamental to the debate. Secondly theory: Again, comprehension contrasts and it should be endorsed a definition that permits to incorporate a more extensive scope of approaches. Narrowly characterized, “theory is understood as a causal argument of universal, trans-historical validity and nomothetic quality, which can be tested through the falsification of a series of hypotheses” (Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, 1970). They utilize theory in a rather loose sense of abstract reflection, which in spite of its conceptual nature can in any case be context-specific, for example by taking its purpose of departure in the thought of a specific policy field of the European Community. To make this point clearer, it serves to consider that theory fills contrasting purposes. Some theoretical approaches clarify policy results or decision-making behavior, others problematize or criticize general patterns on the premise of abstract consideration; some fit specific developments into a larger classificatory scheme, others pursue to provide normative guidance. For every situation, theory means something else: Various theoretical ways to European integration are informed by different classifications of the purpose and meaning of theorizing. To distinguish these different understandings from the narrow explanation of theory defined above, in the dissertation we use the term “integration theory” while we theorize the process at the start period of the Western European integration and cooperation. And we use the term “theoretical approaches” when it refers to the individual ways of dealing with integration and cooperation. They all contribute to the reflection on European integration, cooperation and governance and not singularly concerned with the advancement of specific policies.

Legitimately through, one may wonder whether Puchala’s cynical prediction that integration theory will sum to “a rather long but not very prominent footnote in the intellectual history of twentieth century social science will prove as accurate as the author would have us believe” (J.Puchala, 1984). A first reaction is that theory matters, whether its capabilities and conceptual finding are to be evenly appreciated by practitioners and researchers alike. For nature with theory helps to exercise our analytical methods and estimate their combination in real life situations. As Taylor declares it: “Each theory...leads to unique insights which are valid starting points for the purpose of comparison and evaluation” (Taylor P. , 1971). Or, Keohane and Hoffmann describes it: “Attempts to avoid theory...not only miss interesting questions

but rely on the framework for analysis that remains unexamined precisely because it is implicit” (Hoffmann, 1990). In this way Church states, “Awareness of theory is a necessary ground-clearing measure” (Church, 1996). As long as theory-building activities stay at the highest point of the academic agenda, there are good bases for thinking that important opportunities are deemed to be analyzed. Rosamond clarifies: “Theorizing intellectualizes perceptions. It is not that theory just helps us to identify that which is significant” (Rosamond B. , 2000). As Groom claims: “Theory is an intellectual mapping exercise which tells us where we are now, from where we have come and to where we might go” (Groom, 1990). However, more than that, theory is a means of connecting “the order of ideas to the order of events” (Urger, 1975), without being established simply in response to the latter. Church asserts “Theories have a life of their own related not just to what happens outside but to general intellectual changes, and, especially, to who supports them and why. Political commitment and self-interest like academic investment all play a part in keeping theories going in altered circumstances. Hence theories keep re-appearing and debate between them is continuous” (Church, 1996). Substantive progress in the field requires the descriptive or transcendence of purely narrative approaches about the form and capacities – dynamics and structure – of the regional framework, and the settlement of establishment. This requires “structured ways of understanding changing patterns of interaction” (Church, 1996), free from the naturally divided boundaries of microanalysis, and additionally a macroscopic projection of integration based on systematic conceptual explanations. Church outlines: “We need to be aware of the conceptions we use since they determine our perceptions of things” (Church, 1996). The classic instance of this controversy is found in Allison’s influential *Essence of Decision*: “different conceptual lenses lead analysts to different judgments about what is relevant and important” (Allison, 1971). As it would turn out, Hamlyn reminds us, “one cannot get at reality except from within some system of concepts” (Hamlyn, 1995). Groom acquiesce: “our conceptualization does...give a context to the activities of practitioners and provides them with an opportunity of learning from the experience of others...And different projections show us different worlds so that we may find what we are looking for in the sense that we impose meaning on “facts” rather than speaking for themselves. There is a sense in which one can be pragmatic, but behind every pragmatic approach lies a theory of conceptualization - no matter how inchoate. All social activity requires choice and that choice cannot be exercised without some criteria for judgment - in short, a theory, a conception, a framework (Groom, 1990). This methodological pathway offers a higher

access to reality and the conceptual infrastructure from which “a hierarchy of realities might emerge” (Taylor P. , 1971). The hypothesis in the later example is that a continuity of available knowledge domains may connect a distance between the analyze of particular issue areas or the comprehension of collective conduct and the making of exact political choices. Consequently, important connections will be built up between knowledge evaluation and knowledge acquisitions in the process of theorizing the regional system: integration theory might be seen as a system of interdependent ideas and principles, connections between practices and concepts, as well as relationships between wholes and parts of, on the other hand, between particulars and universals. However there exist considerable variety in the way in which scholars of integration theory ascribe distinctive interpretations and meanings to concepts whose exploration anyway stays decisive and important for furthering comprehension of what the European Community really was and how it was actually operated after the Second World War. Additionally, there are those interested in the wider picture; others who expect to capture just part of the overall image; others who concentrate on the connections among different realities; and others who focus all the further on the process of theorizing and its fundamental dialectics and antinomies. As Rosamond tellingly composes: “Theories are necessary if we are to produce ordered observations of social phenomena” (Rosamond B. , 2000). This perspective is in full harmony with Stoker’s understanding of the uses of theory in the social sciences, in that “Theories are of value precisely because they structure all observations” (Stoker, 1995).

There are different methods of analyzing an interdisciplinary object of study - disputable as many as the constitutive contents of theory that create it. Since the beginning of the European integration process, researchers have applied several approaches to advance a better comprehension of what the more extensive institution looked like in the various phases of its evolution. Yet, Church writes, “there has been no resolution of theoretical enterprise” (Church, 1996). It is obvious, regardless of the numerous promising theoretical departures throughout years, only a couple concrete theoretical arrivals have been accomplished. Drawing on the genealogy of the European Community theory – generation - its intellectual setting distinctive customs of international theory, connected with the meso-theorizing of comparative and public policy analysis appear to have depleted the analytical range within which the study of European integration could be advantageous. Particularly if one subscribes to Rosamond’s optimism about the state of theorizing in the field:

“There is no doubt that integration theory is in a good state of health. It was not always so, and the recent phase of theoretical reflexivity and innovation owes much to the spillover into European Union studies of creative thinking across the political sciences...European integration may well be a totally unique enterprise without either historical precedent or contemporary parallel, but it is a ready source for comparative study in some of the most emerging and lively social science currently going on” (Rosamond B. , 2000).

Despite, however, the “comparativists turn in European studies” (Hix, 1994), “intergovernmentalism – or modified schemes of state centrism such as confederance, co-operative confederalism and confederal consociation (Church, 1996) - has survived the tides of regional territorial centralization. An essential implication from this is that the European Union political system has not built up its own sovereignty with the perspective to transcending the sovereignty of its parts, in opposition to prior neofunctionalism expectations. The present interaction between coordinated interdependencies and diffused political authority proposes that the European Community, in spite of the fact that it has since quite a while ago exceeded mere international organization status, is not a piece of a direct process toward a federal end. Fairly, its working arrangements are about the protection of those state qualities that would permit the subunits to survive as distinctive polities, while drawing themselves in a process of polity construction that converts their customary patterns of interaction. In both political and historical terms, such a process amounts to the qualitative – structural – transition of a system of independent states into the most developed scheme of peaceful and voluntary regional integration the world has ever witnessed, without carrying with it the supposition of the end of the nation-state.

The joining together distinguished political units through an institutionalized concession and an informal culture of consensus-establishing at the highest political degree - all of which relate to the European Community’s consociation nature – is a piece of a more extensive advancement that represents no direct challenge to the constitutional conditions of state sovereignty. This period procured a new cooperative dynamic through intensive formal and informal synergy within most advanced institutionalized frameworks: “it is by no means subsumed either by a new political center, or by a new hierarchy, where the dominant form of regulation is authoritative rule” (Hoffmann, 1990), or even by the semi-governmental structure “that approximates a realistic image of a modern state” (Hoffmann, 1990). European Community’s logic of

power-sharing is best clarified through a theory of institutional assignment - sovereignty distribution or through a federal delivery of state powers – sovereignty transmission, the most convincing confirmation for the absence of a European sovereignty is that the member publics are perceived as sovereign only in the scope of their national spheres.

It is obvious, that schemes of supranational integration were of significant potential during the transformation years of the process, commanding the internal policy sphere of the then Community. Later, however, such patterns were supplanted by a more balanced relationship between the Community's expansionist desires and intergovernmental realities. That was the introduction of what has been described – transition stage prompting to The Hague Congress of May 1948, in turn hailed as a first serious and significant dependence of integration after a time of hard intergovernmentalism. Well-known as the Congress of Europe, this was an assembly of delegates of political organizations, comprising 750 representatives from 16 countries, focused to both European cooperation and integration. It adopted various resolutions calling for a European Union or federation with its own institutions, monetary union, a common market and a charter of human rights connected to a European court. This congress brought forth to the European Movement, an expansive based national federation of groups committed to the reason for European integration. This meeting was expected to give the initiative expected needed to move the entire towards more, higher level of integration, while additionally going about as a defensive mechanism for sensitive, and frequently non-negotiable, national interests. These advancements signaled the beginning of what Taylor outlined as the “Second Europe”: a qualitatively distinctive stage from the pre-1945 one, defined by a rather moderate form of intergovernmentalism as a method for advancing integration. The final result of this phase - itself a compromised structure between consociational, confederal and federal governance – anticipated a harmonious courses of action between regional and domestic dynamics.

As a result, it is possible to say, that many various periods of integration and subsequent theories committed to their clarification point to the supposition that the polity of the European Community after the Second World War, as noticeable from a regional state or, contrary, from a classical unification of states, resembled an asymmetrical synthesis of academic disciplines. As an outcome, several points of view on the role and impact of state or central institutions have turned into sited of

intellectual contestation. Writing on the expanding antithesis between institutionalists and intergovernmentalists, Purchala has noticed, that “European Community theorizing “has evolved into a full scale, hard-fought debate...with contenders jumping upon one another’s attributed weaknesses while disregarding one another’s insights” (J.Puchala, 1984). Quite earlier, Lindberg came to a quite similar outcome: “As a contributor to the European integration literature I have more come to feel as if I were excavating a small, isolated portion of a large, dimly-perceived mass, the contours of which I could not make out. I know that there are others digging there too, for I can sometimes hear them, but we seldom meet or see each other, and we have seldom organized so as to combine our efforts” (Lindberg L. , 1967). This is a reflective what Jorgensen calls “my discipline is my castle and looks like the sort of tribalism depicted by Krudsen in his portrait of “the parochial scholar” in European Union studies: “so my project has been, in part, an imperfect search through a jungle of small specialties in different disciplines. Most of us are in reality victims of this kind of incomplete communication...The European tendency is for each specialist to stick to his own corner” (Knudsen, 1991). Bulmer declared quite similar concern: “We may end up with a bewildering set of policy cases explained by a further array of analytical frameworks so that the big picture of integration is lost from view” (Bulmer, 1997). Pentland provided a rather diverse point of view, by establishing the case against the integration of integration theory: “it would seem potentially more useful to identify, acknowledge and sharpen the fundamental differences between various approaches, so that they can be tested through confrontation in the empirical world. Through this procedure scholars may in time converge on the most useful approach...by drawing the disorderly connection of approaches we now have into recognizable lines of battle, we can at least suggest where the most important point of contact will be” (Pentland, 1973).

European integration theory is along these lines the field of systematic reflection on the process of enhancing and promoting political cooperation in Europe and the development of common political institutions, as well as on the result. It likewise incorporates the theorization of changing developments of characters and interests of social actors in the context of this process.

### **2.2.1. Principal Theoretical Tools of Cooperation and Integration after the Second World War in Western Europe**

Bellow will be examined intellectual methods employed by cooperation and consolidation theorists to analyze the incipient structures of the Community system at the starting point of cooperation and integration. The research was knowledgeable by a

process-driven awareness of the essence of integration. Here, the convenience of neofunctionalist and functionalist theory gets to be apparent. Equally crucial, on the other hand, is to estimate the suggestion of federalist theory to an various point of view of integration that set the accentuation on the final result of the process – a formal constitutional settlement. Transnationalism is also of significance to this first wave of theorizing, for it yielded important and valuable vision into the process of international community-formation. Nevertheless their specific concerns with description, clarification and expectation, these theories have added to the scope of insightful and creative theorizing about international integration, while setting the scene for consecutive discourses on Europe.

### **2.2.2. Functionalism Approach**

Functionalism indicates to clarify why collective action is specific, functionality connected areas of cooperation is a more attractive choice to unilateral state activity: group involvement in peaceful problem solving, supported by the vital specialized expertise, emanates as a genuine choice for human governance. Nationalism and international chaos are dealt as the sources for the division of the world into competing territorially centered groups, making obstacles to the creation of a working peace system through the advancement of public welfare. Mitrany clarifies: “peace will not be secured if we organize the world by what divides it” (Mitrany D. , *A Working Peace System*, 1966). The functionalists cure was non-coercive international community-formation centered on the determination of human conflict and the fulfillment of fundamental welfare needs through a smooth – running reasonable technocracy that would rise above any dogmatic territorial considerations; what Pentland outlined “the self-perpetuating jealousies of the nation-state system” (Pentland, 1973). Rosamond concludes the functionalist proposal: “throughout his work, Mitrany declared himself to be an adamant social scientist and thought his purpose to be the avoidance of normative dogma in the production or prescriptions for future human governance...For Mitrany, the starting point should not be a question about the ideal for of international society, but about what its essential functions should be” (Rosamond B. , 1999). According to Taylors point of view, Mitrany’s comprehension of the integrative dynamic “is the learning process of citizens who are gradually drawn into the co-operative ethos created by functionality specific international institutions devoted to the satisfaction of real welfare needs” (Taylor P. , 1975). At the level of individuals, this signifies that “creative association in...problem-solving provides a learning situation in which participants are gradually weaned away from their allegedly irrational nationalistic impulses toward a

self-reinforcing ethos of cooperation” (Pentland, 1995). Connected to this elaborate activity process is an idea of integration, where individuals progress a more extensive awareness of their shared interests and are ready to exchange their loyalties, though function-by-function, to common institutions. More significant perhaps is the implied normative suspicions that “there is - or ought to be – no political loyalty which transcends the sum of functional loyalties” (Pentland, 1995). More, the relationship between community and functionalism, in Tonnies’s “sense of the term” (Tonnies, 1974), was not expressly determined by Mitrany or other similar functionalists. However, Haas has contended, “it is precisely our hope that functional sociology can show how society can develop into, whilst nothing that community is immanent in the evolutionary logic of action process” (Haas E. , 1964). The premise of the functionalist hypothesis advocates that as individuals will gradually relate with the problem-solving ability of the new agencies, a well-known consensus will arise on what functions ought to be performed by the latter and what need ought to be served first. The following logical step includes the improvement of habits of cooperative interactions among individuals that would demonstrate, close by the functionalist reorganization of international society, “a sense of the whole” (Pentland, 1995).

The process of social learning, attitudinal transform and community development by functional association - directed against outmoded types of state governance – is assisted by what is called management committee government, reflecting Mintary’s doubt of classical assembly controls or government by politicians over complex policy-making. Guided by the mission to observe nearly for the connection of things, Mintary’s political science presents the case for supplanting old-style, non-specialist assemblies by new types of representation and methods for obtaining control such as functional assemblies consisted of experts whose technical awareness would ensure more prominent and better productivity in supervising governmental activities. In the functional theory of politics he repeats that “no one would share in power who did not share in responsibility and that the functional structure could be made a union of peoples...directly concerned in any specific function, by giving them functional representation” (Mitrany D. , 1975). Mitrany's fundamental justification was that, “in acquiring formal representative status, also assume a corresponding democratic responsibility” (Mitrany D. , 1975). Most likely this type of democracy - named by Mitrany’s as “working democracy”, instead of voting democracy – is seen by those who identify Parliament as the focal point of public responsibility as a main obstacle to prevention to build up notions of responsible and representative government. It

represents a model of politics arranged in the middle technocracy and democracy, where the art of government is separated from any rigid adherence to set a political ideology: “the central tenet of Mitrany’s conception is a kind of pragmatic or service politics which, although it does not dispense with the idea of power, focuses more on the welfare functions of administration and the peaceful settlement of social conflicts” (Eastby, 1985).

Concerning the functionalist conception of union, it is a piece of an evolutionary process of accomplishing functionally particular objectives, and not of a deterministic circumstance leading, necessarily or immediately, towards a federal state or even a state like substance. Like other various theories of integration and cooperation, the end remains purposely obscure, albeit some type of a larger, but flexible, constitutional framework should not be dismissed. When explanation behind this is that, as indicated by Mitrany’s philosophy, form follows function, is that the real needs of the integrative system will define the structural properties of the larger unit: “the nature of each function tells precisely the range of jurisdiction and the powers needed for its effective performance” (Mitrany D. , 1966). Despite the Mitranian perspective of technocratic social Building, it would be false to accept that his theory distinguishes federalism as a homogenizing power disintegrating national identity and diversity. In addition, Mitrany saw a federation as a rigid political course of action and a sort of political organization that could increase, as opposed to rise above, existing social divisions, by ending up in a territorial realignment, which would likewise recreate, at a more extensive scale, a territorially designated authority. This line of thinking is connected to Mitrany’s doubt of an supposedly irrational, obsolete and dysfunctional nation-state, and additionally to a general impression of integration as: “the gradual overlaying and eventual elimination of the state –system by an administrative network which better serves human needs in what is assumed to be an emergent global community” (Pentland, 1995). As Mitrany declared as early as 1932: “that we are going through a crisis in political outlook is evident: one cannot put it down to a decline in political fervor, like the decline in religion, for the surge towards the good society and so the wrestling with politics is more than ever with us. Rather the crisis is one of political confusion...from trying to work an epochal change in social direction with the outworn ways and forms of the individualist-nationalist period” (Mitrany D. , 1932)

The key idea and concept of the functionalist method is recognized in the impression of a common interest and an affinity to non-coercive factors of rationalist

problem solving. Specialized bodies like the various United Nation particular agencies are good examples in point. Specialized cooperative courses of action were seen as basic for Europe to build up the important and necessary machinery to deliver common policy, not slightest because of the turbulent 1930s and 1940s. Along these lines, the quest of common tasks was connected from the start to the establishment of international institutions possessing an obligation of their own, however limited in scope. As Kitzinger declares, the main difference between functionalists and federalists was that whereas the former were preoccupied with defining the general interest first, and then finding common answers to common problems, the latter sought joint action as a means for obtaining more effective central institutions (Kitzinger U. , 1973). As an outcome, the functionalists looked for “to set up only that minimum of political institutions that was indispensable in order to direct the common action that was most urgently required” (Kitzinger U. , 1973). Supranationalism as applied in a particular regional setting producing a higher centre, is seen as a source of recreating nationalism beyond the state. Mitrany treated this thought with suspicion due to its weakness to support a conflict-free mode of transnational order.

Functional integration does not propose the formation of sovereignty; rather, by endeavoring to eschew politics, as far as depoliticizing mutual issues as opposed to being naturally apolitical in itself, it introduces no immediate threat to state sovereignty. In fact, states keep on existing as identifiable entities. Taylor clarifies: “the functionalist approach, indeed, allows the view that there is no point at which the state would necessarily lose its sovereignty, in the sense the power would now need to be finally transferred, or that the state would lose its legal right to act, if it so wished, against the wishes of the functional agency” (Taylor P. , 1983)

The functional imperative, as the fundamental law governing the evolution of the integration process, denied the inevitability of constitutional necessities and altered divisions of authority, rather concentrating on problems which, in spite of the fact that they cannot really be overlooked, cannot be solved independently by each government acting alone – “hence a unitary trap” (Albertini M. , 1990).

There seems to be globalizing, combined impact in the functionalism thesis: once problems are perceived as common and problem solving of this issues may emerge from shared rational considering, there is an inclination of broadening such cooperative conduct to other relevant spheres of activity. Does Mitrany’s logic avoid being trapped in the area of conventional politics, where preferences and interests are largely shaped

by customary party political discussion and electoral considerations? The answer is that, despite its concentration on technical self-determination, Mitrany's theory does not usually avoid arguments of such kind. International institution – building depends on the need of the system, as opposed to the preferred lines of state activity according to narrowly assumed territorial interests. Such is the absolute opposite between nationalism and functionalism that Pentland proposes that the “integration of mankind will thus come about not through, above or beyond, but despite, the nation-state” (Pentland, 1995).

However it is not always simple to distinguish between territorial and non-territorial politics in European Community's history, especially when a various of actors were pursuing their own advantage and were motivated by several culturally characterized and historically diverse customs. On a basic level, not “apolitical” but “aterritorial” is an appropriate term to outline Mitrany's functionalism, which is initially a theory about the functions of international society grounded on the concept of technical self-determination, dependence on non-coercive means of extensive - scale community establishing and an apprehension of formal constitution making. Mitrany's fundamental concern was how to replace and transcend territorially based frameworks of decision-making with task-oriented international functional institutions, leading towards an integrated system: a worldwide society working on the premise of an “interwoven network of cross-national organizations...meeting all human needs and responding to technological change” (Mitrany D. , 1975)

### **2.2.3. Federalist Approach**

Federalism is more pertinent to the study of integration and cooperation than is frequently recognized. owing to its accentuation on inbuilt democratic arrangements connecting distinctive levels of governmental authority; its regularly flexible interpretation of the sovereignty principle; its concentration on constitutionalism and the security of collective and individual freedoms; its accentuation on legislative representation inside of multipolar structure and the allocation of responsibilities among distinctive policy areas; and its more profound concern about how to coordinate in a commonly reinforcing way the concurrent requests for unity in diversity. However, either federalism does not emerge from a single corpus of theory or from a grand constitutional configuration that can be transplanted starting with one federal system then onto the next without losing its internal relevance. There may be diverse

but alike federal properties in a federal polity that should be found in a more extensive symbiotic perspective – the coexistence of distinct but constitutive units.

It is true, that the federalist movement was prominent during the starting period of European integration process, but it is not the case, as some scholars have asserted, that it petered out in 1954, when the innovative projects for a European Political Community and a European Defense Community collapsed. To acknowledge this interpretation would be to distort the history of the post-war federalist movement. It proposes that their impact was merely transitory when in reality it showed a strong continuity of thought and practice all through the ensuing half-century. “The appeal of the federal idea to many Europeans can be located in both the threat of war and the practical experience of the Second World War” (Burgess, 1989). It was a great extent among the member of the anti-fascist Europeans Resistance that the federal idea was initially nurtured as the solution to Europe’s post-war destination. For them the defeat of Germany was just the first step. “It offered a golden opportunity for European to return to fundamental questions and the ferment of political ideas and discussions about the role of federalism in post-war European integration was clearly established in the various plans of European union that were drawn up in the years between 1939 and 1945” (Lipgens, 1982). Of course it is important to mention that, as any other theoretical approaches, federalism also incorporated numerous fundamentally distinctive conceptions of Europe and divergent political strategies about how to accomplish what was extensively thought of as a “Federal Europe”. Immediately after the Second World War, the European nation states regrouped and re-created themselves, in this manner effectively rejecting federation as the solution to European unity. Nonetheless, if it is real that the Resistance programme – and the spiritual revolution that is symbolized – was effectively abandoned and defeated by the conservative rehabilitation of the immediate post-war years, the federal idea did not disappear with it. Despite what might be expected, it survived in the plethora of influential interest groups that sprouted across Western Europe after 1945 and it was vivaciously sustained in the European Union of Federalists<sup>7</sup> (EUF). Indeed, one researcher has noticed that “in 1948 in France alone there were 17 European federalist groups” (Greilsammer, 1979), and it was during the late 1940s that prestigious federalists started to formulate highly elaborate federalists doctrines which were, in the end, to have impact in the ideological split in the European Union of Federalists during

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<sup>7</sup> Founded in Basle in December 1946

1950s. Contending political strategy of Jean Monnet who become Spinelli's great opponent in the deliberated post-war drive to champion a federal Europe, who was continually believing that the political strategy of concrete, small economic steps would culminate in a federal Europe.

Lot of different definitions were recorded last years, meaning of federalism - the formal interpretation of federal concepts in the organization of the polity - are less advantageous. Elazar and his research group have performed a helpful service by characterizing federation as "a compound polity compounded of strong constituent entities and a strong general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the people and empowered to deal directly with the citizenry in the exercise of those powers" (Elazar D. J., 1994). In this line, goal of the federalism is to harmonize the parallel requirements for more prominent political union - However necessarily unity - of the entire and sufficient guarantee for the parts; or, "unity without uniformity and diversity without anarchy" (Watts, 1981). Along this lines, the appropriateness of federal arrangements "would appear to lie in those instances where the existence and vigour of the forces that press both for wider unity and for autonomous regional diversity are relatively balanced" (Watts, 1981). Striking equality between shared rule and self-governance turns into the strongest motivation for federal cohesion; itself a preliminary condition federations to endure the test of time. As Forsyth describes, federal structures "establish a union but they simultaneously guarantee autonomy, and they fix or settle ratio or balance between the two" (Forsyth M. , 1995). Alternatively, as Robinson outlines it: "Federalism is based on the existence of regional differences and recognizes the claims of the component areas to perpetuate their individual characters" (Robinson, 1961). Watts notes the significance of distinguishing between "operational reality" and "constitutional form" and concentrating on both politics and the law of a federation in order to explain and understand the federal process, for in numerous federations "political practice has transformed the way the constitution operates" (Watts, 1999). At the same time, he makes a point that, although some federal constitutions recognize non-territorial constituent entity, "the constitutional distribution of power among territorial units is by far the most common pattern among federations" (Watts, 1999). In any case, democratic representation turns into a crucial factor for the political feasibility of federal systems. This declaration additionally outlines the significance of accommodating territorial and non-territorial assertion in incipient federal structures operating nearby the classical nation-state such as the

union, taking into account frameworks of mutual management across an ever-consuming scope of policy arenas.

Furthermore, “the representation of the people, either as a whole or as parts becomes the prior object of the federation” (King, 1993). What is special about federations, King mentions, “is not that the people are viewed as sovereign, but that the expression of this sovereignty is tied to the existence and entrenchment of regional, territorial entities” (King, 1993). In fact, “one of the characteristics of federalism that flows from its popular base is the reduction of the question of political sovereignty to an incidental one”, with the federal principle turning into “an alternative to the idea of sovereignty” (Elazar D. J., 1987). Hence, there are two conceivable but not contradictory ways of perceiving the people: as united and as diverse; a duality which “for the life of the federation, is implicitly inexpugnable” (King, 1993). In both equations, however, it is a federal people as a whole, rather than principally the dominant political elites representing the interest of each constituent entity, which is to be dealt by the central arrangements. Despite the fact that federations “represents a particular species in which neither the federal nor the constituent units of government are constitutionally subordinate to each other” (Watts, 1999), they include considerable variation in purposes, traditions, identities, patterns of symmetry, resources, mechanisms for conflict resolution, power-sharing arrangement , constitutional revision, as well as in the means of securing the constitution. Yet, democratic representation of all sections emanates as a typical defining property. The crucial point here is less about making direct connections between various levels of government, but rather about setting up reachable and concrete avenues of connections among the federal people and the central political institutions. In talking of such levels one may assume that they are strictly separated from each other, “like boxes piled on top of one another” (Friedrich, 1968). In reality, these distinctive levels are never hence sharply divided. However if one takes into the consideration that in most federal systems the central authorities are allowed to practice considerable power over the federal people as a whole, it is easy to clarify why these direct connections are central to the democratic legitimacy of the federal polity. In this sense likewise, responsibility and power should be seen as being commonly supportive, serving the interests of the collective citizens body, rather than as a competitive argue for political authority between the state and federal governments.

Unlike a unitary state model, the level of democratic participation in the federal system is connected to the degree of legislative autonomy being presented to the constituent entities by the constitution, from point of view of direct self-rule or in the shape of saved powers – for example, powers not delegated to the center. In this way, public participation in the affairs of federal polity is essentially woven into the level of autonomous action activity to every single degree of government in which the people practices its sovereign rights. Further, the degree to which democratic diversity, or “a coordinated expression of it” (Harrison, 1974), could be preserved without threatening the coherence of the entire is stipulated by the capacity of the central arrangements to create vital constitutional equilibria. Obviously, the crossing line between democracy and federalism passes through the ability of the compound polity to create a commitment to federal unity, a sort of shared loyalty, whilst safeguarding the proceeded autonomy and presence of the part. This suggests that the idea of federation rises as a pluralist, living and natural political order, which “builds itself from the ground upwards” (Burgess, 1993). As Elazar’s says: “Federalism must be considered a mother form of democracy like parliamentary democracy or direct democracy” (Elazar D. J.). Shortly, “federalism is a multilevel political arrangement based on a constitutional system of delegated, reserved or shared powers between relatively autonomous, yet interrelated, structure of government, whose multiple interactions aim to serve the sovereign will of the federal people” (Chrysochoou, *Federalism and Democracy Reconsidered*, 1998).

With the postwar circumstances relating, in Bowie’s words, “to those which often in the past have led nations to undertake the initial steps towards federation”, the federal solution rose as an inspiring remedy for Europe’s organizational problems (Bowie R. R., 1987). At the same time, the intervention of a central authority beyond pre-existing boundaries acquired, because of Italian federalist thought, the status of a desirable ideology. In spite of the fact that the ideal of a united Europe predated the specific postwar endeavors, what makes them special is that “the unity concept moved into the foreground of popular thinking in both an emotional and practical appeal” (Bowie R. , 1987). Profoundly shocked with the suicidal outcome of nationalism, the federal impulse to post-war unity emerged as an attractive alternative option to a challenge that, in Bowie’s words, “went to the very foundations of social existence” (Bowie R. R., 1987). Far from conceiving the nation-state as a priority fact of presence, but instead as “a historic accident”, the federalist proposed its transcendence through a process of “rational federal development” (Harrison, 1974). As an announcement by the European

Resistance movement put in: “Federal Union alone can ensure the principles of liberty and democracy in the continent of Europe” (The European Common Market and Community). Following this line of contention, any federal surrender of sovereignty appeared netter than permitting the European state system to consolidate itself after its “great moral and material bankruptcy” (Kitzinger U. , 1973). Reflecting on the 1944 Ventotene Manifesto<sup>8</sup>, Burgess outlines: “The real cause of international anarchy was seen as the absolute sovereignty of national states, which is the source of power-politics in international sphere and of totalitarianism in the national one” (Bosco, 1992). Similarly, Spinelli has contended that the nation-state had turned into “a compass which has ceased to give any bearings” (Spinelli, 1967). These perspectives offered the moral justification of early federalist designs; it appeared as through the choice for Europe was one between anarchy and federalism, rather than between the former and measure or some structure of regional interstate cooperation.

The federalists have additionally made their case by focusing the weaknesses of states to provide new possibilities of popular involvement and cooperation, and that an unprecedented legitimacy crisis had shaken their once intense structures: a profound established structural crisis, which inspired and prompted them to look above the nation-state with a specific end goal to resolve its intense legitimacy problems. Underlying these criticisms was the conviction that “new loyalties will arise in direct conflict with the nation-state” (Spinelli, 1967). This is precisely what European federalists had into the consideration: that these various pressures on the nation-state would prompt to the appreciation that new democratic arrangements would need to be devised. Spinelli, for instance, had emphatically opposed the idea suggested by national governments of a partial union without first establishing a democratic base upon which mutual institutions would be assembled. In this way, federalism offered the methods not only “to transform the very essence of national statehood into a larger loyalty going beyond its territorial affinities” (Levi L. , 1992), but also a capable stimulus to make wider democracy outside the state framework. Whatever the title ascribed to the envisaged polity, it was recognized that the latter ought to strike a balance between diversity and unity. To persuade the publics of the merits of federalism as a means of safeguarding their political and cultural customs, the federalists focused on the representative character of the central institutions. It was maintained that the latter should be left free to exercise the authority conferred on them by a written constitution

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<sup>8</sup> A political Statement written by Aliero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi

in direct connection of the European peoples, without needing to rely first on the convergence of short-term national interests. Herein suggests perhaps federalist's most noteworthy contribution to postwar European unity: in the comprehensive polity, responsibility and power should be seen as being mutually supportive, rather than as a competitive tussle for political authority.

Writing on the strategic points of the federalist movement, Levi refers to "the objective of changing the character of exclusive communities which nation-states have and unify them in a federal community thus transforming them into member states of the European Federation, in such a way that they can coexist peacefully through maintaining their autonomy" (Levi L. , 1990). It was believed that federalism would encourage democratic differing qualities by creating a system of coordinate however independent spheres of authority grounded on a division of forces among federal and state agents. According to this, the member state legislatures would hold their executives responsible to their respective publics, while a European legislature would act as a barrier against the risk of central executive predominance. Laying on a firm constitutional structure, the fundamental forces of the federation were in the sphere of defense, external affairs, international exchange, commerce across state lines, communication and, as Pinder's says, "enough tax to sustain the necessary expenditure" (Pinder J. , 1993). This example of federal-state relations was closer to the dualistic model of classical federalism, requiring a constitutional division of obligations between the general government and state governments, instead of to a system of shared capabilities. It soon became obvious that if the federal project were to be crowned with success it would need to overcome government resistance to an immediate relinquishing of sovereignty to a new polity. The answer for this issue originated from Spinelli, who proposed a strategy based on a campaign of public persuasion for the drafting of a federal constitution. This was to be completed by "a directly elected European Constituent Assembly" (S.Pistone, 1991). The envisaged constitution would offer a balanced structure of federal and rational forces taking into account the principle of dual federalism, preserving national diversity and identity in a manner compatible with the democratic ethos. It was agreed that the federation ought to have real but limited powers, with the remaining spheres of ability resting on state jurisdiction. The main and most important message of the federalist thesis was that "federalism is the only international democratic bond which can create a reign of law among nations", and the only possible means for enlarging "the sphere of democratic government from the ambit of the state to that of a group of states" (Albertini M. , 1990). As most

federalist have acknowledged though, the difficulty of the task was not so much to persuade the European publics of the requirement for a political federation, but to ensure them that they, instead of their governments, must establish it.

The first real test accompanied with the convention of the 1948 Hague Congress; the Council of Europe failed to satisfy federalist desires and expectations, representing rather “a triumph of the unionist” (Rougemont, 1972). As the federal movement was losing its initial mainstream appeal, an alternative option, though modest, method of integration began to consolidate its strength, well known as Monnet’s “functional federalism”. Turning their concentration away from end – situations, the functionalist criticized the federal alternative for being absolutely idealistic and impractical, offering, in Horrison’s words, “merely the prospect of the unattainable” (Harrison, 1974).

The early European federalists, by looking to the American federal experience for a promising analogy, appeared to have undermined character of European integration. As Albertini outlines: “as a new form of the modern state, federalism is an American product. But the United States of America had not to overcome historically constituted nations to continue itself” (Albertini M. , 1994). European federalists failed to perceive that their vision was not the essential objective for a sufficient number of fellow-citizens. But it would be unjust not to reiterate their commitment to a more democratic process of union, their resistance to a utilitarian type of interest convergence and their conviction that parliamentary democracy was too closely identified with Europe’s political culture to be denied at a level beyond the state. Consequently, it is possible to say, that they were the first to stretch significance of connecting the idea of a European constitution to the democratic legitimacy of the envisaged federal polity.


In addition, to Monnet’s “federalism by installments” and Spinelli’s “self-styled federalism”, there existed another significant strand of federalist thought, that merits incorporation of this survey. This is what is differently named “personalist, integral, or Proudhonian federalism” (Roemheld L, 1990) and encapsulates a fairly wide scope of sociological and political ideas based upon the notion of a European society and spread of federalist values over the established limitation of European states.

As a result, it is possible to say, that the relevance of federal idea to starting point of European integration has been examined by series of researches of several authors.

Hence, above mentioned each area confirmed the significance of federalism and the federalists to the post-war historical part of the European project.

### **2.2.3.1. Confederalism**

A confederation is a free system of administration in which two or more organizational units keep their independent characters but give determined powers to a central power for reasons of benefit, common security or effectiveness. Choudhry and Sharma have clarified the contrast between federation and confederation: “a confederation is a loose union over confederating independent states, whereas a federation is a union deriving its authority from the citizens of the union; a confederation is the outcome of an agreement or treaty made generally for a specific period, whereas a federation is the result of a true constitution supreme over all other instruments from which both levels of governments derive their respective powers” (Sharma and Choudhry, 1967). A confederation is not based on the customary tripartite division of powers and tree-fold set of constitutional arenas. Its division of powers is much easy, generally based on four-fold partition of institutions and up to four of five arenas with their own constitutional standings (Elazar D. J., 1998). Lister outlines that “the relationship between central and regional governments is reversed since confederal treaty-constitutions are designed to protect the latter from the risk of subordination, and the treaty aspect of the basic law is strictly maintained” (Lister F. K., 1996), while in a federation, as Wheare notes it, “central and regional governments are not subordinate one to another, but coordinate to each other” (Wheare, 1964). From an alternate point of view, on account of confederation, a plurality of previously independent states offers path to a “treaty-constituted political body” (Forsyth, 1995), in which, to consider Dahl’s suggestion, “the condition of the last say rests with the partners to it, rather than with an independent authoritative entity having a monopoly of legislative and coercive powers”. Thus, Forsyth sees confederation as being “far more directly a contractual creature than the normal state”, manifesting itself not as “the constituted unity of one people or nation, but a unity constituted by states” (Dahl R. A., 1956).



**Table 1 - Confederal and Federal System**

The confederal type of the community was contributed by Hoffmann and Keohane: “if any traditional model were to be applied, it would be that of a confederation, since the central institutions are largely intergovernmental; more concerned with establishing a common framework than with networks of detailed regulations, and apparently willing to tolerate a vast amount of national diversity” (R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, 1990).

The justification of confederalism to the research of post-Second World War period in Western Europe is, that the Community system has been decisive by intergovernmental arrangements among sovereign states, as well as by an attempt to suit the fluctuating interests of the fragments in a commonly acceptable manner, that is without risking what they have frequently seen as their fundamental national interests. The concept that the larger entity is based on a system of international treaty rules, instead of on a constitution.

**2.2.4. Transnationalism Approach**

The approach created and developed by Deutsch and his research team in their examination of the North Atlantic Area was a noteworthy shift in accentuation from earlier work on integration to an empirical framework of analysis. As Rosamond declares, transnationalism “grew out of a conscious effort by social scientist to bring about a formal separation of theory from practice” (Hoffmann, 1990). Alternatively, as outlined by Pentland, “in the work of Deutsch...there flows a strong stream of

rationalistic optimism of social science” (Pentland, 1995). Transnationalism was a systematic endeavor to catch the relationship between social communication and international integration, by concentrating on the making of an expansive scale socio-psychological community. Deutsch sees integration as “the attainment of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population” (Deutsch K. W., 1957). By peaceful change was signified “the resolution of social problems, normally through institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force” (Pentland, 1995). The idea was that integration, and the accomplishment of an international system based on security and peace, could be attainment through processes of shared transactions, social learning and cultural flows that changes people’s attitudes and contribute to the gradual expand of community - or, of a collective consciousness.

In *Social Communications and Nationalism* Deutsch considered that the achievement of integration rests on “a historical process of social learning in which individuals, usually over several generations, learn to become a people” (Deutsch K. , 1967). Social learning turned into the central dynamic of international community-establishing, to the consequent formation of a people “who have learned to communicate with each other and understand each other well beyond the mere interchange of goods and services” (Deutsch K. , 1967) – a people comes into being through the advancement of complementary habits and facilities of communication that would in turn allow for the qualitative transformation of “previously separate units into components of a coherent system” (Deutsch K. W., 1971). Outstanding here was the idea of peaceful problem-solving way through the increase of communicative connections amongst nations. This he called a “security community”: a framework of social cooperation within which war would eventually become in the relevant region both impractical and unthinkable. His notion of security community could take the type of being either pluralistic<sup>9</sup> or amalgamated<sup>10</sup>. However, Deutsch never really suggested that there was an automatic forward connection between these sorts of community. Besides, as Lijphart has rightly indicated, Deutsch’s theorizing is likewise of significance due to the way that it “disputes the axiomatic character of the relationship between war and anarchy” (Lijphart, 1981).

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<sup>9</sup> Where no formal/legal merger has occurred among the segments

<sup>10</sup> Where the parts have been formally incorporated into a higher authority

Deutsch was not specifically concerned with the institutional configuration that the integration process would achieve a formal institutional change. However, nor was he generally interested in the assignment of definitive power among distinctive levels of decision-making. He concentrated on the socio-psychological aspects of international community building, seen because of expanded and commonly responsive transactions. However, it would be unfair to take the developments in transactions singularly as an indicator of international-community establishing. As Taylor clarifies, “it is the range and quality of changes in transactions that constitutes an indicator of community: too frequently Deutsch’s ideas are criticized on the mistaken assumption that he sees particular transactions as equivalent of developing community” (Taylor P. , 1990). The consequence of integration would take the type of an identifiable community of citizens - a people – through a process of social learning. However, such a result would take quite a long time to appear, indeed several generations as Deutsch suggested. It is significant, that the uniting parts build up “a sense of community” taking into the account the power of shared identities, common values and beliefs systems and a feeling of common destination, and that certain standards and propensities of societal interaction would rise up from the extent and intensity of informal connections. Community feelings, and the development over time of a community of values at the more extensive level of aggregation, where seen as the outcome, instead of the reason, of closer connections among the participating units. Deutsch’s classification between pluralistic and amalgamated security community justifies closer consideration. The previous was expected to deliver a feeling of security among the appropriate populations, whereby the resolution of contentions through brutal means would be supplanted by commonly satisfactory methods of peaceful settlement. It was the specific attitudes of the actors that would make a certain cooperative society culture that, through the forging of further and closer communicative connections, would make resort to war highly unlikely. His concept of amalgamated security community was a more developed form of political community. In this kind of association rather than the more instrumental notion, one may perceive the embryo of a constitutive community; one that “would constitute the very identity of the individuals” (Mouffe, 1993). Security community, more advanced form of political community is generally regarded as a steady type of association that fulfills the flourishing of commonly responsive relations in light of the fact that the individuals constructing it have developed a “sense of community” – a “community spirit” or a “community of attachment” – sufficiently enough to overcome any conceivably divisive issues which may emerge as integration

proceeds. Where such a soul is less significant and intense, the integrative system will find it much more difficult to adapt with internal political and social disputes. From this perspective, along these lines, the “security community factor” emerges to constitute one of integration’s indispensable mutual spheres.

Indeed, even though no actual society or institution will never conform totally to Tonnies’s conceptual entities (Kamenka, 1989), since they represent two ideal sorts of social organization. Deutsch was aware of the fact that a socio-psychological community should be based on a sense among the individuals forming it of belonging together, of having mutual values and loyalties, of connection, so that the tasks within its structures stem from “a feeling of contributing something worthwhile to the good of the whole” (Taylor P. , 1983). In this way, a security community is qualitatively particular and supposedly higher than the numerical entirety of the private prosperity of its members. In it, people associate themselves together in light of the fact that they think of their relationships as important and valuable in a dual sense of being significant both as an end in and of itself. Along this line, it is perceived as an organic collective entity, in terms of being considered and conceived in relations to its parts (Tonnies, 1974), whose standards of order lay on concord, rather than a security community that lays on a contractual arrangements or convention. Based on connections of shared affirmation of a federative kind, participators in a security community establish strong feelings of “togetherness”, “we-ness” or even “oneness”, to the consequent surroundings of a collective awareness. They are bound together by symbiotic connections, think of their collective presence as dominating their respective individualism and perceive their nearby association as a means of developing their internal conditions of living. An entity that is created through this positive sort of relationship, focuses to “a lasting and genuine form of living together, as opposed to its counterpart form of human security community that is taken as a mere coexistence of people independent of each other” (Tonnies, 1974). While the mutual sphere of a security community lays on the concept of contract - “a rational coming together of ends that remain individual” (Kamenka, 1989) – that of a security community lays on the concept of “one people” – a domestically- situated relationship developed among its participators, instead of an artificial fusion of private wills. Additionally, in a security community, the ensemble of individual wills commonly guide each other towards an “equilibrium of forces”, with authority not constituting an all-powerful center, but instead alluding to a dialectical process of organizing social relations within a legitimized setting.

Deutsch's sociological methodology concentrated more "on description and was more cautious about predicting the dynamic links between the various stages of the integration process" (Taylor P. , 1971). This separates him from neofunctionalist approaches and the premium they put on forward connections. Being interested in the early phases of community creation and connection between various conditions of integration is quite easy to determine Deutsch's analysis likewise from the early federalist school of thought. As Taylor mentions, "Deutsch's pluralistic security community contains no common decision-making centers...but in some ways it is highly integrated" (Taylor P. , 1971). Along this line, institution- developing is not treated in mainstream Deutschian examination as an end-in-itself or as evidence that integration has actually occurred; the accentuation is on the improvement of a sense of community at the prominent level.

Scholars of international politics have broadly recognized Deutsch's commitment to international pluralist theory. His pluralistic way to deal with integration and peaceful formation of international political communities endeavored to "transcend the atmosphere of political realism" (Pentland, 1995), in an era commanded by superpower contention and ideological confrontations between communist and liberal values, despite the fact that these were to a great extent exacerbated by intermittent communication between the two blocks. His innovative research established the alternative frameworks to mainstream realism, whose ontological stance portrayed states as more concerned with conflict in interests.

#### 2.2.5. Neofunctionalism Approach

To focus precisely what neofunctionalism stands for is no clear undertaking, as the theory has come to mean various things to various people. There are number of explanations behind this. To begin with, it turn out to be progressively difficult to distinguish what precisely qualified as neofunctionalist because the theory experienced a series of reformulations the late 1960s. A various researchers, such as Stuart Scheingold, Philippe Schmitter and Joseph Nye, adjusted the first forms and original versions of Leon Lindberg and Ernst Haas. Secondly, there have been internal different opinions within the neofunctionalist school of thought. Neofunctionalist scholars contrasted on the dependent variable problem, whether, and to what degree loyalties shifted to the new focus, and whether politicization or depoliticization constituted a precondition for the spillover process. Thirdly, the ambiguity about the limits and substance of neofunctionalist thought likewise gave rise to semantic confusion. This

part of dissertation seeks to characterize key neofunctionalist assumptions, terms and hypotheses.

Neofunctionalism offers no single authoritative meaning of integration. Its practitioners have revised their definition over time. Both Lindberg and Haas held integration to be a process instead of a result. Likewise, they agreed that integration included the creation and role expansions of regional institutions. Furthermore, they both focused change in expectations and activities with respect to participating actors. Whilst Lindberg limit his study to the European Economic Community, Haas construct his analysis on the European Coal and Steel Community, but extend his conclusions to the European Economic Community. Haas described “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones” (Haas E. B., 1958). Lindberg offers a distinctive definition: “the process whereby nations forego the desire and ability to conduct foreign and domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs: and the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new center” (Lindberg L. , 1967).

The essence of the theory is derived from a set of fundamental precepts, some of which have been implied at in the neofunctionalist comprehension and explanation of integration. To start with, accordance with the mainstream of United States of America political science of the time, the early neofunctionalism intended at general theory building. In its original conception, neofunctionalism comprehended itself as a grand or general theory of cooperation and integration – asserting relevance regardless of when and where it occurred (Haas E. , 1964). Secondly, integration is understood as a process. Here neofunctionalists on a very basic level contrast from intergovernmentalists who have a tendency to look at disconnected events (treaty negotiations) and accept them to be repetition of the same power game. Implicit in the notion of process is the opposite suspicion that integration processes develop after some time and take on their own dynamic. Third, neofunctionalism is pluralist in nature. In contrast to traditional realist theories, it contents both that states are cooperative actors and that they are the main relevant actors. Rather than, “neofunctionalists assume that regional integration is

characterized by multiply, diverse, and changing actors who are not restricted to the domestic political realm but also interact and build coalitions across national frontiers and bureaucracies” (Haas E. , 1964). Fourth, neofunctionalists see the Community a creature of elites. Whilst Haas dedicated much of his attention to the role of non-governmental elites, Lindberg largely concentrated on governmental elites. Neither attributed much significance of the role of public opinion. Consequently, it is possible to say, “there was a permissive consensus in favor of European integration” (Lindberg L. N., 2007) and that this would suffice to maintain it. Fifth, despite the fact, that Haas did not specify it, “he seems to have assumed uninterrupted economic growth in Europe” (Lindberg L. N., 2007). Connected to this was a more explicit end of ideology presumption, thus, these increasingly prosperous societies would concentrate essentially on the quest for wealth rather than socialist, nationalist or religious ideals.

In neofunctionalism theory, towards early European integration, could be distinguish five significant points:

1. “Its practitioners assume rational and self-interested actors” (Haas E. , 1964), who have the ability to learn and change their preferences. Interest-driven national and supranational elites, perceiving the confinement of national solutions, provide the key impetus. The shift of activities, expectations and loyalties towards the new center is also seen as one, which is inspired by actors’ interests. Nonetheless, these self-regarding thoughts are not perceived as constant. “They are likely to change during the integration process, as actors learn from the benefits of regional policies and from their experiences in cooperative decision-making” (Haas E. B., 1958). Neofunctionalists challenge the intergovernmentalist presumption of interest aggregation exclusively at the national level through some hermetic process. Rather, Haas contended that “membership in the European Community alerted the way that interest groups and, later, member governments, perceived their interests” (Haas E. B., 1958).

2. Once established, institutions can take on a life of their own and continuously get away from the control of their inventors. Concerned with expanding their own powers, employees of regional institutions become agents of further incorporation by affecting the perceptions of participating elites, and therefore governments’ interest.

3. Early reformulations of the theory focused on the primacy of incremental decision-making over grand designs. Besides that, as it seems marginal adjustments are frequently determined by the unintended outcomes of previous decisions. This impact

emerges from the inability of most political actors to engage in long-term purposive conduct as they stumble from one decision into the next, particularly when engaging in such an innovative task as regional integration. “Decisions in this arena are normally taken with highly imperfect knowledge of their consequences and frequently under the pressure of deadlines” (Haas E. , 1964).

4. Neofunctionalists denies the conventional realist axiom, says that all games played between actors are necessarily zero-sum in nature. In the Community setting exchanges are frequently better identified as positive-sum games and a supranational style of decision-making, which Haas characterized as “a cumulative pattern of accommodation in which the participants refrain from unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreement by means of compromises upgrading common interest” (Haas E. , 1964).

5. Haas agreed with the hypothesis made by some economists, such as Pierre Uri who was the distinguished economist of the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s, that “emerging functional interdependencies between whole economies and their productive sectors tends inexorably to foster further integration” (Haas E. B., 1958). Most likely, on the premise of this supposition, Haas initially trusted that the spillover process<sup>11</sup> would be automatic, which drove him to foresee the emergence of a political community in Europe before the end of the transitional period (Haas E. B., 1958).

While discussing about the neofunctionalism theory, it is necessary to touch its criticism, as long as this theory is the most heavily criticized theory. After mid – 1960s, analyzes of neofunctionalism rose up from intergovernmentalist scholarship, and progressively from inside of the neofunctionalist camp itself. Scholars have erroneously blamed the theory of “failing to account for unintended consequences” (McNamara, 1993) or for its supposed inadequacy to perceive that identities and loyalties tend to be multiply. Its critics have additionally exaggerated neofunctionalism’s predictive pretensions and, specifically, Haas’s affirmation of a political community as a reasonable result of the integration process before the end of the transitional period, in spite of the fact that neofunctionalists had abstaining making such assumptions about an end-state as early as the beginning of the 1960s (Haas E. , 1964). Furthermore, the theory was, to

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<sup>11</sup> The term first was used in two distinctive manners: (1) as a sort of shorthand for describing the occurrence of integration; and, (2) it was used to identify the driving force and inherent logic of integration via increased functional/economic interdependence.

some degree unfairly, “disparaged for explanatory shortcomings on issues beyond its research focus and analytical spectrum, such as questions related to the nature of interest representation and intermediation in the European Community” (Hix, 1994) or “the initiation of the integration process in Europe” (Milward A. , 2002). On the other hand, this latter line of criticism does have a certain validity given the early neofunctionalist aspirations to grand theorizing, an issue that will be taken up below. A more broad range account of contestable critiques neofunctionalist theory has been provided elsewhere.

Nevertheless, some criticisms provide more pertinent and fundamental challenges. Initially, neofunctionalism has been criticized for its grand theoretical demands. It has been rightly contended that neofunctionalism does not and cannot offer a general theory of regional integration in all settings, particularly not of their origins; it presumes that member countries are somewhat developed and broadened in their productive systems and that they have democratic polities. Moreover, the theory implements certain analytical instruments to deal with only a specific sort of questions. Other critics have brought issue with “neofunctionalism’s alleged actor – centeredness” (Christiansen, 1997). Neofunctionalist notion was not without structural components. For instance, the functional-economic rationale based on the interdependence of sectors, which has additionally been alluded to as functional spillover, is a structural pressure. On the other hand, one may contend that neofunctionalism gives undue eminence to participators – particularly, in the assigned to supranational civil servants and representatives of sectorial interests - and that agents and structural clarifications should be lined with each other more satisfactory. Despite the fact that Church criticized the theory on the basis that its “predictions proved empirically wrong...the states of Western Europe did not lie down and let supranationality walk over them” (Church, 1996), he was correct to declare that neofunctionalism “was the first really deep and complex explanations of the Communities” (Church, 1996).

Given the intellectual richness inserted in this involved activity in self-inspection, one is constrained to acknowledge that neofunctionalism has performed a significant and valuable service to the study of regional integration. More importantly perhaps, together with the older established functionalist school, neofunctionalist writings have both empowered and propelled political science research “to move away from state-centricity and power politics” (Groom, 1990), and turn its interest to units of analysis that are either consistently disregarded or for the most part rejected as irrelevant by the

dominant realist school of international politics. Most importantly, neofunctionalism was the first systematic endeavor to develop a general theory of regional integration, remaining to this day an indispensable referent not only for theorizing the European experience, as well as for the comparative study for other regional unions, or processes of regionalization.

As a conclusion, it is possible to say, that neofunctionalism remains an important approach for explaining and conceptualizing the integration and cooperation process of Western European countries after the Second World War. There are a few explanations behind it: firstly, as the case illustrations have demonstrated, neofunctionalism has an exceptionally useful toolkit for analyzing silent issues, mainly revolving around clarifying European Union decision process and consequences. Despite the fact that this has been an old and long-standing analyzing question, it will continue to be a conspicuous one. Secondly, neofunctionalism has inspired subsequent theorizing and later approaches have drawn broadly on its suspicions and hypotheses, which thus contributed useful building blocks for several of frameworks. Thirdly, neofunctionalism has verified to be capable of reformulation, mostly owing to the nature from the way of its theoretical suspicions, and somewhat because of the inclination for self-reflection and self-criticism of its creators.

### **2.3. Peace-making theories in Western European countries after the WW2**

In conflict resolution literature, peace is normally characterized as the elimination of war as a methods for solving international conflicts, through changes in fundamental and institutional conditions and learning processes; “whereas reconciliation refers to an affective and psychological process involving a healing of emotions and the elimination of resentment” (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004). Ideas and theories of Winston Churchill, Altiero Spinelli and Schuman declaration which made offer to European states to join together to the Community, specifies the words peaceful and peace, however not reconciliation. Lily Gardner Feldman, on the other hand, in the same way as other various Europeanists, utilizes the two terms almost interchangeably while building up another useful distinction between “pragmatic reconciliation policies that serve state interests and security and the moral programs that break age-old animosities” (Feldman, 1975). If peace is an “unattainable absolute” (Arendt, 1973), reconciliation does not require mean the final elimination of conflicts. Most likely, conflicts are “articulated as differences that can be managed rather than existential threats; they become productive contention in a shared and cooperative framework” (Feldman, 1975). At the state level, the

arrangement for a European Coal and Steel Community suggested fundamental changes: de facto economic consensus and supranational establishments instead of the amity and recuperating of emotions. Feldman stresses the pragmatic aspect of fruitful reconciliatory politics and programs of cooperation, which served states interests and constituted a “proven source of security and prosperity” (Feldman, 1975). The European founders did not form a strong distinction between economics and politics: “economic interactions would create the public space where former enemies could learn to trust and begin to act together again” (Piotr H. Kosicki, Slawomir Lukasiewicz, 2016). Constitutional movements instead of elite leadership contributed the essential emotional underpinning to the European cooperation and integration. However “too sharply drawn distinctions between elite and popular behavior distort the facts” (Derivois, 2017). Pro-integration leaders were very much aware of the political significance of emotions despite the fact that they conceived the new trans-European foundations as a tool of conductional conversion instead of healing of emotions. They focused on the psychological boundaries between the nations of Europe: “Men’s attitudes must be changed. The French had to be delivered of their fears of the Germans, the Germans of the humiliation of occupation. Men, who are placed in new practical circumstances, or subjected to a new set of obligations, adapt their behavior and become different. If the new context is better, they themselves become better: that is the whole rationale of the European Community and the process of civilization itself” (Monnet, 1978). For Adenauer, the European Coal and Steel Community would change “the thinking and political feeling of European man” (Adenauer, 1953). The fact, that former enemy nations could launch cooperation after the end of a destructive conflict, is too frequently taken for granted, or justified essentially by economic estimations. Such accounts, on the other hand, do not reveal how participants in the European establishing managed with their historical memories of war, intrusion and shared exploration, and how they could trust each other sufficiently to put their war enterprises under a common authority with no hegemonic force mediating conflicts.

Ideally, political theorists should drove political reality challenge, and if fundamental, change their thoughts. This is a difficult demonstration, and Arendt did not see that the ability to act together of previously bitter enemies – the Benelux countries, Germany, France and Italy– could outline her theorizing of political forgiveness as the human ability and scope for new beginnings. “The new therefore always appears in the guise of a miracle. Even the origin of Totalitarianism does not conclude on a despondent note: but there remains also the truth that every end in

history necessarily contains a new beginning... this beginning is guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every man" (Arendt, 1973). In the case of European integration and cooperation Schuman was "every man". He expected the political threat of the initiative for the European Coal and Steel Community and choose to declare the plan directly to the public in general on the grounds that "it was essential to act quickly and to impact public opinion before any diplomatic negotiations, thus pushing the governments toward the agreement" (W. Kaiser, A. Varsor, 2010). The Schuman declaration likewise "offered a promise, which the treaty of Paris institutionalized" (Guisan, 2003). Scholars and actors have compared the European and the American establishing experiences. Like their American predecessors, the Europeans believed in constitutional arrangements more than individual good will.

Academic writings on conflict resolution have a tendency to view top-down reconciliatory forms as antagonistic or somewhat separated from bottom-up processes, as indicated by David Bloomfield: "But a strong argument can be made to see reconciliatory processes as complementary, mutually related and mutually supporting" (Bloomfield, 2006). Despite the fact that European integration is most frequently discussed as an "elite process", a surge of grassroots developments provided the necessary affective underpinning and significant support to cooperation processes in the Western European countries after the Second World War. Certainly, the principle of reconciliation could not have formed a new kind of, another sort of European politics without prominent roots. As long as Arendt was intensely critical of representative democracy, the procedure of negotiation and parliamentary ratification, "which gave the European Coal and Steel Community its legitimacy, may have struck her as falling short of her exacting standard of participatory politics" (Arendt, 1973). Arendt herself perceived that her concept of public engagement might work best in a little society, and some observers discount her contribution to democratic theory altogether. Jeffrey C. Isaacs offers a more thoughtful conversion: Arendt took for granted that representative democracy was here to remain and simply advocated for a supplement to this political structure. Her "elementary republics" are meant to "invigorate democracy", not substitute the establishments of representative democracy. "They are members of the participatory elite and they are counter posed to the masses. However, the counter position is not between a privileged few and an incapable many. It is not between two classes or types of people as much as between two competing attitudes...But this is not a derogation of average people. It is an invitation, perhaps even an incitement, for them

to surpass their ordinariness simply through their voluntary association and concerted action” (Arendt, 1973).

The European Coal and Steel Community’s creators did not leave a theoretical justification of their choice of the term community to name the new European institutions, in spite of the fact that Monnet needed from his collaborators various drafts before settling on a proposition. Therefore, it would be indiscreet to gloss over this not ordinal terminology. According to Anthony Cohen, “community” came to Monnet through Paul Reuter” (Fimister, 2008). To understand Reuter’s perspectives on community is to “go back to the pre-war years and the strong reactions of both the left and the right to the French elite against the ineffectiveness of parliamentary democracy in dealing with social injustices and national decline” (W. Kaiser, A. Varsor, 2010). “The national French community could no longer deal with the excesses of both capitalism and collectivism without a European Community, organized politically on the federal model” (Ulf Hedetoft, Mette Hjort, 2002). The ideological reconversion of the most prominent prewar themes of federalism and community occurred after 1945 with the advancement of an economic philosophy that was neither socialism nor capitalism or liberalism, however something new and very impossible in a national framework. In order “to resist the reign of money and capitalism and create federation, strong states were needed, which an elite body of civil servants would serve by coordinating and regulating the economic life of the nation” (Woolcock, 2012). It is good not to exaggerate Reuter’s impact towards Monnet. The collaboration effort was brief and short-lived. However, they agreed, “great evil was the recurrence of wars, and what caused them, the instinct for power of nation-states. Only an organized Europe could rein in such impulses” (Jaspers, 1981). Contra Michael Sandel, Arendt’s credentials as a communitarian are tenuous. She considered, “that individual citizens, in times of crisis, must act unencumbered by affective ties to Community or nation” (Jaspers, 1981). Moreover, the European Communities initiators were not advancing some European identity in light of shared culture or ideology; they settled community with a specific end goal to keep politics, integration and cooperation going, regardless of the possibilities for activity in concert were excessively limited and technical to evoke Arendt’s interest. Ian Manners summarize, “the ideological narrative of global Europa as the attempts to come to terms with an age of extreme ideological differences, and to avoid the extremes of capitalism and communism, while at the same time shunning populist nationalist temptation and the traditional failings of power politics” (Jaspers, 1981). As some of political actors noted, numerous ambiguities were left unsolved

during the creation of idea of European Community. There was a dualism in the thought of power as it was comprehended by the supporters of European reconciliation: it was activity among European Community members, but beyond the Community's boundaries Europeans needed to recuperate the mastery of their own fail politically, economically and even military to be "in harmony with themselves and the world," (Duchene F. , 1994), "after they have destroyed each other through the pursuit of national sovereignty and prestige" (Monnet, 1978).

### **2.3.1. Consociational Approach**

Althusius, a major defender of associational principles in the organization of public life, characterizes consociation as some sort of "contractus societatis" in which "the constitutive parts of the state...retain not only the right to resist the ruler who broke the contract...but also the right to secede from one state and to make a contract with another" (Vasovic, 1992). Consociation therefore rises as a compound association of collectivities and, in Elazar's words, "a universitas composed of collegia" (Elazar D. J., 1987) that lacks genuine sovereignty of its own, with central authority being equally divided among the subunits in order to evade the danger of segmental subordination. In this network of various powers, equal partnership, instead of segmental predominance or whatever other type of hegemonic control, emanates as a common defining property of consociational systems. For Althusius, politics is the art of associating people for the foundation and protection of social life symbiosis. Carney clarifies: "Symbiotic association involves something more than mere existence together...wherever there is symbiosis there is also communication , on the sharing of things, services, rights" (Carney, 2000). As Elazar analyzes it: "Althusius politica...represented a theory of polity-building based on a polity as a compound political association established by its citizens through their primary association on the basis of consent rather than a reified state imposed by a ruler or an elite" (Elazar D. J., 1994). The application of Althusian principles to composite polities – "developed out of a series of building blocks or self-governing cells...each of which is internally organized and linked to the others by some form of consensual relationship" (Elazar, 1994)– is a methods for empowering the peoples of different communities, republics commonwealths and the like "to live together or more than a Hobbesian basis" (Elazar D. J., 1998).

The most essential exponent of consociationalism was Apter who, in his research of bureaucratic nationalism, characterized this type of political organization as "a joining together of constituent units which do not lose their identity when merging in some

form of union” (Apter, 1966). As indicated by Apter, the primary components of a consociation include “a pyramidal authority; multiply loyalties; necessity for compromise; pluralism; and ideological diffuseness” (Apter, 1966). He outlines: “Consociational forms may range from a relatively loose confederation of groups and states to federal arrangements with a recognized structure. A characteristic feature of the consociational system is that its consensus derives from an acceptance of a common denominator or a shared set of interests by which groups are willing to interrelate. It is essentially a system of compromise and accommodation” (Apter, 1966). However it was Lijphart who focused on the stabilizing impacts of consociationalism in plural social orders described, in Sartori’s words, by “cumulative, reinforcing and, specifically, isolative cleavages” (Sartori, 1987). From that point, “consociationalism, comparable types of which are Lorwin’s notion of “segmented pluralism”, Lehmbruch’s models of “Proporzdemocratie and Konkordanzdemokratie, and Bluhm’s theory of contractarianisms” (Lorwin, 1971), attempted to answer the question of how democracy can survive in composite polities which lack commonly shared values, characterized instead by a divided social base. Stevenson clarifies “in such countries the population is segmented in subgroups, each represented by political elites who are trusted to bargain with other elites on behalf of the group’s interests” (Stevenson, 1982). In this line, “the consociational model aims to strike a balance between “positive-sum and zero-sum governing by replacing majoritarian modes of decision-making with joint consensual rule” (Lijphart, 1979). The significance here is on informal rules that structure elite conduct.

Reflecting on the paradoxical way of the Dutch polity, in merging political stability and social fragmentation, Lijphart offered “a refinement of pluralist theory” (Lijphart, 1968). The proposal he set forward was that it is conceivable to accomplish conditions of democratic political stability “in plural, vertically segmented, communally divided, or fractionalized societies if there is overarching cooperation among the segment elites based on a set of unwritten rules of the game” (Lustick, 1979). By instigating from the rather restricted Dutch case, however, Lijphart built up a general model, if not a grand theory, of “consociational democracy”, “departing from classical pluralist theory in so far as the latter required crisis-crossing conflicts and multiple loyalties to produce stability” (Lustick, 1979). His theoretical framework constitutes a noteworthy contribution to comparative democratic theory, not least in light of the fact that the mainstream pluralist ways to deal with democracy were not prepared to clarifying its conservation in conflict-laden polities. Consociational theory “is not interested in the

reasons of segmentation but in their empirical existence” (Weiler, 1995). Rather, it concentrates on elite driven methods of transcending the immobilism caused by divisive and commonly strengthening cleavages in society. Lijphart’s general model, which is largely to do with “political stability, rather than with the qualities of democratic decision-making, consists of the four defining properties: grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality and mutual veto” (Lijphart, 1979). The combined impact of these distinctive political components, clarifies Boule, “give rise to a system of power-sharing at the national level...and group autonomy at the subnational level” (Boule, 1984).

These, then, are the defining properties of consociational democracy, whose achievement “presupposes not only a willingness on the part of elites to cooperate, but also a capacity to solve the political problems of their countries” (Lindberg L. , 1967). Apart from the cooperative endeavors of rival group elites in a bargaining process, what is likewise needed is the deployment of accommodationist methods, as proceeding procedural guarantees, to maintain general systemic stability and, as Lijphart says, “counteract the centrifugal tendencies of cultural fragmentation” (Lindberg L. , 1967). As Ersson and Lane sum up: “these agreements or pacts need not be institutionally sanctioned or explicitly translated into institutions, as long as all important players are brought on board. What matters is the actual elite behavior, consisting of all kinds of behavior from participation in oversized governments or grand coalitions to the making of formal or informal pacts outside of government, which promote a mutual understanding of politics and policies, accommodating differences” (Svante Ersson, Jan-Erik Lane, 2000). Consociationalism, both as a process of consensual decision-making and as an example of elite conduct, can be seen as a strategy of cooperative conflict resolution, whereby the elites transcend intergroup fragmentation through negotiated agreements or settlements based on a politics of accommodation. Accordingly, elite accommodation constitutes the principle determinant of systemic stability, with politics itself getting to be, as Hallowell says, “the institutionalized art of compromise” (Hallowell, *The Moral Foundation of Democracy*, 1954). Consociationalism is not concerned with the improvement of a social network at the popular level and “its structural concomitant, namely...”cross-cutting cleavages” (Taylor P. , 1990). It requires neither one of the sense of community, nor a popular assertion of common values, let alone the presence of a single and undifferentiated people united by an overarching civic “we-ness”. In reality, consociational regimes are characterized by the vary absence of the above conditions, in that two or more specific communities exists, while a

positive accumulation of segmental interests hardly ever exists as such. Holden clarifies: “Due to the fundamental nature of the sectional divisions and conflicts, demands cannot simply aggregated or synthesized” (Holden, 1993). In this manner, consociationalism frequently “ceases to be a theory about the nature of democratic decision making and becomes instead of theory about how much decision making remains possible in the face of grave difficulties” (Holden, 1993). The improvement of attitudes and values among the decision-receivers is of lesser significance in comparison to advancements at the level of decision-makers. Moreover, even there, trust building among the elites may not be equivalent to that found in polities with relatively comparable publics. At the same time, “the process of macro-level loyalty building should not be associated with the integration or amalgamation of the constituent publics into a common political form that overrides citizens fixed primary loyalties” (Lodge, 1987). A priori acceptance of the requirement for cooperative shared principle among the group leaders is specific to the functionality and policy responsiveness of the plural polity is a specific to the functionality and policy responsiveness of the plural polity. From this perspective, the praxis of politics lays on the acknowledgment that “economic and political interests are best advanced by staying together in a sensibly arranged political union” (Boulle, 1984). As Taylor notes, the irony of the situation lies in “the need to generate enthusiasm for stability precisely because of the continuing threat of fragmentation” (Taylor P. , 1971). It is important to outline, that the scope, quality and consistency of such cooperative interplay among the elites will determine the efficiency of the mutual institutions to accommodate the specific interests of the segments.

Peoples control over elite activities is the special case rather instead of the principle of the political game, in comparison to Almond’s Anglo-American type of democracies where “the existence of overlapping and crosscutting memberships and a homogenous political culture make systems of collective accountability easier to apply” (Almond, 1967). The fundamental pattern in consociational polities is that each area of the divided citizenry activities controlling capacities over its dominant section elites through own procedures. On the other hand, one cannot ignore the probability that, by asserting that societal mobilization around delicate issues will not be profitable to systemic stability, the members of the elite cartel may reject themselves from broad public scrutiny through the institutions of ex-post ruler responsibility. “The faith of democracy lies more in a belief in the principle of compromise itself” (Hallowell, 1954). than in the frameworks of responsible and open government. This is specifically the case if one subscribes to the perspective that “consociational politics typically favor the

social status quo and, while mediating the problems of deeply fragmented societies, also are instrumental in maintaining those very fragments” (J. H. H. Weiler, 1995).

Consociationalism highlights the determination of the segment elites to practice administrative control over the integration process, to safeguard the collective force of their relevant executives and to make advancement toward ever-closer union dependent on the convergence of state preferences. It likewise permits states to oppose the producing of connections on a horizontal scale among the national level, which would in principle in any case, encourage the emergence of a transnational civic identity, however weaken the local power base on the segment elites. Consequently, the later tend to advance vertical integration in order to retain ultimate authority in the internal political sphere or even to improve their impact over domestic opposition elites. More significantly, perhaps, vertical integration upgrades the status of the elite cartel in the mutual management framework as the essential site for the advancement of collective segmental interest, while reinforcing the individual ability of its members to affect the explanation and articulation of such interest. It is in this light statecentred scholarship has reached the conclusion that the integration process “tends to reinforce rather than weaken the nation-state” (Taylor P. , 1990). As outlined by Moravcsik, “the European Community did not diffuse the domestic influence of the executive; it centralizes it. Rather than domesticating the international system, the European Community internationalizes domestic politics. While cooperation may limit the external ability of executives, it simultaneously confers greater domestic influence . . . In this sense; the European Community strengthens the state” (Moravcsik, 1993).

### **2.3.2. Principle of Subsidiarity**

To all intents and purposes, starting period of cooperation in the European Community, is an excellent example questions of multilevel competence allotment, due to the pluralism and variability nature in its governance. The involvement into the treaty framework of the federally motivated principle of subsidiarity is a decent point of beginning. Poorly thought-out guideline for the division of obligations between the states and the Community, subsidiarity opened the route for two different lines of advancement: the safeguard of national autonomy against exaggerated centralization, and the expansion of European legislative competences. While the previous, and more broadly acknowledged perspective, supports the theory of confederal consociation, perceiving subsidiarity as an affective restriction in both legal and political terms on Community law-making powers, the focuses in the direction of a more federally

perceptible structure of shared rule. In reality, much dependent on the primary clarification of European Community article, which declares:

“The community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and therefore, by reason of the scale and effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community”<sup>12</sup> (Article 3b of European Community).

Subsidiarity appears to establish viability and an effectiveness criterion concerning the relevant arena for activity: the first proposes that “Community institutions must demonstrate that state action is not sufficient, while the second implies that Community action must be better able to achieve the objective at hand” (Shaw, 1993). In this manner, the question of competence comes down to the comparative proficiency of the means accessible to the collectivity and the parts. Here, Lenaerts clarifies, “a necessary condition for Community action is that at least one member state has inadequate means at its disposal for achieving the objectives of the proposed action” (Lenaerts, Subsidiarity and Community Competence in the Field of Education, 1994). However there is also third criteria which, though indirectly identified with the principle itself, connects the previous two with a central tent of democracy: decisions should be taken “as closely as possible to the citizen” (Chrysochoou, 1998).

Subsidiarity chimes well with consociationalism, for it justifies a potential stream of decision-making powers to national authorities, offering a fractional offset to the quest for legislative autonomy within the parts. This way of interpretation affirms Taylor’s consideration that the principle resembles a sort of reserved powers to states, in that the later have viably managed to equilibrate any potential federalizing tendencies by methods of balancing “the loss of power in one realm against the gain of or retention of powers in another” (Taylor P. , 1990). A comparable point on the principle’s political significance was made by Lenaerts: “for the member states, the principle of subsidiarity then constitutes a mechanism - and presumably a judicially enforceable one - of self-defense against what they perceive as a risk that the Community will make excessive use of its non-exclusive powers, and thus preempt their residual powers. In this respect,

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<sup>12</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT&from=EN>

the principle of subsidiarity serves as a substitute for the wavering of political safeguards of federalism” (Lenaerts, 1994). From this prism, it is quite hard to overlook indications of a reverse kind of federalism limiting the concentration of capabilities to the center, supporting their spreading down mention words:

“European Community does not reflect the philosophy of allowing smaller units to define and achieve their own ends, and refers only to two levels of authority: that of the nation state and that of the Community...and the only criterion given for determining which level is appropriate is one of outcome or effect, rather than process”<sup>13</sup> (Article 3b of European Community).

Subsidiarity is accompanied by the principle of proportionality. It reads as follows: “Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty” (Article 3b). This principle does not change the attribution of capability, but rather concerns the path in which Community power should be practiced once the Community level has been approved as the proper one to take activity. The explanation behind this principle is that Community activity should not exaggerate what is important to meet the end in view: its activity should be *intra vires*. In this line, the principle “seeks to ensure that the nature and intensity of the proposed action are in proportion with what is necessary to achieve the objectives of that action” (Lenaerts, 1994). Lenaerts offers a more extensive interpretation of the principle: “proportionality suggests that the Community should take action only in so far as such action is required in order to compensate for the member states inability to achieve sufficiently the objectives of the action proposed. The value that this expression of the proportionality principle means to protect is very clear, namely the sovereignty of the member states and their subnational authorities. Under this view, the residual powers of the states should not be impaired any more than is necessary in order for the Community and the member states, each acting in a spirit of loyal cooperation, to attain the objectives of the proposed action” (Lenaerts, 1994).

From the Burca’s perspective, “proportionality applies across the Community’s domains of action and thus does not seem to be restricted by the idea of non-exclusive competence” (Burca, 1999). Likewise: “Although the proportionality question purports to deal with the means by which an objective is pursued, and the second part with whether the objective is best pursued by Community action or by member state action

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<sup>13</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT&from=EN>

in the first place, it would often be difficult to answer the second question without knowing what kind of action is envisaged. That is to say, the objective of an action and the means to achieve that action cannot readily be separated (Burca, 1999).

Contributions of this chapter of the dissertation have demonstrated that theorizing European Integration after the Second World War period includes no less than three fundamental components. They incorporate the choice of the research object, polity: supranational institution building; politics: quality of cooperation and integration, and the scope in which this part of the dissertation has been designed, disciplinary and historical views. The reason and choice of research object make a difference. It creates a particular theoretical concentration and influence, which is highlighted in three sections presenting no less than three fundamental theoretical points of view at the starting period of cooperation and integration in Western European countries after the Second World War. These three alternate points of view are distinguished according to the perspective analytical concentration on clarifying cooperation, analytical governance, and establishing the Euro polity. In order to substantiate the essential suggestion of each approach, the contributors have been requested to choose a best-case scenario. This combination of best and test case scenarios in all commitments exposes nicely how research object and reason of this part are subject to the choice of the individual researcher, yet never under conditions of their own choosing.

Theoretical approaches indeed, emerge general questions that are shared by a scope of distinctive methodologies. For instance, the questions of how to clarify institution establishing over the state, how to represent for governance as a process that develops across national limitations and how to get to the emergence of a sociopolitical framework critically.

### III Chapter: Political Documents, Doctrines and Agreements

Indeed, in the community which tries to aspire just too minimum public order, in the sense of the counteractive action and restraint of unauthorized violence, agreements has of focal significance: agreements, implicit and explicit, are basic for building up a stability in people's desires and expectations, which diminishes inclinations for irrational resort to violence.<sup>14</sup> In a community, which extends, beyond minimum order, the objectives of an ideal public system, in the sense of the best establishment and most extensive sharing of all human values, agreements accept an ever more noteworthy. In such a community, agreements serve both to secure that values are formed and shared more by persuasion than intimidation and to sort out initiatives for the compelling employment of resources in the greatest production and dissemination of valued social outcomes.

The important role of agreements in the most exhaustive community of humanity relates, in this manner, to both minimum order and ideal order. It is by agreement most extensively conceived – that is, when agreement is considered to incorporate the entire stream of peoples shared conduct – that the effective members in power processes create an overall “constitutive process”<sup>15</sup> – identifying definitive decision-makers, anticipating fundamental community destinations, bearing structures of authority, giving bases of power in authority and other various values, censuring or legitimizing distinctive strategies in pressure and persuasion, and allocating competence among effective participants over diverse authority capacities and value collaborations – for the support of a unobtrusive minimum order. It is by agreement, further, when agreement is no less extensively conceived that the set up decision-makers perform the essential authority ability of determining, of legislating, general community policies about the comprehensive activities, which constitute international social process in quest of all values (Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, 1961). It is by agreement likewise, when the fundamental constitutive process of the general community is accordingly maintained, that the various participants in the international social process – territorially composed communities, international governmental organizations, political parties, pressure groups – express their innovative initiatives and

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<sup>14</sup> This approach is comprehensively documented in McDougal and Feliciano, *Law and Minimum World Public Order* (1961). The potential role of agreements is outlined in Ch.4. More abundant illustration is offered in Clark and Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law* (2d rev.ed.1960).

<sup>15</sup> McDougal and Feliciano, op. cit. supra note 1, Ch. 4.

establishes their base values to get on with the work in creating and distributing new values.<sup>16</sup>

In spite of the fact that the subjectivities of one human being are not open to direct investigation by another, the proposition for community decision-makers confronted with the problem of clarifying an international agreement, of the target of the closest conceivable approximation to the genuine shared expectation of the specific parties to the agreement appears an altogether achievable objective. The mere reality that individuals and people can and do join in complex, noncoercive, cooperative action is acceptable confirmation of their ability to formulate and communicate some mutual subjectivities, even by basic coordinated effort. The historic record of such actions shows, it may bear accentuation, not simply cooperation, but cooperation of a most successful and effective kind in quest of all the values admired by humanity.

The international agreements in Western European countries with which are in this dissertation concerned embrace all agreements, whoever the parties and whatever the sort, which are proposed to order, or do in fact have an effect upon the ordering of, value shaping and sharing which overstep nation-state lines. The process of agreement, by which we conclude our reference to all such agreements, is an integral part of a more complete international social process in which individuals and groups utilize strategies both of influence and of coercion to achieve their goals.<sup>17</sup>

In the most exhaustive international social process, grasping all value processes and both sorts of strategy, various participants, for different objectives, in fluctuating circumstances of international impact, utilize a wide range of base values, by different methodologies in communication, to accomplish a wide range of outcomes in degree and content of shared responsibility. An applicable understanding of the scope of components in this process that may influence both the common desires of commitment, which the parties are able to accomplish, and the realism with which a subsequent interpreter may hope to approximate their mutual desire requires a more deliberate review of the numerous phases of the process and its setting.

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<sup>16</sup> Two points may require emphasis: First, the agreements with which are concerned in this dissertation are between Nation-states and governments, however it includes those participants, which made influence in “community process”, which have effects transcending nation-state lines. Secondly, the line between expectation created by cooperative activity – sometimes called “customary” behavior – and explicit agreement is often difficult to draw.

<sup>17</sup> This part notices of the more comprehensive international social process are indicated in McDougal and Lasswell, *supra* note 2. Also McDougal, Lasswell, and Vlasic, *op. cit. supra* note 3, Ch.1.

The starting point and basic point of view for analyzing Political Documents and Agreements for the Cooperation in the Western Europe after the Second World War Two may be started as follows. From the earliest period there was a clear element of design about the bodies that make up the European Community now the European Union. Despite the fact that the European Community's definitive destination was not started with complete clarity at each outset, nevertheless it was clear what was included was intended to be a process, and a development in a certain direction. The process, course and direction were depicted in the very first lines of the starting of the cooperation as to establish the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe. That formula already demonstrated not only a nature of the process and the general manner, additionally some of the ambiguities, the potential for contrasts of opinion and scope for disagreement misunderstanding and which were to appear. Ever closer union obviously meant a dynamic and progressive growing together. On the other hand, it did not determine the nature of an "end product": it did not, for instance, declare of the single state, or state like entity, nor a federation at this period. On the other hand, the union was characterized as being among the peoples of Western Europe: this appeared to demonstrate something other than simply a union of several states.

In this way, it is obvious that what were being set up were a general process and a general direction. However it is also mentionable that the project was, from the beginning, after the Second World War period, open-ended and imprecise, having about it characteristics and qualities of desire and ambition and not only just narrow obligation.

### **3.1. Foreign impacts**

The emergence of the Cold War and its domestic political repercussions inspired the European Movement, which called for European states, once at the focal point of the international system, to join together in an increasingly rigid bipolar world. As the Cold War reinforced and the "Iron Curtain" descended, integration came to be seen as a method by which Western Europe could strengthen its security, in close and coordinated cooperation with the United States of America, against external Soviet aggression and internal communist subversion. Western Europe's defenselessness drew the United States profound into the continent's affairs and turned Washington into a "zealous champion" of Western European Integration, from this point we can see what sort of political system Western Europe was looking at that period. The campaign for

Cold War foreign policy was a spectacular achievement when seen from the constrained point of view of the effort to win acceptance of large-scale foreign aid. However, the ideological and propagandistic machinations of this campaign had outcomes, which were not entirely desired or predicted by the United States policy-makers and turned into a major problem for foreign policy, particularly towards Western Europe. The campaign failed to activate and mobilize congressional or public support for the economic and commercial destinations that had given a great part of the original motivation to the “Marshall Plan”; this ultimately limited the success of the aid program, for Congress declined to support legislation empowering the United States of America to adopt the commercial policies that the Marshall Plan had been intended to make possible. Besides, the campaign implanted the notion in the public mind that the United States of America was inevitably threatened by a massive, ideologically based fight upon everything Americans valued. This overstated representation of the risks of international communism founded the emotional and reasonable context, specifically on the continent of Europe. After the Second World War American government had to be interested almost solely with repelling the development of German power in Europe. In creating arrangements for the postwar period, the officials in charge of American foreign policy thought a formula that would avoid a second recurrence of terrible cycle by which the arrangement of one major war served only to construct the conditions for another.

### **3.1.1. Preconditions of United States Foreign Aid Programs**

Researchers of American foreign policy have been moderated to examine the issue of preconditions of United States foreign aid programs. Recent works in this field have neglected to connect the tendencies in domestic history to those in the history of foreign relations or to take note how institutional adjustments and adaptations at home affected the direction of policy abroad. In these works, to put it differently, the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan remains cut off from the nation’s previous contemporary history. This lack of connection clarifies why this part of dissertation starts from analyzing preconditions of United States aid programs and continues to demonstrate its impact towards the implementation of programs.

American attitudes toward political developments in all western European countries during 1946 developed along lines parallel to those demonstrated in German policy. American endeavors to assist European reconstruction were progressively seen not only as intends to eliminate the depressed economic conditions that tended to serve the

interests of the communists, but also as political instruments to undermine the impact of communist party and move Western European governments towards strong pro-American and anti-Soviet positions. Concluding point, which was recommended one of the essential decisions of the Administration in the sphere of foreign policy in 1946 was economic aid, not arms, would be the basis of United States power in the immediate post-hostilities period. This decision reflected the conviction that the Soviet Union did not need war with the United States, that Congress and the public would not support massive rearmament, and that financial aid was the most effective method of advocating America's broad interests – economic as well as political – in Western Europe. Additionally, political circumstance in Western Europe appeared that the communists – who had adopted a strategy of collaborating with established authority – would not endeavor revolutions or coups in Western Europe. On the premise of these different considerations, postwar rearmament was deferred uncertainly. For the following two years defense budgets were held to a minimum and the energies of the defense foundation were committed to the issues of reorganizations (European Recovery Program: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-first Congress First Session on H.R. 2362 and H.R. 3748, a Bill to Amend the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, 1949). The American diplomatic offensive beginning in August 1945 and proceeding through 1946 characterized in practice the noteworthiness of post-war reconstruction to American foreign policy. From the point of view determined by political advancements, economic aid ceased to be methods for building up a Wilsonian World Order<sup>18</sup> and turn out obviously a device for strengthening America's geopolitical position. By receiving a position that the United States should utilize its economic power to establish anti-Soviet bloc, the government violated the most essential precept of multilateralism, that bilateral economic agreements to advocate political purposes should be banned in light of the fact they let to international conflict. Obviously, multilateral ideas turn into an important adjunct to the development of an American sphere of influence. If the United States could tie the states of Western Europe into a commercial system in which the United States of America would be dominant, this would be a very viable method for uniting the Western bloc on a long-term basis. American endeavors to advocate multilateral commercial agreements were hence deprived of the honorable aspirations expressed by

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<sup>18</sup> A certain type of ideological perspectives on foreign policy - the term comes from the ideology of United States President Woodrow Wilson and his famous Fourteen Points that he believed would help create world peace if implemented.

the Second World War period planners and undoubtedly turn into an instrument in the kind of international power conflict they were calculated to prevent.

One of the consequences attributable to the inattention given the reconstruction issue during World War II was a significant absence of realism among American officials concerning the issues of postwar recovery of Europe. Far from assuming the fact that economic reconstruction itself would be the greatest challenge of the post-war period, wartime organizers anticipated a fast transition to conditions that would allow full usage and implementation of multilateralism. This sort of speculation slowly died. It was reflected in American persistence that the British accept full convertibility of sterling one year after the compelling date of the proposed loan.

Stimson outlines that it was “wholly clear, by July 1945 that, not only Britain but all Western Europe would need large scale American help” (Henry Lewis Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, 1948). Also writing in mid-1945 President Truman has declared that “it was already becoming apparent that we would be called upon to give aid, on a large scale, to many of the war devastated areas...it was plain that help was nearly needed and that it would have to come from us” (Truman H. S., 1986). This confirmation of the status of European recovery was, obviously, fragmentary, and in late 1946, the state department was simply starting to assemble a total picture of the status of Western European recovery. Early proposals of the colossal scope of the problem, however, emerged from various quarters. One State Department report in late 1946 illustrated that “the devastated countries of Europe will all face in 1947 and to a lesser extent in 1948 balance of payments problems aggravated by trade difficulties...substantial financial assistance will be required to maintain the current rate of recovery and to get ahead with the problem of reconstruction” (State Department Quotation, 1946). One of the main documents which demonstrated foreign, specifically the United States, influence into the Western European transition processes is The Truman Doctrine<sup>19</sup>, which will be analyzed below.

#### **3.1.1.1 Press Review**

In order to highlight and for the better understanding of the transition period after the Second World War in this subchapter the press review will take a place. In the New York Times we read: “Washington, April 3 - President Truman signed today the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, which made the long debated European Recovery Program an

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<sup>19</sup> The Truman Doctrine – was announced to Congress of the United States of America by President Harry S. Truman on March 12, 1947.

actuality," This measure," he said, "is America's answer to the challenge facing the free world." "The European Recovery Program had its genesis in a suggestion advanced by Secretary Marshall during a speech at Harvard University on June 5, 1947. He recommended that the European nations get together to see what they could do among themselves to speed economic rehabilitation and to calculate the deficiency. He intimated that the United States would consider to what extent it could make up this deficiency in the interest of re-establishing peace and security in the world"<sup>20</sup> (Hinton, 1948).

On the pages of the newspaper Altoona Mirror, published on January 6, 1948<sup>21</sup>, we read: "A number of questions about the Marshall plan which are practically unanswerable. For instance: What guarantee is there that the Marshall plan will work?" If it is asked: "Isn't there a chance that the Marshall plan will fail to stop communism? - the honest answer is; yes, it may. In spite of Marshall Plan aid, a number of western European countries may go socialist and further nationalize their industries" (Lawrence, 1948). It is visible here; that national interest of the United States of America was essential and it was one of the main point in the financial aid in order to help European reconstruction process.

It is essential to discuss about American Peoples attitude towards the Marshal Plan. For this reason, here we present the survey made by the "Long Beach Independent" newspaper and published in 22 April 1948. The question was formulated as follows: "Have you happened to read or hear anything about a plan for American aid to European commonly called Marshal Plan?"<sup>22</sup> (Roper, 1948). (See results in the [Chart No 1](#)).


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<sup>20</sup> <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0403.html#article>

<sup>21</sup> <https://newspaperarchive.com/altoona-mirror-jan-06-1948-p-8/>


<sup>22</sup> <https://newspaperarchive.com/long-beach-independent-apr-22-1948-p-2/>

**Chart No 1**




As we see 85, 5% of respondents have heard about the Marshall Plan. The respondents who had heard or read about it, they were asked: “From what you know about the Marshall Plan, are you generally favorable to it, generally against it, or have not made up your mind about it yet?” (See results in the [chart No 2](#)).

**Chart No 2**



People were making all sorts of arguments for and against the Marshall Plan. Below in the chart No 3 are statements of argument in favor of the plan. The question was formulated as follows: “do you agree with this statement, disagree with it, or it is something you are not sure about one way or the other?” (See results in the [Chart No 3](#)) (Roper, 1948).



### 3.1.2. The Truman Doctrine and Its Impact

The distinctive component of American foreign policy as it had been developed by the Truman Administration in 1945-46 was that it was based not upon the negotiations or arrangements of treaties or the utilization of armed forces but on the development of economic assistance. While executive initiatives and activities had been set up and accepted with regard to functions traditionally identified with diplomacy, the Administration's strategy had the remarkable impact of focusing foreign policy in an aspect of federal activity – appropriations – were initiative traditionally rested with the legislative branch. This progressive advancement implied difficulties of numerous amount, including the requirement that the State Department operate in somewhat not adequately, the relative lack of expertise in the area of foreign policy and the low status of House Committee of foreign affairs<sup>23</sup> (Phillips, 1966).

The rapid development in American awareness of economic condition in Europe constrained the Truman administration to consider a scope of prompt political and economic potential outcomes that taken together could fail American plans for the postwar world. The implications of Europe's plight for America's long-range economic goals were serious. The minimization of politically enforced controls on international trade was the focal motivation of America's multilateral program. Yet the immediate future appeared to guarantee an increase of such controls. The economic conditions that

<sup>23</sup> Is a standing Committee of the United States House of Representatives which has jurisdiction over bills and investigations related to the foreign affairs of the United States.

developed in Europe after the World War Two seriously undermined the political stability of Western European states and American endeavors to construct this region into an anti-Soviet bloc. The collapsing British economy was one of the main principle props of Western Europe in early 1947. British industrial exports were playing a crucial role in reconstruction of the continent. If Britain were to forcibly restrict exports to the rest of Europe and along these lines further limit supplies of essential goods in countries where almost all materials were in short supply, the political outcomes were certain to be in a direction of instability and polarization. The American government could not ignore the possibility that these circumstances would reinforce the Communist Party in Italy and France and might well bring communists into power in either country through elections or a forcible coup.

The Truman administration's aim of using economic assistance to advance the political interests of pro-American elements was evident in American dealings with other western-European countries in 1946. Advisory Council – which consisted of representatives of the executive departments, concerned with foreign economic policy and was in charge for making recommendations to the president – demonstrate the consistent consideration of this factor.

The Truman Doctrine (Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1947) and the Development of American Foreign Policy in 1947, President Harry S. Truman characterized United States foreign policy in the context of its new role as a world superpower. Many researchers consider his speech to Congress as the words that officially started the Cold War. Truman argued that the United States could no longer remain by and permit the forcible expansion of Soviet totalitarianism into free, sovereign nations, in light of the fact that American national security now depended upon more than only the physical security of American territory. Rather, in a sharp break with its traditional avoidance of extensive foreign commitments beyond the Western Hemisphere during peacetime, the Truman Doctrine committed the United States of America to actively offering assistance to protect the political integrity of democratic states when such an offer was presumed to be in the best interest of the United States of America.

The Truman Doctrine was a noteworthy break from United States historical patterns of isolationist foreign policy. Moreover, it served as a precedent for future United States policy of interventionism. An important quote from Truman's speech, "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are

resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures," stands as "all encompassing" and would "define American policy for the next generation and beyond" (Truman H. S., 1986). The Truman Doctrine not just outlined the new foreign policy of the United States of America, but also helped to clarify American foreign policy since the Doctrine's inception. One of the main consequences, characterized from the doctrine, are to introduce two important ideas that have shaped the way presidents have argued for foreign policy: direct economic aid and containment; at the same time, the doctrine illustrates the isolationism of post-World War Two Americans - and how the Soviet Union came to be seen as a global threat.

Two themes of American policy found expression in the President's statement. The first of these anti-Soviet and anti-communist, was expressed in the references to "several thousand armed men, led by Communists", who were challenging the governments of European Countries, and in the broad statement that "a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will" (Truman H. S., 1986). The second theme indicated to America's world economic responsibilities, especially those concerning the problem of postwar reconstruction. It was outlined in the reference to European countries endeavoring to "repair the ravages of war", and most importantly in the assertion that "our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid". In its discussion of these two themes, the speech referred to two matters concerning which the proclamation of new American policies had been deferred for a significant period. In conjoining them, the President adopted the position taken by Forrestal and Byrnes early in 1946 that popular support for extensive foreign aid could be accomplished only in the framework of an exposition of the expansionist nature of Soviet policy and the announcement of a policy of resistance to it (Acacia, 2009).

The Truman Doctrine speech was an official pronouncement of unusual historical significance. Although rapidly composed in the absence of the Secretary of State, it was to become the fundamental affirmation of American foreign policy in the post-war period. American politicians on each level to characterize the nature of America's purposes in the Cold War would utilize it in a more constrained sense; it initiated the long-deferred campaign to win public support for a comprehensive American response to the economic needs of post-war Europe. In spite of the fact that the "Marshall Plan" itself, which would constitute the bulk of the American program for European reconstruction, was not proposed publicly until June 1947, the Truman Doctrine

speech, created an arrangement of procedure that the Truman administration would utilize at each significant point in Congressional consideration of the foreign-aid program. Doctrine speech was commendably designed to accomplish the purposes proposed by Vandenberg<sup>24</sup> and Clayton<sup>25</sup>. There were two fundamental elements of this design: the first included the environment of crisis in which the recommendations were put forward; the second included the rhetoric by which the speech characterized the world circumstance (Fosseda, 1993), (Davies, 1947). The speech that emerged from these deliberations constituted, as the passages quoted previously indicate, an almost exclusively ideological appeal for backing of a limited aid program. The heart of the speech and doctrine was the President's assertion that the essential principles of America's political doctrine were being challenged in a worldwide campaign of totalitarian aggression composed of communist subversion and Soviet expansion. It was to this threat, the President proposed, that the United States needed to react, rather than to the issue of post-war economic reconstruction. Americans needed to react, moreover, in light of the fact that it was appropriate to protect "free peoples", not to defend specific economic and strategic interests that were not specified in the speech. It should be outlined that treatment of the Truman Doctrine speech as an instrument of propaganda was not expected to imply that it included a total distortion of American foreign policy. There is no doubt that the President was consistently convinced that the USSR was focused on an expansionist policy not only in the Balkans as well as in Western Europe, and that only American interference could prevent their success. Nor should it be suspected that they deeply abhorred communism as synonymous with Soviet imperialism, were sure no people would willingly choose it aside from in the most distressed circumstances, and were anxious to avoid – within the limits of American interests and abilities – the extension of communist influence. To the degree that the Truman Doctrine represented this world of view, it was an accurate reflection of American policy. The elements of propaganda were presented by the handling of the whole affair in an environment of intense crisis, by depicting the problems of post-war Europe as the result of Soviet betrayal and communist subversion, and by representing American policies "vis-à-vis" communism as based upon philosophical scruples instead

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<sup>24</sup> Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1947-49

<sup>25</sup> The first Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 1946-47

of considerations of practical self-interest. These points were not minor but fundamental (Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 1947)<sup>26</sup>.

The refusal of Administration witnesses, under the pressure of direct questioning, to support their apparent wish to draw back from the literal indications of the Truman Doctrine was demonstrative of the hearings generally. These extensive discussions provided only one brief reference to American economic interests in Europe and not discussion whatever of the conceptions of geopolitics that had driven the Administration to commit itself to building up a Western European bloc. The Administration's complete dependence upon the methods of Propaganda during consideration of Greco-Turkish aid raised serious questions about the degree to which it had succeeded in inaugurating a precedent for large-scale economic assistance to Western Europe.

### **3.1.3. The Marshall Plan as the Main Tool of United States Influence towards Western European States transition processes after the WW2**

The successful accomplishment of the Truman Doctrine speech and the United States Administration's initiatives against domestic communists in guaranteeing Congressional confirmation of the request, transformed the mood of the State Department from one of "utter despair about foreign aid" to vigorous anticipation of a major program of economic assistance. "Now ...American power was released for its world tasks" and United States foreign policy could be planned without boundary" (Jones, 1955), Even before the Truman Doctrine, under Secretary Acheson<sup>27</sup> had set a special committee of the State-War-Navy coordinating committee to work evaluating the broad requirements of European recovery. Under these circumstances, the Department moved rapidly toward basic decisions on two critical problems: What form should be aid program take? When must the program go into effect?

The question as to the shape of the aid program was complex. The obvious decision, a set of programs, one for each country of Western Europe, had little to recommend it but its simplicity. The United States had been extending aid to Europe on this premise since the end of the war and had accomplished little more than the prevention of collapse. Additionally, the Americans had strong inclinations about the organization of

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<sup>26</sup> Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eightieth Congress, First Session, on H. R. 2616, a Bill to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey. March 20, 21, 24, 27, 28, 31, April 3, 8, 9, 1947

<sup>27</sup> United States Secretary of State in the administration of President Harry S. Truman from 1949 to 1953

the European economy. By 1946, the reconstruction of both Western Europe and Germany was viewed as a crucial to the consolidation of the Western bloc. However, other Western European states, particularly France, opposed the idea of reconstructing the country that had so recently used its military power against them. The concept of an integrated recovery program provided a solution of this, because it would not be reconstructing the old, autonomous Germany, but a Germany limited by its incorporation in a supranational economic system. Given all these circumstances, it is not surprising that in early 1947, when there was strong pressure to promote and advance an effective program for European recovery in a hurry, the idea of an integrated, Europe wide-plan came rapidly to the surface.

The State Department was concerning itself with establishing a political strategy for putting the plan into effect. Before proceeding to this aspect of the aid program, it is worth seeing the almost incredible rapidity with which the State Department composed the Marshall Plan<sup>28</sup>. The idea of accomplishing reconstruction by integrating the European economy was widely accepted in both among European officials and the State Department by 1946. The reason that these ideas had not risen to the top prior to March 1947 was political – the issue of reconstruction had been negotiated at the policy-making level – not substantive. The great accomplishment of the Administration in the spring of 1947 was less in developing the conception of the Marshall Plan as in setting up a political environment in which long-repressed ideas could be achieved.

The American government officially declared its readiness to launch a major program of European reconstruction in two stages. First, in a speech to the Delta Council in Cleveland, on May 8, under secretary Acheson attempted the idea in a lengthy speech<sup>29</sup> on the economic conditions of postwar Europe. Somewhat less than month later came Secretary of State Marshall's famous address<sup>30</sup> at the Harvard university commencement, where he announced: "The United States should do what it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the World but that "before the United States government can proceed much further...there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation" (Holm, 2017).

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<sup>28</sup> The Marshall Plan – officially the European Recovery Program, ERP – was an American initiative to aid Western Europe, make economic support to rebuild Western European economies after the Second World War

<sup>29</sup> Department of State Bulletin (DSB), Vol. 16, p. 991

<sup>30</sup> Department of State Bulletin (DSB), Vol. 16, p. 1159

The logic of circumstances during 1947 moved the Americans toward an adopted strategy for realizing their political and economic program. If it was clear that both politics and economics weighed against the early acceptance of multilateral economic policies of Western European states, it was equally obvious that these circumstances were subject to change. A democratic victory could put the Americans in a strong political position to press forward for further political and economic reform in Western Europe, while a defeat would cancel any present achievements they might accomplish. Moreover, Marshall Plan aid was anticipated to become available early in 1948 so that, while waiting for the political situation to elucidate, the United States Administration could unhesitatingly expect the economic conditions that were conflicting with multilateralism to be improved. Finally, United States' influence upon European economic policies would be significantly strengthened once Marshall Plan aid started to flow. These considerations appear to have led the United States Administration to approve an interim strategy. The endeavor to accomplish immediate approval of multilateral principles would be pressed. In this context, the improvement of the International Trade Organization (ITO)<sup>31</sup> Charter retained considerable significance. Its fulfillment – with suitable modifications to give special exceptions to full application of multilateralism during the transition period – would commit America's partners to consequent adoption of principles presently inapplicable. A Clayton outlined: "The Marshall Plan makes the ITO negotiations more important than ever before because without a sound permanent program of reciprocal multilateral economic relations, no emergency program could possibly have any permanent results"<sup>32</sup>. Meanwhile, actual implementation of multilateral practices would be sought only on a constrained premise, within the regional framework of Western European states, which would be encouraged to move toward a Customs Union modeled after the Benelux federation. Progress along this line would at least conclude the negative purpose of abolishing bilateral economic practices in Europe and accordingly establish constrained multilateral precedents that could be generalized later. Clayton stated for the State Department the preconditions upon which he felt the United States ought to insist before accepting the CEEC<sup>33</sup> plan. Two of his three proposals were conducted toward convincing the countries of Western Europe to adopt economic policies that would guarantee significant progress toward reconstruction. The third directly reflected his

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<sup>31</sup> ITO was the proposed name for an international institution for the regulation of trade, Led by the United States in collaboration with allies, the effort to form the organization from 1945-1948

<sup>32</sup> House Committee of Foreign Affairs, *Hearings of Postwar Recovery Policy*, p. 95

<sup>33</sup> Committee of European economic cooperation met in Paris, July 1947

aspiration to use the Marshall Plan as the instrument for accomplishing the United States Administrations long-range political and economic goals<sup>34</sup>. It held that beneficiary states ought to be required to achieve agreement among themselves for successful and effective activity in political and economic fields. It was generally comprehended, that one principal and basic purpose of American commercial policy was the expansion of American access to world politics and economics, in case of economics to promote and facilitate continuing high levels of exports. Obviously, a consistent theme within the United States Administration during the development of the Marshall Plan was the need to provide and maintain high levels of American exports.

Under these circumstances, the significance of the Marshall Plan as a method of directly financing American exports turns into the prevailing economic theme in the United States of America's Administrations approach to foreign aid. Clayton states the point: "Without further prompt and substantial aid from the United States, political, social and economic disruption will overwhelm Europe. Aside from the awful implications, which this would have for the future peace and security of the world, the immediate effects on our domestic economy would be disastrous: markets for our surplus production gone, unemployment, and a heavily unbalanced budget on the background of a mountainous was debt. These things must not happen" (Garwood, 1958). President Truman outlined the same issue: "The impact upon our domestic economy of the assistance we are now furnishing or may furnish t foreign countries is a matter of grave concern...I believe we are generally agreed that the recovery of production abroad is essential...to a world trade in which our farmers and workers may benefit from substantial exports and in which their customers may be able to pay for these goods" (Nourse, 1953).

From the point of view of the domestic economy, such a reduction was critical, since any increase in export levels under the Marshall Plan would have exercised new inflationary pressures and opened the program to attack based upon its effect upon the most essential domestic political issue of the moment. The best summary of the implication that the Administration attached to the Marshall Plan as an instrument of maintaining export levels was contributed by Clayton: "If we leave these countries of Western Europe to shift for themselves and say, we are sorry; we can't help you

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<sup>34</sup> The Senate Committee on Finance, hearings on *Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act* (80:2), p. 454

anymore, I think conditions will quickly ensue there which will, in effect, bring about substantial blackout of that market for our goods and for the good of the rest of the World – for Latin America, for example. If Latin America loses its markets in Western Europe, we lose ours in Latin America...It is highly important that we do what we responsibly can to help these countries to get again to a position where they can stand alone, because if we do not we are going to have to make such radical changes, I am afraid, in our own economy, that it would be very difficult for a democratic, free-enterprise system to make it.<sup>35</sup> In short, Europe must not only recover, it must recover in a way that would preserve it as a market for American goods, lest the entire American economy suffer a setback that would jeopardize the free – enterprise system.<sup>36</sup>

To point out that the economic forces convincing the United States to subsidize European recovery would have been sufficient, in themselves, to move the American government to propose the Marshall Plan is not to recommend that considerations established in economic relationships alone influenced development of this program. Without a doubt, by 1946 foreign aid had been assigned the chief instrument of American endeavors to consolidate an anti-Soviet Bloc of Western European states behind American leadership. At first look, the relationship of the Marshall Plan to this strategy is not obvious. In stating the program in his Harvard commencement speech, Secretary Marshall expresses that American policy “is not directed against any country or doctrine but against depression and chaos” and that “any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation...on the part of the united states government”<sup>37</sup>. Far from preceding the line of rhetoric established by the Truman Doctrine or proposing Americas aim of establishing an anti-Soviet Bloc, Secretary Marshall Speech certainly offered to work with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in accomplishing economic recovery and even suggested that American aid might be made accessible to these states. Only after Soviet Union’s refusing Marshall’s offer was held CEEC conference.<sup>38</sup> What, then, was the relationship of Marshall’s proposition to American political strategies toward Europe? In developing Marshall’s proposition, American policymakers were affected by a political problem: The Truman Doctrine, directed to the domestic audience, had not been generally well received in Europe. Not only did the speech constitute an immediate attack upon the largest political

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<sup>35</sup> House Committee of Foreign Affairs, *Hearings of Postwar Recovery Policy*, p. 334-5

<sup>36</sup> House Committee of Foreign Affairs, *Hearings of Postwar Recovery Policy*, p. 329

<sup>37</sup> Department of State Bulletin (DSB), Vol. 16, p. 1159

<sup>38</sup> Held in Paris, July 1947

organizations in Western Europe, yet it additionally presaged a division of Europe into Soviet and American spheres of influence. The President's speech was the first official American repudiation of United States – Soviet cooperation (Watt, 1963). The greater part of this was clarified to American officials during their meetings with European officials at the GAAT conference<sup>39</sup> and afterwards United State's officials decided that any American offer of aid would have to be founded on something other than resistance to the Soviet Union. It should be mentioned that recently was established an Economic Committee for Europe (ECE)<sup>40</sup>, including representatives of all European countries, West and East. United States could not simply disregard the ECE or support a unilateral program rejecting communists without acquiring widespread disapproval for provoking the division of Europe. At the same time, they were worried about communist obstructionism, and sensitive to the arrangements to which the American government was devoted. Kennan's statement suggested a tactical solution: "it would be best...to stimulate initiative in the first instance from the ECE but to do so in such a way that Eastern European countries would either exclude themselves by unwillingness to accept the proposed conditions or agree to abandon the exclusive orientations of their economies" (Kennan G. F., 1969). Clayton even reported: "we must avoid getting into another UNRRA<sup>41</sup>. United States must run this show" (Pritchard). Marshall Speech, which was the synthesis of the Kennan's and Clayton's proposals, therefore derived from two proposals concurring that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe should be excluded from the aid program. Marshall's proposal was intended to appear to offer involvement to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and to guarantee that they could not accept without receiving the multilateral economic policies that the Soviet Union many times rejected.<sup>42</sup> Should they obtain, the United States would reverse belatedly

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<sup>39</sup> The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a multilateral agreement regulating international trade. According to its preamble, its purpose was the "substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis." It was negotiated during the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment and was the outcome of the failure of negotiating governments to create the International Trade Organization (ITO). GATT was signed by 23 states in Geneva on October 30, 1947 and took effect on January 1, 1948

<sup>40</sup> Was established in 1947, to encourage economic cooperation among its member states, it is one of five regional commissions under the administrative direction of United Nations headquarters.

<sup>41</sup> Was an international relief agency, largely dominated by the United States but representing 44 nations. Founded in 1943, it became part of the United Nations in 1945, and it largely shut down operations in 1947. Its purpose was to plan, co-ordinate, administer or arrange for the administration of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities, medical and other essential services

<sup>42</sup> Department of State, *Draft Summary of Department's Position on ERP*, ERP file, 1947

the defeat of its endeavors to influence Soviet policies in Eastern Europe, in this manner making the Western Bloc – America’s second choice for post-war Europe – unnecessary; should the Communist states deny Marshall’s offer, they, not the Americans, would acquire the responsibility of dividing Europe.

The Marshall Plan inclined toward the consolidation of the Western Bloc on both the political and economic levels. Dispel of the hope of setting up a global multilateral system, the American’s kept on progressing to the direction of the formation of multilateral economic arrangements over a wide geographical area, including Western Europe. The compromises with immediate economic consequences, which had resulted in the acceptance of regional multilateral economic relations, were seen as short-term, transitional arrangements that would establish the fundamental principle of multilateralism and set the stage for the consequent institution of multilateral economic relations in a significant part of the non-communist world. During the short term, the countries of Western Europe would be restrained to the United States through their reliance upon economic assistance. As American assistance diminished in volume and significance, the process of full economic recovery would approach finalization, carrying with it – as indicated by the terms of the Marshall Plan – the prospects of adjusting the exceptions that had been made on behalf of regional economic connections to meet the recovery crisis. At this point the arrangements of economic relationship established during the transition period would be maintained as the major factors of a progressing system, tying the countries of Europe and the United States into the close economic relationships, by which political relationships, effectively developed, would be continued. Accordingly, in both the long and short terms the politics and economics of the Marshall plan guaranteed to play a fundamental role in the unification and strengthening of the Western Bloc.

In 1947, the immediate Western reality was entirely different. In the two Major countries of continental Western Europe, Italy and France, national Communist parties were in influential political positions. Moreover, these communist parties had solid impact over labor organizations in both countries, and therefore would have the capacity to affect significantly any program of reconstruction. The unification of the Western bloc would be difficult under these circumstances, as Kennan proposed in a speech: “What is the moral for us?” he asked, referring to the strength of the French Communist Party. “I think it is the same as in the case of Italy. Any assistance extended to France by us, directly or indirectly, must be anchored in some sort of undertaking

which will bind at least the French government if not French labor as well, to see that there is no dirty work at the crossroads” (Nelson, 1983). The improvements of America’s engagement to an unlimited program of aid to Europe during 1947 paralleled a series of decisive events in Western Europe that largely excluded existing barriers to the Western bloc. The availability of American aid would reinforce incredibly the political position of the non-communist parties. Consequently, it was to be expected that the news of an American initiative in the field of financial aid would initiate a period of political retrenchment in Europe. As Raymond Aron outlines: “The more or less genuine news of a vast ‘lend-lease of peace’ plan that America is about to produce has already touched off something of an ideological battle in France” (Werth, 1956). The problem of American policy represented by communist domination of the labor movements in Italy and France, serious prior to 1947 despite the erosion of Communist impact that had occurred, was highly aggravated by the expulsion of the Communists from the governments and the implied termination of the policy of cooperation. The Communists would now be able to use their strengths in the labor unions to obstruct endeavors at reconstruction. In both Italy and France, the communist’s parties moved toward anti-government positions. Finally, the governments in both states were restructured without the communists. The American government was able to derive noticeable satisfaction from political circumstances in Western Europe during 1947. Americans had accomplished an important and decisive victory; the unequal fight for Western Europe was over. The United States government was confident that just Congressional activity on the proposed aid program stood between it and the total success of its policy of constructing the Western Bloc.

Consequently, from above mentioned sections it has attempted to examine the relationship of the Marshall Plan to American economic and politico-strategic policies. It is clear from the material presented, that the foreign aid program was informally identified with both. The question emerges, on the other hand, as to the relative weights of these two kinds of considerations. The answer one can give on this issue is that the economic and strategic implication of Europe were indivisible – Europe’s strategic importance derived in large part from its economic strength – and that any endeavor to outline one side of the matter without reference to the other is not real. Keeping in this mind, however, some observations can be made. It is obvious that the American government would have initiated the program to aid to Europe fundamentally identical to the Marshall Plan regardless of the fact that there had been no communist threat to Western Europe. This was the certain significance of repeated

statements of the relationship of American economic interests to the problem of European recovery and the explicit conclusion of the Policy Planning Staff in its report (Nelson, 1983). Would be communist threat alone, without strong economic interests, have composed the Marshall Plan? Surely the ideological issue was not decisive; in 1947 the American government was not able to do any contradiction anywhere in the World to stop communism, through it was highly exceedingly aware of the considerable cultural loss Americans would feel if Western Europe fell under control of an ideology inconsistent to most of them. The strategic importance of Europe was such, however, as to make terminating expansion of communism there crucial. Had the Soviet Union possessed the capacity to accomplish domination over all Europe it would have had a concentration of economic and military power that the United States could not have coordinated without transforming American society into a “garrison state” (LaFeber, 1987). One conclusion, then, is that either economic or politico-strategic considerations, independent from anyone else, would have composed a proposal like the Marshall Plan.

### **3.2. Interdependence in Western European countries during transition processes**

It has become customary to suggest that whilst both political and economic factors were crucial to Western European cooperation and integration in the formative post-war years, the former have now declined in relation to the latter. The impact of modernization is generally agreed to be a main point for this. “It has broadened the international agenda from its traditional power and security concerns to embrace a range of economic and social issues, and at the same time it has produced an interconnectedness between states and interrelatedness between states, especially in the economic and monetary spheres, that amounts to and interdependence” (Nugent, 2017). Within Western European countries there have been many regional aspects to this development of interdependence, one from these dimensions have been specifically important. First, “all significant Western European countries have, since the Second World War, seen their external trade become increasingly West European focused” (Nugent, 2017).

As a consequence and result of interdependence, a wide variety of financial and economic issues can thus no longer be limited to, national barriers. States are more and more sensitive to outside events and are increasingly unable to act in policy of isolation. They must have cooperation; have consultation and some would dispute integrate with one another in the interest of international and national economic growth and stability.

### 3.2.1. The Treaty of Western Europe (Brussels Pact)

One of the primary political documents was signed and which could have considerable influence in a key success of cooperation between Western European countries is the Treaty of Western Europe (Brussels Pact). The treaty had been signed by the Benelux Three<sup>43</sup>, France and the United Kingdom in 1948. M. Bidault<sup>44</sup> stated: “The moment has come, strengthen on the political level and, as soon as possible, on the military level, the collaboration of the old and of the new world, both so closely united in their attachment to the only civilization which counts”. It guaranteed them to establish a joint defensive system as well as to strengthen their cultural, political and economic cooperation. The supreme body of the Brussels Treaty Organization was to be the Consultative Council, consisting of the five Foreign Ministers. Under it was to be a Western Defense Committee consisting of the Defense Ministers. Article IV of the Treaty outlined that “should any of the Parties be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the others would afford the attacked Party all the military and other aid and assistance in their power”. It was quite far away from the much prominent level of integration wished for by the European movement; however, its provisions, similar to the equally intergovernmental structure of the OEEC<sup>45</sup>, precisely reflected how far Britain was prepared to move toward supranational cooperation in 1948. The most important aspect of the treaty was the last item of its title: “Collective Self-defense”. The signatories resolved, among other things, to “afford assistance to each other...in resisting any policy of aggression” (Preamble). The significance of the treaty is that the defense angle was in this manner already covered; it incorporated the United Kingdom from the beginning; it was greatly broadened the following year with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949; and in the early years, to no one’s introductory surprise, the Federal Republic of Germany was rejected. With the defense flank covered, attention could turn to different things; and by the same consideration, when “other things” were established, they would not cover defense, in spite of the fact

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<sup>43</sup> Member countries: Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands

<sup>44</sup> Georges-Augustin Bidault - a French politician After the war, he served as foreign minister and prime minister on several occasions

<sup>45</sup> The Organization for European Economic Co-operation; (OEEC) came into being on 16 April 1948. It emerged from the Marshall Plan and the Conference of Sixteen (Conference for European Economic Co-operation), which sought to establish a permanent organization to continue work on a joint recovery programme and in particular to supervise the distribution of aid. The headquarters of the Organization was in Paris, France.

that the possibility was periodically raised. Defense matters were particularly excluded when the Statute of the Council of Europe<sup>46</sup> was signed in 1949.

### 3.2.2. The Hague Congress and its consequences

The idea of creating an European assembly, which was to be the leading force in a formulation process for a European identity, was to explore increasing support. This was the essential message of the Congress of Europe, which took place in The Hague from seven to ten May 1948, and was organized by the Joint International Committee of the Movements for European Unity. The Congress was the first meeting in which the approaches to create forms of cooperation between peoples who only three years prior had been at war with one another, were discussed before public opinion. The Congress gave its participants the sense of a common belonging to an entity – Europe – that was much more than a geographical expression. Europe was, in the new context of the Cold War, to rediscover the best of its specific cultural features. In Churchill's mind, the Congress had to be „the voice of Europe“ (Jean-Michel Guieu and Christophe Le Dreau, 1948). For his part, the leader of the „Union europe enne des federalistes“, Holland's Hendrik Brugmans, outlined: „Europe is a sense of freedom“ (Jean-Michel Guieu and Christophe Le Dreau, 1948). As far as institutional issues were concerned, the Congress endorsed a contradiction between the supporters of a supranational integration and the advocators of an approach that excluded a constitutional accomplishment. The Hague Congress of 1948 was a crucial moment for the future of federalist thought in Europe. From one perspective, the Congress was the culmination of decades of federalist advocacy. The event demonstrated that Europeans of all nationalities and political persuasion could be attracted to a single-state solution to the crises the continent faced during the Second World War. Yet the results of the Congress were underwhelming for federalists, and historians generally agree that unionists emerged from this event as winners. Without a doubt, the Hague Congress of 1948 was at the same time a starting point and continuing point for the present European federalist project.

It was not just politicians looking toward a united continent for a solid and secure European future. Blair indicates that supranationalist sentiment in Europe was also a consequence of transnational resistance groups that grew during the Second World War. Members of these groups founded and developed the European Union of Federalists (UEF) in December 1946. Their post-war objectives included the formation of a constitutionally united Europe with a federal parliament, government and court,

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<sup>46</sup> <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/001>

which controlled areas such as security, while regional governments would have jurisdiction over remaining issues (Blair, 2010). It in this way creates the impression that national politicians were supportive of intergovernmental cooperation while transnational citizens groups advocated for a federalist arrangement in the consequence of the Second World War. This should come as no surprise if one considers that a federal Europe would require political leaders to surrender their countries sovereignty for the purpose of the European project, while transnational activists had apparently less to lose from such cooperation. Despite their inspiration, it is clear that, by the end of the Second World War, the goal of a united Europe in one form or another was broadly viewed as the sole guarantor of prosperity and peace. As political researcher Dusan Sidjanski mentions, „the primary debate during this Congress was between the federalists and unionists, and generally had no relation to political ideology, occupation or nationality“ (Sidjanski D. , 2007).

In accordance with the principles and objectives set out in the Political Report submitted by the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity:

The Congress:

- Recognizes that it is the urgent obligation of the nations of Europe to create a political and economic union with specific objectives in order to guarantee security and social advancement.
- Notes with endorsement the recent steps, which have been taken by some European Governments towards political and economic cooperation, however trusts that in the present emergency the organizations established are by themselves incomplete to afford any lasting remedy.

Sovereign Rights:

- Declares that the time has come when the European countries must transfer and connect some portion of their sovereign rights in order to secure common political and economic activity for the integration and proper improvement of their common resources.
- Considers that any Union or Federation of Europe should be constructed to assure the security of its constituent peoples, ought to be free from outside control, and should not be conducted against any other nation.

- Assigns to a United Europe the immediate assignment of setting up continuously a democratic social system, the point of which should be to free men from all sorts of slavery and economic insecurity, just as political democracy intends to protect them against the activity of irrational power.
- Affirms that the integration of Germany in a United or Federated Europe alone contributes an answer to both the political and economic aspects of the German issue.
- Declares that the Union or Federation must assist in guaranteeing the political, economic and cultural developments of the populations of the territories away, identified with it, without preference to the special ties, which connect these territories to European countries.

European Assembly:

- Requests the assemble, as a matter of real urgency, of a European Assembly chosen by the Parliaments of the participating nations, from among their members or others, outlined:

(a) to empower and give expression to European public opinion;

(b) to advise upon immediate practical measures composed dynamically to achieve about the necessary economic and political union of Europe;

(c) to analyze the juridical and constitutional implications emerging out of the creation of such a Union or Federation and their economic and social outcomes;

Charter of Human Rights:

- Considers that the resultant Union or Federation should be open to all European nations democratically represented and governed and which guarantees to respect a Charter of Human Rights.
- Resolves that a Commission should be set up to guarantee immediately the double task of drafting such a Charter and of setting down models to which a State must harmonize if it is to justify the name of a democracy.
- Requests that this Commission should report within three months on its labors.

Supreme Court:

- Is persuaded that in the interests of human values and human liberty, the Assembly should make recommendations and proposals for the foundation of a Court of Justice with adequate sanctions for the implementation of this Charter, and to this end any citizen of the associated states shall have readiness before the court, at any time and with the least conceivable delay, of any violation of his rights as detailed in the Charter.<sup>47</sup>

Ultimately, historians have seen the result of the Congress as a unionist victory – in spite of the fact that federalist attendants outnumbered unionists (Sidjanski D. , 2007). In spite of the fact that the Manifesto developed as a compromise of these two sides, and both the terms „federation“ and „union“ were used reciprocally throughout, the document ultimately calls for the protection of national sovereignty. Moreover, it served as a guide for Europe’s global strategy in the post-War years (Sidjanski D. , 2007). Finally, and perhaps most significantly for the federalist movement, the Congress’s Manifesto called for an declaration of political will that went over those of national politicians and incorporated the voices of citizens as well (Pistone S. , 2008). Nevertheless, the Congress was not able to create a “greater unity between its members” on a political degree, because of its emphasis on intergovernmental cooperation. This in turn led to the deceleration of the federalist movement. The major consequence was the Council of Europe, founded with the signing in London in 1949 of a statute by ten Western European states<sup>48</sup>. The statute noted the requirement for closer unity between all the like-minded countries of Europe and listed the Council’s aims, including common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters“, however not defense. The Council content a governing Committee of Ministers, on which each member state had one vote and a member Consultative Assembly made up of representatives proposed from national legislatures.

The Hague Congress along these lines ended with few of the federalists objectives meaningfully incorporated into the Manifesto. Despite the fact that the Congress absolutely created circumstances for the establishment of the European Communities, it also guaranteed that the way toward integration would not end in federalism.

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<sup>47</sup> Congress of Europe: The Hague-May, 1948: Resolutions. London-Paris: International Committee of the Movements for European Unity, 1948. 16 p. p. 5-7

<sup>48</sup> The Statute of the Council of Europe is a treaty signed on 5 May 1949, which created the Council of Europe.

Moreover, this came, although, that Europe was, in the post-war era, ready for a continental, political union.

### 3.2.3. European Coal and Steel Community and its Impact

A limited set of states pushed toward further integration. “That political aim was to be achieved, not through unrealistic plans for complete political union, but through a strategy of gradual integration of certain functions” (Mitrany D. , 1966). The first function chosen was of an economic nature, “which seemed the most practical and very good economic reasons were pushing in that direction” (Molle W. , European Cohesion Policy, 2007). This was necessary to be guided and accompanied by the creation of institutions in order to guarantee the endurance of the integration strategy. There have been disputes about the degree of which national governments needed to transfer powers to this organization, between advocates of two main concepts:

- Firstly, “an intergovernmental organization, where the representatives of the national governments take decisions by unanimity.
- A second, supranational organization, with an organ independently executes policies and prepares decisions. Where the representatives of national governments may take decisions by majority rule” (Molle W. , 2006).

Joining the German and French main industries under the High Authority was based on a supranational and functional approach. The course Europe took at that moment towards economic and political integration has followed since, consisted in the creation of a factual solidarity based in practical realizations.

The European Coal and Steel Community was "a new structure in the marches between internal and international law"<sup>49</sup>. To characterize this new type of structure the expression "supranational" has found increasing utilization. Supranational organs have been describing as standing midway between federal and international organs. "International organizations - such as the United Nations or the Council of Europe - are based on the “sovereign equality” of their members and non-intervention in domestic affairs; they are really at the intergovernmental level. Supranational organs transcend international organizations in both these respects without, however, constituting a federal state. They are based “not on a mere restriction, but on a transfer of national

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<sup>49</sup> E. van Raalte, cited by J. L. Kunz, "Supra-National Organs," *American Journal of International Law*, 1952, p. 698.

sovereignty, but a transfer of sovereignty in a particular area only” (McConnell, 2017). This experiment in supranational organization is of twofold significance. In the first place, although operating on a local level only, it could demonstrate important lessons concerning future endeavors at world organization through the “functional methodology. As Mitrany describes, “national divisions must be overlaid “with a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all the nations would be gradually integrated” (Mitrany D. , 1946). The Coal and Steel Community could be an excellent experiment ground for the improvement of an international community, developing from the fulfillment of common needs, which people of various nations share. The extension of the dissertation study includes - with emphasis on political and constitutional problems - a discourse of the ratification of the Coal and Steel Community's treaty in the six member countries; an investigation of its legal structure; a study of its operations during the first three years, 1952-1954; its institutional advancements. Robert Schuman's original proposition – “... to place the entire French and German coal and steel industry under a common High Authority, in an organization also open to the other countries of Europe ... “ - was made on May 9, 1950 (Mason, 1953).

The ratification of the Schuman Plan by the six national parliaments was surely a noteworthy event, demonstrating as it did the surrender of significant sectors of national jurisdiction to a supranational High Authority. Thus, the spirit in which the national parliaments submitted in this partial surrender of their sovereign powers merits attention that is more accurate. Despite the fact that the economic possibilities and problems of the Community were not neglected in the ratification discussions, political and constitutional issues appeared to dominate the economic aspects. The surrender of national sovereignty, the legality of the Treaty with respect to national constitutions, the fulfillment of the Community with national democratic traditions, the possibility of French or German dominion and related reasons of fears - these were the most thoroughly debated inquiries, as analyzed below.

### **3.2.3.1. The Surrender of National Sovereignty**

The revolutionary consequences of supranational organization were accentuated in all ECSC states. No endeavor was made to hide the inroads on national sovereignty appearing from the Treaty; rather, these were called most prominent merit. While it is conceivable that such example of supranationalism was at times but a cloak for an assortment of political, economic, and maybe even nationalist approaches, it is

mentionable that supranationalism apparently was viewed as an essential asset to guarantee ratification. "For the first time in history nations were voluntarily giving up a portion of their sovereignty to a supranational institution - "an event which signifies the end of nationalism . . . which has been the main problem of Europe ..."50, Chancellor Adenauer, stated. French Assembly's Foreign Relations Committee saw in the Schuman Plan "a veritable revolution" in international society, after several centuries under the "quasi-divine" principle of national sovereignty.<sup>51</sup> A Socialist expressed before the Council of the Republic that the idea of national sovereignty was depleted: "national frameworks no longer measure up to the political, economic, and social needs of our time."<sup>52</sup>

The key motive of opposition to the Community could be considered ideology of nationalism (Mason, 1953). Other opposition contentions, in his opinion, were normally only rationalizations of this essential motive. Previously, numerous had paid lip service to European unification; the radical provisions of the Treaty brought into the open fundamental nationalist instincts in several assumed Europeans (Mason, 1953). While it would be hard to confirm or disagree this observation, it was mentionable that during the ratification debates generally several members of the different parliaments stood in opposition to the sacrifice of national sovereignty as such - except of those super-patriots, the Communists. Most opponents preferred to attack different parts of the Treaty, for example, alleged infringements of national constitutions or lack of democracy. The most dedicated defenders of national sovereignty in the six parliaments were the Communists. As indicated by a German comrade, "the representatives in the Bundestag do not have the right to ratify a treaty which deprives the German people of its right of self-determination and national independence."<sup>53</sup> French Communists outlined the national sovereignty "as an essentially progressive idea," and proclaimed "the wish of the French people to remain French."<sup>54</sup>

The constitutionality of the Treaty was often addressed and questioned in the different parliaments. Numerous opponents contended that a partial transfer of national sovereignty could not possibly shape without amending the national constitution. Yet, in all six parliaments, supporters of the Community figured out to acquire ratification without constitutional amendment. The constitutional question introduced special problems in the three Benelux countries: at the period of ratification of the Schuman

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<sup>50</sup> Bundestag, July 12, 1951, p. 6501.

<sup>51</sup> *Journal Officiel*, Assemblée Nationale, 1951, p. 8857

<sup>52</sup> A. Southon, Conseil de la République, 1952, p. 773

<sup>53</sup> Bundestag, 1952, p. 7821

<sup>54</sup> Conseil, 1952, p. 822.

Plan, their constitutions - unlike those of Western Germany, Italy and France - did not contain “international” provisions which more or less allowed transfer of parts of national sovereignty.

Several critics of the Treaty in the several parliaments charged that national democratic traditions - whether formally ensured in the constitution or not - were disregarded by the regulations and institutions of the Community. The greater part of these criticisms concerned the “autocratic” High Authority, the ineffective Assembly, economic review powers of the Court, the risk of bureaucratization, and the unbending nature of the amendment procedure in a treaty formulated for a time of more than a half century. C. Schmid called the high authority a unified and centralized organ of dominance with supreme powers in coal and steel, however without satisfactory democratic, i.e., parliamentary monitoring to check on it. National parliaments would be weak in face of the high authority and no member state would have the capacity to conduct its own economic policy. A Gaullist leader charged that national sovereignty was being abandoned to a “stateless” and irresistible technocracy, to a dictatorship of a committee of experts without popular responsibility (Soustelle, 1951). Another French representative expected that the High Authority would be freely accessible to certain particular interest groups.

Concerning the High Authority, A. Coste-Floret examined that it was not really an executive agency, just as the Assembly was not by any means a legislature. The High Authority was “merely the organ which was to administer the common rules, because the source of law in the Community was the Treaty, and nothing but the Treaty. There could not be a dictatorial government, for, strictly speaking; there was not even a government.” The high authority’s powers were constrained by the exact and detailed rules of the Treaty. The High Authority was additionally unlike a real executive because it had no general police powers. Besides, it could make obstacles precisely with national economies only in times of crisis, and it could never nationalize industries. Numerous supporters repeated this thought: without the Community, the old international coal and steel monopolies would again be prevalent.

While criticism of the High Authority concerned its close-dictatorial powers, the Assembly's powers and capacities were found far too unobtrusive. Real European unity would only be achieved when European organs were made dependable to “the elected parliament of a European nation.” Schmid pronounced that “the historical development from local and regional to centralized national communities had been accomplished by powerful national parliaments as unifying agents; the European community also

required this type of parliament.”<sup>55</sup> At the same time existed the idea that the Assembly would have the capacity to criticize only the annual report of the High Authority, i.e., its past activities; future aims and intentions were, in his clarification, beyond control of the Assembly, which he considered “not a parliament but a receiving station for yearly reports. The Community was nothing “but a union of national managers with reporting duties” (Mason, 1953). Sovereignty was taken from national democratic parliaments, without being transferred to a supranational democratic parliament (Mason, 1953). At the end, it was expected that the significant role of the opposition would be almost impossible to satisfy in a “legislature” without lawmaking capacities.

The European Coal and Steel Court<sup>56</sup> was the subject of noticeable parliamentary discussion. It was doubted whether the judges would have the capacity to “jump over their national shadows.” Schmid refereed, that International judges would be certain to see themselves as representatives of their own state. Besides, the independence of the judges was not viewed as settled. The French Economic Council speculation that it would have improved to choose the judges from a list drawn up by the Hague Court than to allow national governments to appoint them directly. The most serious criticism of the Court concerned its review powers over decisions of the High Authority. The idea could be exist, that the Court was charged with tasks, which simply could not be fulfilled by a judicial body: “It is the function of courts to consider facts in relation to the law. However, if a court is supposed to make difficult economic decisions, not only in relation to formal requirements on jurisdictional issues, but also concerning possible misuse of discretionary powers” (Valentine, 1954).

Defenders of the Treaty admitted that it would be risky to give a court other than strictly legal jurisdiction, but that the review powers were important to compensate for the Assembly's weakness; likewise, the content of the Treaty was considered so exact and definite that the judges would have no inconvenience in applying its provisions.

As a conclusion it could be defined, that criticism of the institutions of the Community, the fear of bureaucratization was often outlined. In perspective of the complex system of checks and balances among the four main organs, the bureaucrats would be raise behind the scenes (Debre, 1952). Schuman's ideal had been deceived by the bureaucrats, who by impulse and propensity support the power of bureaucracy. Additionally, could be criticized the long term of the Treaty and the apparently very

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<sup>55</sup> Bundestag, July 12, 1951, pp. 6513-6515.

<sup>56</sup> The court was established in 1952, by the Treaty of Paris (1951) within the European Coal and Steel Community. Its mission has been to ensure that "the law is observed" "in the interpretation and application" of the Treaties.

difficult amendment process. Schmid trusted that the long duration of the Treaty would make for perpetual minorities; a progressively outvoted member would not have the capacity to threaten to withdraw. The extremely difficult modification process - Schmid contrasted it with the impossible revision clause of the Versailles Treaty<sup>57</sup> (Art. 19) - would further commit to make alleviation impossible in such circumstances.<sup>58</sup> However, if the Treaty were to run for a brief period only, there would be great reluctance to acknowledge the immediate sacrifices, which were requested from all members; the Community's real benefits could only be achieved in the end and only if all members maintained to show complete confidence in their common future.

### 3.2.3.2. Anti-trust powers

The completion of the traditional hostility between France and Germany had always been viewed a main principle of European integration. Supporters of the Schuman Plan contended that enrollment in a supranational community could overcome "age-old jealousies" and challenges between the two countries. It is not surprising that opponents of the Treaty in Germany and France endeavored to exploit persisting suspicions in that regard, each charging that the Community would involve dominant of the other.

French coal and steel plants were over- contributed by Marshall Plan money and would not require outside financial assistance for further extension (Mason, 1953) The German plants, on the other hand, required outside capital very badly, which as indicated by the Treaty - could be achievable only if the High Authority affirmed. Moreover, the anti-trust powers of the High Authority would again hurt only the Germans, since the French had covered their focuses by nationalizing them. The Schuman Plan had turned into a caricature of the ideal of European unity:

"The Europe-urge of the inhabitants of this continent has been put into the service of certain interests ... The Schuman Plan is not the beginning of Europe, but a continuation of the politics of the post-World War II period" (Mason, 1953).

The French debates acknowledged equally strong apprehensions about a German dominance in the Community: "Even without attributing Machiavellian intentions to the Germans, the Community will mean the supremacy of the Ruhr... By beginning European unity on the strong purpose of Germany, we should not be surprised if Europe will at the end have a German accent" (Official Reports, 1951).

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<sup>57</sup> Signed in 1919, Peace Treaty at the end of the World War I

<sup>58</sup> Bundestag, 1951, p. 6514.

French supporters of the Treaty did their best to lessen apprehensions of Germany and German intentions. Robert Schuman approached on Frenchmen to forget their inadequate complex: “we are not inferior to others, not even to the Germans”. (Official Reports, 1951).

In perspective of this arrangement of special circumstances, the fruitful ratification of the ECSC treaty by no means indicates that the age of the “Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World,” has arrived. It shows, however, that under favorable conditions contemporary national states can be instigated to surrender important divisions of national jurisdiction.

### **3.2.3.3. Legal Aspects of the Document**

The key to the remarkable supranational structure of the ECSC is found in the extensive amount of independence enjoyed by its organs, particularly the High Authority and the Court, and in the extensive variety of powers, which these organs have at their disposal to intervene in the affairs of member states.

#### ***I. The High Authority***

It was the executive and semi legislator of the ECSC in charge of guaranteeing the satisfaction of the reasons of the Treaty, “under the terms thereof” (Art. 8). It comprised of nine members who should be “generally competent” and nationals of member countries, no more than two of the same nationality (Art. 9). Members of the high authority obtained “tenure” during their six-year period; they were able for reappointment. Nonetheless, the Community’s own Court under certain exceptional circumstances (Art. 12) might remove individual members. Besides, they might be compelled to resign “in a body” by a motion of censure adopted by two-thirds of the members of the Common Assembly, during the annual debate on the General Report presented by the High Authority (Art.24). The High Authority acted by a simple majority vote; its quorum should be greater than one-half of its membership. These votes could express decisions or recommendations, as the High Authority choose, and could be tended to member governments or directly to individual coal or steel enterprises (Art. 14).

The High Authority might accumulate such information as could be necessary for the achievement of its goal. For reasons of verifying information High Authority officials had, in the territories of member states, such powers as were acknowledged to the national governments own tax service (Art. 86). In the perspective of researchers, the Community's economic life consequently resembled a “glass house” (Reuter P. ,

1953). Furthermore, since the High Authority's goal had to be satisfied “in harmony with the general economy of the member states” (Art. 2), it appears not unreasonable to expect that this information gathering responsibility could relate to coal and steel, as well as it might broadened to other different sectors of the six national economies.

If the High Authority considered that a member state was delinquent with regard to Treaty commitments, it might accept or approve measures including limitations and discriminations, so as to correct the impacts of the violation in question (Art. 88). Despite some ambiguities have been raised about the adequacy of these measures, it would appear entirely possible to transform this power of sanction into an impressive weapon by such means as boycotts or embargoes (1953). However, Reuter characterized the sanctions “theoretical and limited” (Op. cit., p. 104). Likewise, Wehberg was suspicious about the sanctions (Bernhardt, 1954).

“The member States bind themselves to take all appropriate general and specific measures to ensure the execution of their obligations under the decisions and recommendations of the institutions of the Community and to facilitate the accomplishment of the Community's objectives” (Art. 86). This statement may even lend itself to develop an implicit powers doctrine in the Community. This would empower the High Authority to develop its jurisdiction beyond problems identifying with coal and steel.

## *II. The Court*

A Court practices the legal capacity in the Community, which has been equipped with significant powers. The eminent position of the Court was somewhat an outcome of the close-weakness of the Assembly, which made it fundamental to provide other different checks on the High Authority. The significance of the Court could likewise be attributed to the fact that national and supranational jurisdictions are practiced simultaneously in the Community, a circumstance which traditionally has appeared to require a capable tribunal. The most compelling aspect of the Court was its extensive and necessary jurisdiction inside the Community in matters influencing the Treaty. The Court acted as a “Supreme Court” in deciding contentions in regards to the application of the Treaty between ECSC organs and member states, and between its agencies themselves. Moreover, the Court satisfied the capacity of a “Conseil d'Etat,”<sup>59</sup> protecting individuals and enterprises against administrative dereliction of ECSC agencies.

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<sup>59</sup> A body of the French national government that acts both as legal adviser of the executive branch and as the supreme court for administrative justice.

Two rather uncommon sorts of jurisdiction were granted to the Court, the appointment of high authority members and concerning certain economic difficulties. If a member government considered that the high authority, by its activities or collapse to act, has incited essential and persevering unsettling influences in its national economy, it might appeal to the Court, after first having attempted to get fulfillment from the High Authority. The Court should then review the cogency of the High Authority's activity and could void or turn it around. This provision of Art. 37 have been known as a general saving statement of the Treaty. In one side, the Court in this manner turns into the final “arbiter between the interests of the complaining State and those of the entire ECSC as represented by the high authority” (Bebr, 1953). But, Reuter considered that this provision could not be efficient since neither the High Authority nor the Court were conceded particular powers to suppress the impacts of the common market, not even where it had created essential and determined disruption (Mason, 1953).

### *III. The Assembly*

The Assembly was expected to contribute a minimum of controls of a semi-parliamentary character. On the other hand, the Treaty did not provide it with legislative or strings power, a fact that brought on much criticism during the ratification debates. The high authority itself satisfied a couple of legislative capacities which the Treaty left to the Community, for the most part in the form of executive declarations – for example the definition “by a general regulation of what constitutes control of an enterprise” (Art. 66).

Researchers examined, that the Council was not simply a semi-permanent diplomatic conference. Wherever the Council has jurisdiction, the national governments have lost it and the participant countries constitutional provisions no longer apply (Mason, 1953). In addition, it was specified, that the national governments instructions to their representatives on the Council have no legal sanction: “a representative who votes against these guidelines may be recalled, but the decision to which he contributed will stand nevertheless (Institute of International Relations, op. cit., pp.73-4).

Beside the legitimate circumstance, the experiences of the first years of the Community appeared to demonstrate that the Council operated as an aid for supranational activity rather than a brake on it.

#### **IV. The Consultative Committee**

This organ was appended to the High Authority in an auxiliary scope, and satisfies essentially advisory capacities. It was comprised of equally distributed of labor, producers and consumers (Art. 18). The Consultative Committee, with its semi-corporative characteristics, was established to provide fulfillment to organized labor and employers and consumers partnerships. These groups had a tendency to be less than enthusiastic about the original concept of the Community, due to its bureaucratic and technocratic conditions.

#### **3.2.3.4. Operations during the first three years, 1952-1954**

Have the real operations of ECSC institutions satisfied the supranational desires raised by the stipulations of the Treaty? After about two years of the common market, it was too early to achieve even provisional conclusions on this point. Nevertheless, it is clear that the following account may provide some first consequences and its effect toward a comprehension of the political and constitutional matter of the Community.

The Treaty contributed for the potential outlawing of not only agreements, as well as “any transaction which would have in itself the direct or indirect impact of achieving a focus ...,” if found in restriction of competition. Art. 66 imposed the responsibility on the High Authority of preparing three general regulations to expound further on the anti-concentration provisions. The High Authority in 1954 - adopted these general regulations the "executive pronouncements of the first European anti-trust law, as Monnet outlined it<sup>60</sup>. In the most essential of these, the High Authority characterized the elements, which make up the control over the enterprise. The second regulation set up the circumstances under which enterprises were liberated from requiring prior approval for concentration, to make conceivable with a minimum “minor concentrations or ... operations which obviously cannot distort competition ...”. The third regulation indicated what persons or enterprises had responsibilities, even though not under the general jurisdiction of the High Authority, to furnish information to the High Authority in order that the counters focus provisions can be properly connected.<sup>61</sup>

The advancements of institutions are very important, as long as they provide furthermore communities integration and cooperation. The first years of the Treaty

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<sup>60</sup> *Verhandlungen der Gemeinsamen Versammlung*, session of May 1954, p. 17. The regulations were published in the *Amtsblatt* of May 11, 1954. Cf. also, *Second General Report*, p. 120.

<sup>61</sup> A CSC source admitted that these regulations "outlined policy only very generally." Presumably, the HA had decided to develop a kind of "case law" on concentrations, building up policy from precedents on individual cases. (*Bulletin from the European Community for Coal and Steel*, April 1955, p. 3.)

brought certain changes and advancements in the working of the Community's institutions and their common relations. These improvements could be most certainly seen as far as the Assembly was concerned, because of its public procedures. The High Authority contributed only little information about its internal affairs, for the most part under pressure from the Assembly. The Council of Ministers and the Consultative Committee, unfortunately, operated not only in secret, but also were rarely examined by the Assembly; moreover, both considered it irrelevant to give more than sporadic attention to their actions. Council of Ministers, it has been known as the “secretive organ” of the Community; it was recognized that it met and decided, however the way of its considerations and the inspirations of its decisions were often a mystery (Cornides, 1958). The Court began its operations much later than the alternate organs of the Community; its first decision was accomplished in 1954.

The High Authority, in the perspective of one of its members, was feeling its way gradually to find the most appropriate methods of procedure; being an entirely novel kind of supranational organ it needed to establish its own precedents. The key standard of High Authority operations was the collegiate system. As indicated by Monnet, there was no specialization, no delegation of obligation among the members of the High Authority; in its work and decisions, additionally in its responsibility toward the Assembly, the collegiate aspect was fully protected. Each High Authority decision was depended on collective discussion; each considered was considered within each member's jurisdiction. The collegiate system was viewed as appropriated to the supranational nature of the High Authority. As Monnet clarified, members of the Assembly represent both national and European perspectives; however, the High Authority's only reason for existence was that it could never take a national perspective. By avoiding the association of individual High Authority members with particular issues, it was trusted national awareness would be upset as it could be allowed.

Despite the fact that the Assembly was expected to act as a check on the High Authority, it did not have the traditional sources of strength of parliaments: legislative power, control over finances, and an elective premise. Its primary instrument of control contributed by the Treaty is “*ex post facto*”<sup>62</sup>, the vote of condemnation. In its Rules of Procedure, the Assembly spelled out three new prerogatives. Art. 26 of the Rules allowed each member of the Assembly the privilege to acquaint resolutions dedicated to the High Authority or the Council of Ministers; these do not need to concern matters in

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<sup>62</sup> Is a law that retroactively changes the legal consequences (or status) of actions that were committed, or relationships that existed, before the enactment of the law

the High Authority's General Report. Art. 39 of the Rules of Procedure qualified the Assembly to receive petitions concerning exercises of the Community. Despite the fact, that two of these privileges were not in the Treaty, it was clear that a democratic Assembly should have such rights<sup>63</sup>. The closest way to deal with successful supervision was achieved through the close cooperation, which developed between Assembly committees and the High Authority. Despite the fact that the Treaty does not require this, several committees were in almost constant contact with the High Authority. By 1954, it had turned to the standard procedure for the High Authority to keep the committees continuously informed on all improvements. Obviously, the power and effectiveness of this framework depended on the High Authority's willingness to cooperate.

On relations between the High Authority and the Assembly could be outline some outcomes by the amendment of the Treaty to strengthen democratic controls by the Assembly. Moreover, it approached on the member nations to make the Assembly elective, as allowed by the Treaty. It could be likewise arguable more proficient and effective utilization of political factions: “we must get used to life in factions, not only for the sake of European unity, but also to speed up procedures in the Assembly”<sup>64</sup>.

The session of 1954 was identified by endeavors with respect to the Assembly to strengthen its position, not only within the Community, as well as in relation to the outside world. President of the Assembly expressed in his opening speech that the Assembly would need to contribute strong political leadership, including instructions of problems solving for European integration. It was felt that the Assembly had turned into a last defender for European unity, and that only it could raise the public attitudes and advocate the legal and constitutional adjustments required for the progressed achievement of the Community and supranationalism in general.

Consequently, most observers acknowledged that the Community went far beyond the traditional endeavors to organize international society, whether on a regional or worldwide level. At the same time it was generally agreed that the European Community in the post-World War period did not even come close to establish a federal-type system. Therefore, reporters referred to the “in-between” features of supranational organization: the European Community was “a new structure in the marches between internal and international law”; “supranational organizations stood ...

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<sup>63</sup> Cf Document Nr. I, Jan.1953, pp. 7-8

<sup>64</sup> Cf Document Nr. I, Jan.1953, pp. 16-17

midway between international and federal organizations.” Robert Schuman expressed analogous terms:

“The supranational is situated at equal distances between, on the one hand, international individualism which considers national sovereignty untouchable and accepts only limitations of sovereignty in the form of occasional, temporary treaty clauses; and, on the other hand, the federalism of states which are subordinated to a super-state with complete territorial sovereignty” (Mason, 1953).

Schlochauer, considered supranational structures distinctive from international organizations because of the consequently extensive degree of independence and the extent of jurisdiction allowed them: “We speak of supranational authorities where the independence from ... the governments of the member states are particularly well guaranteed” (Oliver Dörr, Walter Schätzel, Hans Wehberg, Hans Jürgen Schlochauer, 2004). He underlined that the member states remained subjects of international law, regardless of the governmental and even semi-federal nature of the Community.

Reuter tends to a similar point. International organizations had constantly constrained national sovereignty; however, the ECSC had built up entirely other kind of restrictions: it had limited the activity of important national abilities in which the national governments had enjoyed full freedom of activity before, such as those concerning import obligations and appropriations. The ECSC was not the first organization to highlight transfers of national capabilities; The High Authority had gained real governmental powers, i.e. powers of great political outcome, which had been the restrained space of the national governments. In some regards, the High Authority resembled an “embryonic” federal executive (Mason, 1953).

As Wehberg considers, the ECSC went far beyond previous endeavors in the field of international organization, combining the most important components of all these - such as a specifically characterized sphere of supranational jurisdiction, the impartial character of the supranational organs, majority voting, and a court with extensive and compulsory jurisdiction. The Community's establishment was more monumental and was depended on fewer concessions than had been viewed possible previously; its organizational potential outcomes had been produced more attentively and logically than had ever been endeavored previously. Such a structure could be called supranational, but only if this term were utilized in the restricted and, according to Wehberg, to some degree illogical sense, of the highest type of international organization till that period, equipped with sovereign powers of its own. However, the ECSC was certainly not above the member states in a legal sense; only a federal

structure could have influenced this. Therefore, the Community still fell within the general framework of international organization, although advanced to an exceptional degree (Oliver Dörr, 2004).

Monnet called the ECSC a “supranational, in other words a federal institution”. As indicated by an official French memorandum of 1950, the Community was to be “in a limited but essential sphere on the level of federal, not international law” (Mosler, 1982). In Schuman’s original proposition the ECSC had been presented as the first level of a European federation.

According to H. Mosler, five federal characteristics could be distinguished in the starting period of cooperation after the Second World War in Western European countries: there was a division of powers between supranational and national jurisdiction; the central organs were partly completed by the governments of the member countries; the central organs had direct powers over citizens; the European Communities Court related to a federal supreme court, guaranteeing the supremacy of federal law in final instance; ECSC organs could attempt to authorize the permanence of the supranational structure. Regardless of these federal characteristics, on the other hand, the Community had not really left the circle of international law; it was by no means a federal structure, at least not during its first years. Mosler outlined: “a line from international to constitutional law would be crossed only if the Community were sufficiently effective to prevent severance; as soon as real integration within the European Community “would reach such a degree that breaking it up would be as difficult as dismembering a state, at that moment the transition to a ... European federal constitution would have taken place, even if the organization were to exercise only a part of governmental functions” (Mosler, 1982). He accepted that the European Community may one day transform itself into a federal structure, for the period, at least, it had not come that stage, however, currently European community is in above mentioned transformation process.

Perspectives, proposing the similarity between the Community and federal institutions in general have been rejected. A group of Belgian analysts indicated that two federal characteristics were mentionable in the ECSC: the High Authority’s and the Court’s direct powers over individual enterprises, and the coexistence of both a national and a supranational jurisdiction. However, in some regards the Community observed to be completely distinctive from a federal structure: in comparison with existing federal systems, the High Authority’s scope of jurisdiction was restricted; member states of the ECSC continued to be subjects of international law and led independently their foreign

affairs. In a federal state the source of sovereignty is dual, implementing not only in the several member states as well as in the union as a whole, while ECSC sovereignty had been established by the will of national governments only, without the coordinated intervention of the masses of citizens in the member countries, and without the expression of a “unified, Community-wide will” (Probleme des Relations Internationales, 1948)

K. H. Klein came to similar conclusions. The supranational structure in that capacity did not make that period European Community federal in character; only the certain degree and stability of integration impacted in the future might make it possible, to speak of the European Community in federal terms. A real federation, in Klein’s perspective, would lead to complete loss of sovereignty for the member countries involved (Kenneth H. Klein and Joseph Kunkel, 1952).

In Wehbergs perspective the Community constituted a higher form of international organization, however it did not contributed for an authority above the member countries:

„The European Community is neither a state nor a federation. It merely exercises certain sovereign powers by delegation of the member states. These states maintain their international law status and cooperate with the Community in order to enable it to fulfill its duties“ (Wehberg, 2009).

Only a structure with complete sovereignty considered as situated above the member states, but for this, the European Community would have had to be organized as a federal state. The Community, as indicated by Wehberg, was a great development over previous international organizations, reason was its “Integrations Character,” through which international and national organs could be situated together. If efficient integration would in reality formulated, and if other - further reaching - Communities could be established, and then a real supranational structure could be created. This, consequently, would constitute a European federal state (Wehberg, 2009).

The European Community after the Second World War situated somewhere between internal and international law, despite the fact that during its first years, regardless, it seems closer to typical international organizations than to a federal structure. The concept supranational is not perfect in describing the fundamental political and legal substances of such a Community. It is a concept, which - as Reuter mentioned - “can claim neither ancient traditions nor great scientific validity, but which nevertheless has made sudden fortune” (Mason, 1953)

Essentially, the Community established a legal institution. It cannot be fitted into traditional categories of constitutional or international law. Yet, its key attributes could be determined quite clearly. In the first place, supranational organs, the High Authority and the Court were significantly independent from the national governments than the bodies of traditional international organizations. Secondly, there has been a transfer of a significant number of national powers to the Community, along these lines constituting a supranational sphere of jurisdiction; in traditional international organizations, we can speak about the restriction of activity of certain national powers, nor their transfer.

Most importantly, supranational organization seems notable as long as it includes the activity of important governmental capacities at a higher level than the national does. The High Authority has been allowed powers which previously have been viewed the fundament of national political jurisdiction, powers sufficiently enough - as the Treaty concedes in Art. 37 - Potentially to bring about “fundamental and persistent disturbances” in national economies.

The politics of the European Community during transition processes after the Second World War might only be part framed and largely formulated itself; this stage politics in the European Community was not essentially distinctive to the practice of government in any democratic system. As in all modern politics, European Community politics is influenced by questions of representation and participation, the distribution and allocation of recourses, and political and administrative efficiency (Geoffrey K. Roberts, Jill Lovecy, 2014). To research the connection between political inputs and outputs on these issues, will be used the discourse of the “comparative politics”<sup>65</sup>.

### **3.3. The Empirical Research**

Since the 1950s, however European Community for the most part has been examined as an example of the supranational integration of, or intergovernmental cooperation between, sovereign nation-states. It was therefore proper that the traditional investigation of the European community utilized the discourse of International Relations. However, now that the European Community is more than an international organization, approaches of international politics are of limited use for examining the internal politics of the community. For instance, from an International relations perspective political conflicts in the European Community were essentially along the single measurement; where actors either supported or restricted further supranational integration. As the political feature of the European Community was

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<sup>65</sup> The subfield of political science concerned with the study of the internal politics of political systems.

growing, however, there was additionally conflict over inquiries of allocation and distribution of recourses. On these socio-economic issues, political rivalry was along a fundamentally distinctive measurements; which in comparative political aspects and terms is classically assigned to as the Left-Right.

### 3.3.1. The typology of approaches

The two contending perspectives can be clearly distinguished. A basic rule is that researchers of the European Community as an international organization utilize the discourse of comparative politics.<sup>66</sup> In Order to contrast as well as, however, must be compared approaches with the same basic expectation. A typology of basic political sciences paradigms therefore empowers comparison that is more accurate and permits the various hypotheses for empirical research to be more precisely classified. In spite of the fact that this might not give a full picture of the complexity nature, richness and diversity of the approaches to the study of politics, it serves as a compelling “heuristic device”.<sup>67</sup>

The arrangement of opposed approaches to political science is almost as various as the number of methodologies themselves. For instance, Blondel makes contradiction between behavioral, structural and normative accounts (Blondel, 1976). However, Olsen and March makes distinction between reductionist, utilitarian, instrumental, functional and contextual approaches (James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 2010). Furthermore, on a more meta-theoretical parallel, Charlesworth contrasts between accounts characterized by their method and those identified by their objective (Charlesworth, 1967) and Almond suggested a fourfold typology emerging from methodological and ideological divisions (Almond, 1967). Nonetheless, Charlesworth and Almond’s contradiction are not commonly characterized, because distinctive methodological approaches are often taken from contending ideologies or research objectives. Moreover, these typologies do not outline the diverse ontological expectations of political science models; which have turned into the focal point of

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<sup>66</sup> In the dissertation comparative politics is defined by its discourse rather than its method. Roberts, who differentiates between comparative politics and comparative analysis (G. K. Roberts, *Comparative Politics Today, Government and Opposition*, 1972), use a similar definition. Sartori argues, however, that by definition comparative politics only exists because of its method (G. Sartori, *Comparing and Miscomparing*, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 1991). Nevertheless, in order to differentiate between comparative and international politics, which both use the comparative method, Schmitter prefers to define comparative politics by its subject matter and its academic discourse (P.C. Schmitter, *Comparative Politics at the Crossroads*, Estudio/Working paper, 1991). Likewise, in contrast of Morgenthau’s classic international relations text “Politics Among Nations”, LaPalombara calls his main comparative politics text book “Politics Within Nations” (J. LaPalombara, *Politics Within Nations*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974).

<sup>67</sup>A procedure which involves the use of an artificial construct to assist in the exploration of social phenomena.

recent debate in the discipline. Hence, a more applicable categorization should incorporate methodological and ontological distinctions.

The ontological division is taken from social theory, where conduct is essentially decided either by the autonomous activity of individuals or by economic, social and cultural institutions. On the table II, we can see the Paradigms of Comparative Politics in European Community.

Ontological Bias	Agency		Structure	
	I	II	III	IV
Meta-theory types				
<b>International Relations</b>	Pluralist	Realist	Structuralist	Institutional
<b>Comparative Politics</b>	Pluralist	Rational Choice	Sociological	Institutional

Table 2 - Ontological Bias, Strategy and Structure

Hence, “structure and agent are antinomies” (Parsons, 1968). The ontological division is likewise essential in comparative politics of European Community. For instance, Wendt points out the contrast between structure-biased and agent-biased theories in international relations; and the necessity to address the significance of opposing ontological expectations are focal to the “new institutional” argues in comparative politics (Wight, 1987).

However, inside the structure-primitive and agency-primitive approaches, there are considerable methodological differences. In the structure-primitive group, there is a contrast between “structure-neutral theories and “structure-active” theories. In the agency-primitive group, there is a contrast between “rational actor and group” theories. Therefore, within the main ontological meta-theoretical division, could be distinguished four types of approaches to investigate European Community after Second World War (Figure 1).<sup>68</sup> First type of approaches are agency-primitive group approaches, when second type of approaches are agency – primitive rational actor methods; and the third type of approaches are structure – active approaches, when the fourth types are structure-neutral methodologies. By outlining these essential agreements, the approaches to the study of European Community in transition process after the Second World War generated by the numerous paradigms can now be more effectively and fruitfully compared.

<sup>68</sup> Jorgensen, *European Community External Relations as a Theoretical Challenge*, 1992, uses a similar meta-theoretical typology, derived from rival ontological and methodological assumptions.

### 3.3.2. Various methodological approaches

For the investigating principles to political conduct and action in the Community could be utilized field of comparative politics. Still in the early stages, however, direct functions of comparative politics to the European Community for that stage stays more. Therefore, despite the fact that this area will include an analysis of these approaches, it will likewise incorporate a discourse of possible further applications inside the comparative politics models for the study of recent European Community.

#### 3.3.2.1. Pluralist Vision

Advancing from the group theories the interest group process is a primary component of pluralist approaches<sup>69</sup> in both fields. Politics for most citizens is accepted to be an unrewarding and alien action (Dahl R. A., 1961). Subsequently, problems must be of great personal importance when individuals groups are trying to impact the political process. Comparative pluralist analysis of the European Community contends that the decision-making process in the community was more resembled to the United States of America than the European attitude (W. Streek and P. Schmitter, 1992). The understaffing of the High Authority and the increased channels of access to European Community decision-making organized interest at the European level more chance to be heard than in the more corporatist national frameworks where decision-making is traditionally composed by the governing parties. However, this perception of the European Community as a pluralist vision is somewhat ambiguous. As with the critique of the pluralist analysis of United States politics, there was little contradictory power in the community (Galbraith, 1953). The decision-making process was divided into particular interest scopes and special interests groups controlled each sphere. The access of all interest coalitions to European Community policy channels was far from equality. Furthermore, because of the high organizational expenses of setting up a pan-European group, the larger economic interests had capacity to campaign several institutions more significantly, than the opposed interests did. Consequently, despite the fact that there were several and open access for organized interests in the Community, the European Community could be closer to the American pluralism in which decision-makers were no- more neutral mediators but proactively took account of opposing interest.

However, in spite of the fact that the comparative politics pluralist ways to the European Community might be a primitive stage we have started to make an imperative contribution to the investigation of the political process in the community after the

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<sup>69</sup> The pluralist type is when interest groups are: multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered, self-determined, not recognized or subsidized by the state, not monopolistic, and internally democratic.

Second World War. In addition, from the same methodological and ontological suppositions, the comparative politics approaches made clear understanding of decision-making at the European level, rather than on the significance of organized interest for the improvement of national positions toward cooperation and integration.

### **3.3.2.2. Rational Choice**

By rational choice could be assumed a logical relation between rationally- evaluated inclinations and rationally- ordered conduct. By accepting rationality, we could utilize techniques, to comprehend individual conduct when confronted with ambiguity. This could be either natural ambiguity, emerging from instability factors, or strategic ambiguity, when confronting other actors. The rational choice model does not guarantee that during decision-making process an actor experiences the same methodological processes, however simply that the actor operates following the same procedures (Friedman, 1953).

Consciously endeavoring to move beyond the approaches prevalent in the international cooperation, Garrett uses a game-theoretical framework for comprehension the European Community decision to approve the internal market programme. Aside from disputing that his approach is more accurate, Garrett also condemns the realist approaches to the European Community for wrongly expecting “that the institutions associated with international cooperation have little impact on the political structure of the international system and represent little or no challenge to the sovereignty of the nation-states” (Garrett, 1992).

Other rational choice approaches seem to affirm this second conclusion. Using the Banzhaf and Shapley – Shubik indicators of voting power, Holler and Nurmi outline that the larger member countries are plainly prevailing in the Council of Ministers, regardless of whether simple majority qualified majority or unanimity-voting procedures were utilized (Manfred J. Holler and Hannu Nurmi, 2013). However, in spite of the fact these findings seem to affirm the qualitative findings of the realist approaches, rational choice ways to deal with the European Community have recommended some interesting improvements that have not been highlighted. For instance, rational choice approaches have additionally represented the significance of ideology in the internal market arrangements and that there is an essential connection between party competition in the national and European Community arenas (Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weingast, 1991).

### 3.3.2.3. Sociological aspects

Beginning from the expectation that the European Community after the Second World War has “developed beyond the role of a traditional international organization “, Shackleton inquires: “what kind of institution or set of institutions was the European community after Second World War? (Shackleton, 1991). There could be two fundamental measurements of the connection between the individual and the political system: group, the extent to which an individual is integrated into limited units; and network, the extent to which an individual’s life is outlined by remotely forced confinement. Consequently, in the European Community, group indicated to the level of supranational integration, though framework indicated to the level of central regulation. The synergy of these two measurements consequently creates four possible “ways of life”: individualistic, hierarchical, egalitarian and fatalistic. Shackleton thus achieves conclusion that sociological and institutional structure of the European Community after the Second World War implies that it is closest to the “egalitarian” way of life; yet there were additionally an deep-rooted pressure between two other “ways of life” – the “individualistic and hierarchical”. However, in cultural condition could be recommended that there were inherently two types of political tensions in the politics of cooperation in Western European countries: group tension, between supranational centralization and national independence;<sup>70</sup> and framework tension, between economic and social regulation and deregulation.<sup>71</sup>

The presence of these two crucial dimensions of contention in the European Community was also implicated by the application of the sociological theories of nation building to the improvement of the European Community. Rokkan and Lipset created a model of nation building, which clarifies the grid of political and social cleavages in European politics during starting period of cooperation after the Second World War (Wiarda, 1967). The cleavages emerge from divided conflicts made by critical circumstances in the historical development of every system. For instance, the National Revolution formed State versus Church and center versus periphery tensions, and the Industrial Revolution formed urban versus landed and working class versus middle-class conflicts. However, while church-state and center-periphery conflicts do not exist in each system as a result of diverse national revolution involvement experiences, socio-economic tensions were pervasive in all Western European countries.

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<sup>70</sup> A pro and anti-integration dimensions.

<sup>71</sup> An ideological dimension.

Applying Rokkan-Lipset proposition to the European Community system, along these lines, there were two major lines of contention composed by two separate critical circumstances (Figure #2). Additionally by reason of cultural theory and Rokkan and Lipset both develop their models from the Parsonian model of socialization, it is not an occurrence that Rokkan and Lipset’s “functional” and “territorial-cultural” cleavages dimensions relate closely to group and network tensions.

<i>Critical Juncture</i>	<i>Cleavage</i>	<i>Conflict</i>
<b>Supranational Integration</b>	Centre-Periphery	Integration vs. National Sovereignty
<b>Industrial Revolution</b>	Left – Right	Free Market vs. Intervention

**Table 3 - The Rokkan - Lipset Model**

Consequently, to begin with, as with the process of national integration, supranational integration composes a periphery versus centre cleavage, between European interest and national interest. This cleavage is therefore demonstration in the contention between tensions for further supranational integration and the aspiration to protect national sovereignty. Secondly, the industrial revolution composes a left-right or socio-economic cleavage. Subsequently, this left-right cleavage was demonstration at the European level with the politicization of the European Community; as decisions on inquiries of market regulation started to be taken at the supranational level.

### 3.3.2.4. Institutional analyze

The research of political institutions has always been a focal pillar of comparative politics. In spite of the fact that the traditional legal-formal institutional methodologies were eliminated for more refined sociological and behavioral methods in the 1950s, there has been a re-accentuation of the importance of institutions for formulating individual behavior (Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, Frank Longstreth, 1992).

Researching European Community in transition process after the WW2 within comparative constitutional law accentuates on formality and objectivity. Clarifying the contrast between the political and legal assessment of the Community, juridical methodologies make diversity between the conventional international treaty components of European Community law and remarkable supranational components of the Community framework (Rasmussen, 1986). However, there are likewise other institutional models, which utilize decision-making speculations, and make comparison between the Communities institutional rules and environment to traditional models of

government (Attina, 2011). It is possible that period of transition and starting of cooperation be analyzed using the concept of federalism. However, in this methodology, federalism does not need to suggest that at this period community was a certain federation of states. Moreover, the community did not fit agreeable into the classical Anglo-American typologies of federal systems where the accuracy of the division of power between the central government and the constituent units viewed as an essential marker of the degree of federalism (Elazar D. J., 1987).

Another element which European Community had after the Second World War could be consociational democracy: society with contrast, dominance of elite, autonomy by segments, proportionality, minority veto and larger than usual coalition. First, the European Community was a regionally pillarized system, because individual involvement and allegiance was principally engaged within the nation-states. Secondly, elites prevailed inside of their pillars because the national governments controlled the distribution of recourses and continued a monopoly over the powers of coercion within the national territory. Third, inside of the community the aspiration of governments to preserve their national sovereignty was the equal of segmental autonomy inside regionally pillarized federal states (Lijphart, 1979). Fourth, proportionality was guaranteed in the frameworks of representations in the Council of Ministers. Fifth, veto which permitted a member state to practice it if there were any risk to an essential national interest. The large extent coalition was existed due to the qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers.

As a result, the institutional methodologies to the European Community have demonstrated how comparative politics types can be beneficiary used to analyze empirically the Community after the Second World War (Table #3).

Institutional Structures	Institutional Environment
<p><b>Fixed Collegiate Executive:</b>  <i>Mixed Executive Functions;</i>  <b>Asymmetrical Bicameral Legislature</b>  <i>Primary: Indirect state Representative</i>  <i>Secondary: Direct Citizens representative</i>  <b>Territorial Division of Authority</b>  <b>4 levels of Competences:</b>  <i>I. Supranational</i>  <i>II. Concurrent</i>  <i>III. Intergovernmental</i>  <i>IV. National</i></p>	<p>Elite Predominance  Territorial Pillarization  Segmental Autonomy  Proportionality  Minority/Mutual Veto  Oversized Coalition</p>

“Cooperative Federalism”

“Consociational Democracy”

Table 4 - Result of the institutional features of the European Community

The comparative methodologies therefore seem less to determine an institutional structure than to characterize the decision-making environment. Furthermore, the perception that the European Community after the World War Two, demonstrated principles of “consociational democracy” and “cooperative federalism” has imperative indications for the analysis of political tensions in the community. These institutional elements compose the conduct of the actors, and structure the conflict. Describing the European Community after the Second World War in these ways thus permits further observations to be attracted from politics in other federally formed and territorially pillirized frameworks.

A comparative analysis recommends that there are two major measurements of politics in the Community (Table #4).




Table 5 - Two Major Dimensions

Primarily, there was the national-supranational contrast outlined by the pluralist and realist approaches, and which is utilized in rational choice framework to the European Community. However, sociological methodologies represent that there was also a socio-economic clash, which is present in all European frameworks because of the mutual problems involved in governing an economy. The Rokkan - Lipset model also demonstrates, however, that the Left-Right dimension developed only when essential socio-economic issues were handled at the European level. This, in this manner, emphasizes the instinctive arguments that party-political divisions will only exist at the

European level as an outcome of the politicization of the community (Wallace H. , 1979).

However, the synergy between these two measurements is also dependent upon the institutional circumstances in the European Community; the limitations are typical in “cooperative federalism” and “consociationalism”. In consociational frameworks where the pillars are not taking into account the class divisions the Left-Right contention is frequently subsidiary to the contention between the pillars which could be a territorial, linguistic or religious cleavage (Lijphart, 1979). Moreover, the institution of elite settlement attempts to “control the advancement of contentions that cut across and internal coherence of the Pillars” (Lijphart, 1968). Similarly, the institution of federalism constrains the basis of ideological conflicts, and restrains the development of party structures (William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, 1975). However, in the European federalism, the classical ideology of the *Parteienstaat* is often more grounded than the institution of the *Bundestaat* (Hodge, 1987). In spite of these requirements, accordingly, on Left-Right issues party political positions might be better indicators of European Communities after the Second World War policy - results than the national interests of countries.

## IV Chapter: Implementation and Realization of the Research. The New Cooperation Model for the European Union

If we are to research the European Union as a new federal model, it is necessary that we focus on the specification and characteristics of European integration. And this current period of our research is the outcome of the policy that was initiated and started with the Schuman declaration in 1950. To construct the new federal model for the European Union, in this part of the dissertation we examine links between post-Second World War concepts and current approaches and make connection between history and present circumstances. Finally, we suggested the new federal model acceptable for the European Union, however before we will conclude with the investigation of the conceptual and empirical problems emphasized in the previous chapters while attempting to identify the European Union's empirical reality.

How far could be conceivable to construct the new federal model for modern European Union based on circumstances after the Second World War? Some scientists proposed that in the late twentieth century there were “in the midst of a paradigm shift from a world of states, modeled after the ideal of the nation-state developed at the beginning of the modern epoch in the seventeenth century, to a world of diminished state sovereignty and increased interstate linkages of a constitutionalized federal character” (Elazar D. J., *From Statism to Federalism: A Paradigm Shift*, 1995). The sources of paradigm shift is situated at the end of the Second World War; however, its broad and conclusive character was not completely accepted until the breaking down of the Soviet Union. Certainly, even the most influential scholars, it appeared to have “crept up unawares” (Elazar D. J., *From Statism to Federalism: A Paradigm Shift*, 1995). The truth of this significant change is not that states are collapsing but rather that the state system is acquiring a new measurement which is currently starting to overlay and, at least in a few regards, to overcome the system that prevailed through the modern period. Scientist's global conception of adjustment defined this system of complex interactions as convincing states into numerous combinations of shared rule and self – rule, their particular definition of advanced federation and federalism (Elazar D. J., 1987). Furthermore, this federalist uprising was not confined to advanced federation but rather incorporated a variation of several and complex federal arrangements constructed to accommodate internal divisions. Likewise, it clarified the rise of the European Union, which, in various scientists point of view, had formed into a new style of confederation, constructed to fit European realities (Brown-John, 1995).

Changing the setting of international relations with consideration of the mutual interest between states guaranteed that their energies were changed direction from the aggressive and competitive power politics that prompted war into new areas of cooperation and unity that transformed the state. In outcome, the European Union has established the rule of law into relations between European states which, as Duchene has outlined, has “cut off a whole dimension of destructive expectations in the minds of policy makers” (Duchene F. , Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence, 1994). It has domesticated the balance of power so that the power politics of the so-called international relations school of real politics has been replaced by “aspirations that come nearer to the rights and responsibilities which reign in domestic politics” (Duchene F. , Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence, 1994). The approach after the Second World War to the building of a federal Europe implied continuously appropriating what previously were the externalities of the state. This, is hardly need highlighting, was a major noteworthy in conventional inter-state relations. Nonetheless, in attempt to construct a federal Europe essentially by method of series economic steps, it was endeavored something that had no historical precedent. Certainly, the European Community, and subsequently the European Union, has emerged in a very different manner to other federal models. Proceeding discussion about transforming Europe from incremental economic steps into a new federal model requires us to return to some of the presumption, already analyzed above, upon which conception of Europe was initially based.

The key to understanding the relationship between federalism, federation and European integration lies in the assumption that by creating functional connections between states in a way that does not precisely make threat to the national sovereignty in a formal sense, the way to federation would continuously open. These supposedly functional connections were primarily economic activities, and they were completely expressed in the European Coal and Steel Community initiative of the early 1950. This innovative type of supranational organization was to be the establishment of a European federation that would emerge only gradually to connect national elites in a process of common economic interest. These specific advantages would gradually construct that indispensable solidarity – the mutual interest – which was vital for the removal of mental and physical obstacles.

The outcome that we can highlight from our research is that in the particular setting of European integration, the emerging the European Union is a context of federalism

without federation. Hence, in this term federalism is a specific type of political integration. It is based upon a conception of Europe that suggests shared rule and self-rule. A federal Europe assigns to a specific way that its supporters might prefer to organize Europe. The federal disposition has certain distinct organizational and institutional ramifications for the construct and building Europe.

#### 4.1. Critical analyze

History – or possibly specific historical interpretation based upon shared presumptions about states and the role and inspirations of states elites – has turned into the premise for establishing a theoretical structure that is equivalent to a self-satisfying prediction. The following outline provides to point out the essentially intergovernmental clarifications of the origins and causes of post-Second World War Western European integration. This circumstance makes us to consider the significant works of the two principal contributions to the discussion about post-war period in Western Europe, namely, Andrew Moravcsik and Alan Milward. Milward considered that successful accomplishment of Western Europe’s post-war reconstruction derived from the “creation of its own pattern of institutionalized international economic interdependence” (Milward A. S., 1984). He asserted that previous accounts had neglected to demonstrate precisely how such idealism in reality affected governmental policy-making. Certainly, the empirical proof demonstrated contrary: integration had been the bureaucratic outcome of “the internal expression of national political interest” instead of that of the major political leaders who had realized policy (Milward A. S., 1984). Moreover, the origins and early advancement of the European project were analogous and unforeseen instead of expressive of essential principles that could be called general and endless. European Integration was not part of a grand federal design but had risen merely to adapt with certain historically distinct political and economic problems. The European Coal and Steel Community, for instance, was composed simply to determine specific, limited – not generalized, comprehensive – problems. It was only “an arm of the nation-state” and had no decisive indications for Europe’s future. Above all, he outlines, that they had no intention to overcome the nation-state (Milward A. S., 1984).

Milward’s second significant commitment, namely “rescue of the nation-state”, was depended on two following arguments. First, the development of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community had been an essential part of the advocating of the nation-state since 1945; second, that the process of

European integration had been an indispensable part of the post-war rescue of the nation-state. The principle purpose for the origins, early development and proceeded existence of the European project was that it was essentially one more stage in the long development of the nation-state. Moreover, the economic historian in Milward could not avoid the enticement to assert, “the true origins of the European Community were economic and social” (Alan S. Milward, George Brennan, Federico Romero, 1992). In this manner, the assumed contrast between the European Community and the nation-state was not true, they could exist together. And the development of the European Community was generally state coordinated: member state governments were in control of the process and guidance of the integration.

In the third commitment, Milward attempted to develop a theory of integration taken from empirical research into Europe’s own history, even while accepting that it was not yet “susceptible to full analysis”. He acknowledged his weakness to forecast the future nature of national policy choices based upon the confirmation of contemporary circumstances and processes and, however he although asserted that the “frontier of national sovereignty based upon existing policy choices was essentially were it had been fixed in 1952 and 1957” (Alan S. Milward, George Brennan, Federico Romero, 1992).

Milward’s commitments can be defined as a major aspect of a self-fulfilling prediction – the result of disputed presumption and highly contestable previous conceptions – it could be undoubted that his historical analysis has maintained their rational applicability to the contemporary circumstances and processes currently occurring in the European Union.

Moravcsik’s suggestion is to outline several fundamental premises of liberal intergovernmentalism, which are established upon following fundamental basis: a critique of neo-functionalism, a liberal theory of national choice arrangement, the acceptance of rational state conduct, an intergovernmental analysis of negotiations between states and an account of international institutions as basic promoters of domestic policy targets. It is farther reliance by a theoretical dependence upon regime theory and two-level diversions that could be used for guidance to clarify the demand and supply activities indispensable for the international cooperation. Together these aspects are utilized to take into the consideration the circumstances by which member states of the European Union are periodically prepared to delegate and pool supposedly sovereign powers that come out to decrease, but in reality strengthen, their related autonomy (Moravcsik, 1993). Certainly, the primary presumptions that support

Moravcsik's clarification of Western European countries' cooperation after the Second World War are established in the realist and neo-realist theories of International Relations that arrange the state as the basic actor in international politics. The safeguard and support of member state interest in the European Union, thus, implies that the national governments are the key players of progress and coherence in the pursuit of national self-interest. Practically, Europe has had a tendency to depend upon institutional coherence.

Nonetheless, we are reminded of Spinelli's well-known remark that we should start with what has already been realized. We cannot go back to the planning phase. And there are numerous researchers and interested scientists who still claim that the present European Union demonstrates so many federal and confederal components that we already have a federal Europe.

Moravcsik characterizes the European Union as "an exceptionally weak federation" (Moravcsik, 2001). He is, nonetheless, obviously uncomfortable with this explanation, including that it could be considered "as something qualitatively different from existing federal systems" and much preferring to indicate to it as "a particular sort of limited, multi-level constitutional polity designed within a specific social and historical context" (Moravcsik, 2001). The argument that has prompted what is for him a notably doubtful conclusion acquires from what he accepts are the narrow scope of policies that fall within the European Union's extent and weakness of its institutions. We might soon see that his discomfort is in reality the outcome of neglecting to acknowledge the implication of what we will attribute to as empirical context and the starting point. He contends that the current European Union is weak – in reality, so weak that it rises into inquiry whether it is a federation at all. This is a direct result of a criticism that involves the following spheres of issues about the European voters are concern mostly: foreign policy, human rights, defense, social welfare provision, etc. Therefore, he contends, the European Union's central institutions are limited by super majoritarian decision rules, a powerless administration. In addition, he makes a conclusion: "the European Union constitutional order is not only barely a federal state; it is barely recognizable as a state at all" (Moravcsik, 2001).

What appears from the European Community's policy and institutional ability emerges the picture of a developing eminently decentralized, federal union of states and citizens with constrained however meaningful public obligations, commitments and duties that is constructed upon "unity in diversity". It appears a democratic federal

union based upon constrained centralization with particular state-like elements and aspects.

The starting point, then, outlines, to Monnet's Europe, that is, the way Europe has been assembled. It should be reviewed Monnet's approach to the building of Europe – a federal – was remarkable. His method – the starting point – was a gradual, cumulative development that launched with sectoral integration around Coal and Steel Community and later moved to the more extensive goal of a common market. However, the incorporation of largely socio-economic objectives was supported by what was certainly a political indispensable so that, at some unexamined point in the future, the federation would be accessible. There was neither deadline nor particular program for this movement from functionalism to constitutionalism, the constructing of political Europe; however the imperative ramifications for our argument about empirical setting is that this specific consideration to the constructing of Europe incorporated some threats for the federal project. One of the main threats was that it made the central supranational institutions of the developing European Community intrinsically weak – not able to go much ahead what previously existed – and it certainly counted upon particular accomplishments to provide the motivation for the next step of cooperation and integration.

Empirical setting also offers us to correctly analyze why it is that the Liberal Intergovernmentalism could create such a persuading factors against supranational institutions, similar to the European Commission. They are a simple destination because their distinctive role in the process of cooperation and integration has been decisive by an institutional setting remarkable in the world of states. They are promoter strengths for integration processes not only cooperation. This implies that they should be able to develop, as well establish their own policy capacity by utilizing circumstances when they are regarded positive to supranational progress. More or less, the supranational institutions have also expanded as an element of the advancement of the closer union. Therefore, both empirical setting and the starting point for constructing a federal union is critical to an adequate comprehension of how the European Community has emerged and how it functions. Theories and models of International Relations of decision-making accordingly are not as suitable to European integration as few researchers would have us consider due to that European project in reality is the unique case. To borrow from Spinelli, the normative federalist essential contours Liberal intergovernmentalist protagonist as highly capable at clarifying what exists however

not seeing what does not yet exist but rather should exist (Andrew Glencross and Alexander H. Trechsel, 2010).

## **4.2. Discussion of Results**

Both in its initial conception and in its consequent development, the European Community has solid federal and confederal components that exist at the same time with equally strong inter-governmental and supranational elements. Each of these segmental parts of the European project was fundamental to the constructing of European Community throughout the past half century and have been the cause of much theoretical debates. If it is a function of theory to clarify the present circumstance, apparently it is the case that the European Union functions in practice but not in theory. There is no single comprehensive theory of European integration that can clarify the complex empirical phenomenon that we call Europe.

### **4.2.1. The New Federal Model for the European Union**

The principal explanation for this theoretical puzzle lies in two prominent aspects: firstly, the conceptual deficiency of currently existing theories in European integration and international relations, and, second, the new aspect in which the European project was initially considered and developed. The roots and formulation of most recent federations are commonly the outcome of the connected historical process of state construction and national integration. Their origins and existence has been due to a sequence of complex circumstances that are described by a connection of mutual factors and historical specificity. But when our consideration changes from the world of intra-states relations – those elements that relate to politics within the state – to the inter-state world – those relations between states – we challenge the multilateralism of the federal idea and we need to examine delicately how far its aspect and content could be shifted from one context to another. A reexamination of the federal idea in Europe undoubtedly takes us back to Patrick Riley's emphasis that national federalism, in theory and practice, developed out of international relations practices and ideas. His position is considerable and is necessary to outline here:

“It is essential, then, the study the development of national and international federal ideas together because national federalism is essentially an internalization of a form of external relations while international federalism is essentially an externalization of a political form characteristic of the internal structure of a single state. The development of federal ideas is the history of efforts to turn national government into international relations, and international relations into government. The characteristic ideas of

national federalism – state sovereignty, the equality of states at the national level, rights of ratification and of secession – are really internalized international relations ideas; and the internalization of such ideas gives a peculiar instability of national federalism, insofar as international politics is less stable, less structured, less articulated than national politics” (Riley, 1973).

In one specific sense – that of relations between states identified by inter-governmentalism – the European Community is certainly situated in the world of international relations that conventionally organizes it is a confederation while in another meaning – that of supranationalism – rationally European integration appears to predict the transition processes of the national state into a new, overall, multinational federation. It is considered that it would be a federation of existing, for the most part developed, national states. Interpreted in the way, we can explore that coherently it is a new model of cooperation in Europe, both in environment of its established constituent elements and its unique unification of federal and confederal components.

#### **4.2.1.1. Federalism and Integration**

The European Union – the present interpretation of the European project – has achieved a new intersection in its political and economic advancement. The time has come to resist the political ramifications of Monnet’s method and draw into the challenging and disputing model of constructing political Europe.

The term integration is a word, which implies distinctive things to various people and could be used in a variation of numerous contexts. With this regard, we should consider what Charles Pentland indicated to as “the lowest common denomination” and characterize integration as:

“a process whereby a group of people, organized initially in two or more independent nation-states, come to constitute a political whole which can in some sense be described as a community” (Pentland, 1973).

This basic explanation exists at a genuinely high level of generalization. However, it is an advantageous existing definition, which brings the impression of connecting previously separate parts to shape new entire, new relations between peoples and states. This new relations include the establishment of a single people – a new politic body – depends eventually upon which way and access to integration is accepted. A few theories, similar to that of neofunctionalism, classify a community-model, which

indicates to some type of supra-nationality while others, similar to federalism, are state-oriented, and have customarily defined the new totality constituted as a new state-model with a “single people”. However, there are vast amount of alterations both between and within contemporary theories and some of them are perpetual about the target or final point of integration.

Considering this deep impression of what is included when we introduce integration as a gradual process, it is clear that it is a deeply complex phenomenon, which might be comprehended in several distinct ways. We are interested with political integration however, there are also a wide range of measurements to examine within just one single theory. In the model of European integration, it is obvious that the economic aspect to integration has been of principal significance contrasted to political or social culture elements of the process.

Numerous reasonable issues with integration remain to be settled however for out constrained purposes here it has been characterized and given some genuinely settled sense. At a most advanced level of generality, and despite its natural uncertainty, there is a noteworthy level of concession among scientists about what integration implies. We have to recall that it is essentially necessary to make a solid contrast between empirical and normative integration hypotheses. This implies that we should be apprehensive of those, above mentioned, normative theories, which are prescriptive and effectively suggested specific objectives and strategies to be pursued compared to empirical theories, which imply to clarify what is occurring and make analysis, under given conditions, about what most likely could be developed.

Two principle approaches should be defined. Firstly, let us recognize that, in spite of the fact that what Monnet originally suggested and helped to implement in the Western Europe was economic integration, it was motivated by a political objective and his long-term intention was a European federation. As William Diebold outlined this, examining that the European Coal and Steel Community was a major federal measure of economic integration and that at the premise of the Schuman Plan was "a series of truly federal equations, concerning the relations of the parts to one another and of each to the federal agency" (Diebold, 1962). And the European Coal and Steel Community's reality was not simply “economic means to accomplish political result.” Rather, political and economic components were “inextricably mingled” in the Schuman Plan (Diebold, 1962). Secondly, by reconstructing the essential facts this approach to the constructing of Europe was unprecedented example. Changing the setting of international relations

in order to determine the ambiguous common interest between states guaranteed that their power were redirected from the old channels of function politics into new sphere of integrity and cooperation which overstep the state. The European Community has suggested a rule of law into relations between European states, which, as Duchene outlined, “Has cut off whole dimensions of destructive expectation in the minds of policy-makers.” It has efficiently manifested the balance of power so that the power politics of the “realpolitik school” of international relations has been supplanted by “aspirations that come nearer to the rights and responsibilities which reign in domestic politics” (Duchene F. , 1994). This was a noteworthy exploration in European inter-state relations.

Nevertheless, to assemble a federal Europe by the economic development, Monnet was attempting something, which had no historical example. Indeed the European Union has developed in the opposite way to any of its assumed models. Furthermore, it developed by the gradual combination of previously separate political units.

Therefore, it is obvious that, both federalism and integration are approaches, which can be defined necessarily as processes of international transformation. Federalism, then, is a model of political cooperation and integration. Concerning the European integration, however, federalism has been described by gradual incremental steps, of federal components, which have been included in aggregate form to create the European Union in which supranational, federal and intergovernmental objectives exist together in an unstable and unaccomplished union. As Duchene has noticed it, the European Communities were “steps to a federation that might have to operate indefinitely in intermediate zones. It was federal minimalism confined to certain economic areas” (Duchene F. , 1994).

The following subchapter analyzes a federalism and the conceptual distinction between federal and confederal elements in the European Union.

#### **4.3. Federal and Confederal Elements**

Since the European Union is certainly not a federation, it has been accepted method, in the absence of a new word to characterize it, to assign to it in general terms as a confederal public power. Forsyth has been more decisive in characterizing the European Community as “an economic confederation”. He used well-known language in outlining it as “a subspecies of the genus confederation... a distinct branch of confederation” (Forsyth M. G., 1981).

We will constrain ourselves to the acknowledged modern conceptual contrast, between what is believed federal and what is believed confederal. The classification of these terms, nonetheless, is not generally obvious. Certainly, in some conditions, the conceptual contrast is unavoidably obscured and ambiguous. After all that, fundamental federal and confederal principles – like voluntary union and shared rule and self-rule – include in both classifications. Another sense behind this vagueness is that confederations have frequently been interpreted in the way convenient for federations. They have been predicted upon either to collapse or to develop into federations. It has been accepted practice even for many informed scholars to view as historically successful only those confederations, which took after the way towards federation. They have not commonly been judged according to their own particular terms of reference as a specific type of union in their own privilege.

Given the post-war elements of the European Union in Monnet's origination of Europe, we have effectively established in this dissertation that the objective of initiators of European integration was a federal Europe. Federal concept, impacts and strategies have dependably been part of the European construction and development. However, it is likewise true, that in constructing the European Economic Community in 1957, the fundamental structure of the union featured more an economic confederation than something else. With the specific goal to protect and secure their economic statehood, each participating member country, as we have noticed, appropriated their external factors. Their foreign economic relations were slowly changed into a national market, connected to that of a national political economy. The confederal setting of the European Economic Community, then, proposed that it was mainly an economic confederation, but one with some important institutional elements which typically describe classic confederation: the political union of countries concerned primarily with security and defense. However, the confederal components, through apparent, did not by themselves appropriately characterize the European Community. They did not clarify everything that it did. These components in process coexisted with precisely federal features. Even Forsyth was constrained to accept that it was constantly more than just confederal. These institutional elements served to affect negatively the confederal attribute of the European Community. Taking into the consideration from an alternate point of view – that of the contemporary federalists – the European Community additionally presented rising federal elements. Parallel with, however, not equal to the point of view of Hamilton in "The Federalist", the target of the federalists was to reinforce the focal political institutions of the European

construction (Pinder J. , 1986). For them, the European Court of Justice adjusted to a federal character in its judicial competences as supervisor of laws, which were supreme to the national laws of the member countries and mandatory upon their citizens.

Considering these contrasts, the basic point here is that the powers and responsibilities related with both federal and confederal authorities recently could be practically identical; it is the process in which these forces are organized. In a federation, the central institution is the government of a “single people” (Molle W. , 2006), while in a confederation it is just a “government of governments” (Balassa B. , 2014). The theoretical barrier between federation and confederation empowers us to strengthen our position with regard the European case. The European Union consists of both federal and confederal elements having ability to act upon both the citizens and the governments of the union. Therefore, if, theoretically, confederations never achieve the noble status of being the governments of the “single people”, their ability to have a direct policy affect upon the people cannot be denied.

All above mentioned considered, the European Union is making steps in the general direction of both classic confederation – a federal union of states and federation – a union of states and citizens. The section of the complication could be the intensive contest to move from Monnet’s Europe of functionalism to Spinelli’s Europe of constitutionalism. It is an unavoidable responsibility of the constructing of political Europe. Empirical reality proposes and we will use the following terminology, confederal-federal puzzle.

When we summarize the confederal-federal puzzle, it obviously shows why scholars have been notably unsuccessful to connect a persuasive sign to the European Union complexity. Both, its post- Second World War elements and its historical transformation have implied that it has constantly been subject to hypothesizes, variances of pace and even infrequent developments in the opposite direction.

#### **4.4. General findings**

If the creation and development of federal government is usually viewed as the greatest contribution to the government itself, then the distinct community method of incorporating political and economic integration in the late contemporary period should also be trusted to both Spinelli and Monnet as inventors of a new treaty-based constitutional method for constructing unions of states and citizens.

Regarding the issue of confederal governance, Frederick Lister has classified several characterizing elements, which gives us the chance to specify the relevant scholarly debates about a federal Europe:

- Confederations combine states without denying them their sovereignty;
- Confederations combine states whose citizens are excessively diverse to create applicable federal-type unions;
- Confederation requires a written basic law in the form of treaty-constitutions that are legally mandatory upon the various confederal partners;
- Confederations contribute to a minimalist mandate that allows most governmental powers to be operated individually by its member states;
- Confederation contributes for two quite distinct forms of mandate including collective security and economic union;
- Confederations demonstrate commonly adequate decisions to solve disputes that may arise from any imbalance of power and resources among its member state (Lister F. K., 1996).

This list contributes an essential principle with which to highlight and indicate the confederal aspects in the European Union is admissible. However, in order finally contradiction between these confederal features and the federal elements of the European Union, it is applicable to classify the characterizing attributes of federation as well. We contribute the following aspects of federation:

- A federation is a state with a single people which is described by the convenience of the constituent units of the union in the decision-making process of the central government on some constitutionally-established basis;
- Federation is depends on unity and diversity which are formally perceived by the consolidation of self-rule and shared rule in a written and supreme constitution;
- Self-rule and shared rule are consolidated in no less than two orders of government, each of them acting directly upon its citizens, in which the constituent units enjoy notable autonomy in matters of local concern however have intentionally accepted to pool their sovereignty in matters of mutual concern;

- The federation has a mediator as a supreme court to adjust the relations between the central government and the constituent units, and between the constituent units themselves.<sup>72</sup>

These confederal and federal aspects strengthens our argument, which has been outlined in the dissertation, despite there are clear contrasts between confederation and federation, they share several mutual concepts, values and institutional policy attributes. Lister has clarified: “the spheres of responsibility allocated to the central authorities and to the member states are surprisingly similar in federal and confederal unions” (Lister F. K., 1996). More powers and more absolute powers are normally acceptable for the federal central authorities, than to the confederal authorities; however, this particular combination in the European Union is an outcome of Monnet’s individual Community method.

The recent prominence upon the exceptional combination of confederal and federal assumptions obvious in the European Union influences an empirical shift away from the sort of “energetic government” that Hamilton so admired, however it also goes beyond the classic confederations analyzed previously in this dissertation. It is time to create a new acceptable conceptual space for this new form of confederal-federal union. This is the place where new confederation could be allocated. Contemporary patterns, reflected in bodies like the European Union, would appear to propose that in late modernity we are progressing toward a new era of freedom, more limited, forms of governance. The new European model of confederal union has changed the classic model of federation. The paradigm switch assigned to by Elazar would also imply to recommend that the classical term federation is presently too much constricting a label to exemplify the new complex facts that exist in the world today. Elazar is certainly right to contend that we should now extend our concepts to contain this wide shift or we will fail to assess the new complexities of integration and cooperation (Elazar D. J., 1987)

In the closest future, we might be observers of the recreation and modernizations of confederation concept. A double paradox is obvious here. Our practical experience of federation has driven us to reexamine confederation, similarly as our reexamination of confederation, which has stimulated a current analysis of federalism. The European

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<sup>72</sup> P. King, *Federalism and Federation*, London: Groom Helm, 1982; D.J. Elazar, *Exploring Federalism*, University of Alabama Press, 1987; and M. Burgess and A.G. Gagnon, *Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing Traditions and Future Directions*, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993

Union's experience has made us to reexamine and reuse well known classifications. The new confederations should not be mistaken with their aged predecessors. They create an alternative form of union. More powerful and integrated but less centralized than many modern federations. The development of new shapes of confederal unions modeled on the European Union should not be surprising for us. It is a simple reflection of the changing aspects of international relations.

## Conclusion

In the dissertation has affirmed the importance of federalism in the gradual, accumulative advancement of post-WW2 European political and economic integration. It has manifested a fundamental cohesion and progress of federal ideas, impacts and strategies in the development of European idea, from the European Coal and Steel Community signed in 1951 to the European Economic Community signed in 1957. During the whole of this difficult and often convulsive period in post-WW2 Western European history, the proceeding pertinence and flexibility of federalism has filled in as a steady indication of the presence of a conception of Europe going well beyond absolute intergovernmental cooperation.

Current theoretical discussions have been concerned primarily with the overlay of a set of essential independent and dependent variables, which imply to clarify integration. These variables contain the following: domestic policy-making and policy-makers; inter-state negotiations; the potential rapprochement of national choices; the power and impact of the national state. Any theory whose concentration is confined to domestic coalitions, the comparative power of national states, and policy makers of state in resolute inquiry of highly demonstrated domestic policy interests, will undoubtedly arrive at a limited statist destination. In perspective of these contemporary theoretical patterns federalism remain as a specific type of European integration. In the current commitment of the discussion about the future of the European Union, Alberta Sbragia suggested to analyze federalism, specifically comparative federalism, as a valuable reference of identifying different pathways for the building of Europe (Sbragia, 2002). She inevitably confirmed the conceptual contrast between federalism and federation when she noticed that “one can have what might be called segmented federalism, that is, treaty-based federal arrangements in certain policy-arenas, without having a formal, constitutionally based federation or a federal-type organization could evolve without becoming a constitutionally based federation in the traditional sense” (Sbragia, 2002). This makes the investigation of federations valuable in thinking about the Community’s future. Moving from the theoretical research of comparative federalism and federation to an examination of the European Union itself as a federation, William Wallace suggested that: “the European Community is a constitutional system which has some state attributes, but which most – or all – of its constituent governments do not wish to develop into a state, even while expecting it to deliver outcomes which are hard to envisage outside the framework of an entity which we would recognize as a federal state (Wallace W. , 2013). The ambiguity for Wallace was that, even while the

European Union had not turned into a federation, anyway it maintained “a constitutional agenda which implied the need for a federal-state framework” (Wallace W. , 2013). It could be easily understood why the building of Europe confuses scholars; it is not a federation however, it does combine strong federal and confederal components.

In the dissertation, we suggest that both federal and confederal ideas, impacts techniques lie at the core of the examination about the theory and practice of European integration after the WW2. They have been particularly conspicuous during the most recent decade in light of the current movement towards the constructing of political Europe. Certainly, the debate about the future processes in the European Union has been contentious definitely, as long as it is a constitutional contest – a contest about constitutionalizing the European construction. Federal and confederal conceptions have been launched to the prominence of the contest since we have finally connected the critical issue of institutional transformation and the new architecture. In the work, we indicate that, if we use conceptual focal points different from those utilized by Milward<sup>73</sup> to the historical research of the period, the empirical proof examined is respectively different. In outcome, quite different explanation is put on the historical understanding of post-war transition processes in Western Europe. The historical significance shifts away from basic, genuine economic actualities and statistics, as well toward the more advanced political setting of ideas, players, institutions and processes where federalism rises.

Federal ideas have saturated into every central institution of the European Union, both supranational or intergovernmental, fundamentally influencing between institutional relations and streaming through a large variations of routes both inside and without the formal institutional and policy structures of the European Union. An authentic network of European organizations exists; it includes political parties, an innumerable of interest groups and various professional branches. They advocate the federal elements in various ways, using several distinctive methods, empowering them to change the political setting and circumstance in a way much more incentive to ambitious objectives. Our analytical examination of the historical period after the Second World War in Western European countries has already demonstrated how effectively, the procedural consent, consolidation of political leadership and institutional setting could be used to remarkable influence in the inquiry of a federal

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<sup>73</sup> See Chapter II (Theoretical Research)

Europe. The reality that the European Union serves the utilization of federal and confederal assumptions to European integration emphasizes how responsive have been institutional and policy fields to alternative perceptions of Europe's future. This is exactly how perceptions turn into realities. When federalism associates straightly with reality, it terminates to be another alternative perception and could be put into the practice.

In endeavoring to restore federal ideas, consequences and procedures in the progress of post-Second World War period, we have tested the ordinary intergovernmental clarification, which draws its significance from the realist school of international relations theory and displayed a radical history of the post-WW2 advancement of the European thought. Our aim has not been to entirely change what is the principal realist or intergovernmental model of European integration after the WW2, but instead, to supplement it by taking into the consideration federal ideas and practice. Anymore it is not agreeable to categorize federalism within the general theoretical classification of neofunctionalism, where it simply disappears from the perspective.

The purpose of this dissertation has been to present contentions about post-World War Two circumstances as transition processes of states and to open up European Studies to some recent directions of research. There are few directions, which draw from the dissertation.

Firstly, considering as hypothesis of the empirical investigation of the transition process after the WW2 in Western Europe, the assertion that integration is about the increased cooperation between national representatives that appears under the name of problem solving and consent-achievement instead of that of classical inter-state negotiations. Above-mentioned argument proposes that the core elements of integration its characteristics are typical of integration as a whole and not simply specific policy fields.

The second is to clarify the theoretical analyze of the conception of the state membership. The transformation processes in Western Europe after 1945, has concentrated on the creation of a considerably liberal tradition with essential requirements set upon majorities. The point is the progress and development of western democracy after the fascism.

The third is the comparative aspect. The direction accepted here has been to purpose the comparative methodology, expressing parallels instead of noticing the

relevance of national contrasts. However, it is obvious that the transition process from nation state to state membership has continued in the distinctive way depending on the state.

Investigation on the transnational measures of European integration processes after 1945 could make valuable work to form the concept of this process as the gradual rise of a multilevel polity. To follow the historical origins of the contemporary European Union, in our dissertation we went further of limited concentration on national history and grasp new directions of research. To construct a research design in this sphere, contemporary social science theory on the starting points and improvement of the European institutions could contribute new historical research. Responding the strong interest of the social sciences over the most recent decades in the rise of a complexity of European polity with a several influences on states domestic issues and European politics, this theory contributes various forms of concepts why European institutions were created and developed.

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
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# Appendix

## No 1 - Marshall Plan<sup>74</sup>



<sup>74</sup> Public Law 472 General Records of the United States Government Record Group 11 National Archives and Records Administration

conomic Cooperation, may deem necessary to carry out the purposes of this title and to improve commercial relations with China.

Sec. 404. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is authorized and directed, until such time as an appropriation is made pursuant to section 404, to make advances, not to exceed in the aggregate \$200,000,000, to carry out the provisions of this title in such manner and in such amounts as the President shall determine. From appropriations authorized under section 404, there shall be repaid without interest to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation the advances made by it under the authority contained herein. No interest shall be charged on advances made by the Treasury to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in implementation of this section.

Sec. 407. (a) The Secretary of State, after consultation with the Administrator, is hereby authorized to conclude an agreement with China establishing a Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in China, to be composed of two citizens of the United States appointed by the President of the United States and three citizens of China appointed by the President of China. Such Commission shall, subject to the direction and control of the Administrator, formulate and carry out a program for reconstruction in rural areas of China, which shall include such research and training activities as may be necessary or appropriate for such reconstruction: *Provided*, That assistance furnished under this section shall not be construed as an express or implied assumption by the United States of any responsibility for making any further contributions to carry out the purposes of this section.

(b) Insofar as practicable, an amount equal to not more than 10 per centum of the funds made available under subsection (a) of section 404 shall be used to carry out the purposes of subsection (a) of this section. Such amount may be in United States dollars, proceeds in Chinese currency from the sale of commodities made available to China with funds authorized under subsection (a) of section 404, or both.

*Joseph W. Martin Jr.*

*Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

*Arthur Vandenberg*  
*President of the Senate pro tempore.*

*Approved,*  
*April 2, 1948.*

*Harry Truman*

## No 2 - Truman Doctrine<sup>75</sup>

80TH CONGRESS } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES } DOCUMENT  
1st Session } } No. 171

### RECOMMENDATION FOR ASSISTANCE TO GREECE AND TURKEY

ADDRESS

OF

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

DELIVERED

BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF  
REPRESENTATIVES, RECOMMENDING ASSISTANCE TO GREECE  
AND TURKEY

MARCH 12, 1947.—Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and ordered  
to be printed

MR. PRESIDENT, MR. SPEAKER, MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE  
UNITED STATES:

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today  
necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress.

The foreign policy and the national security of this country are  
involved.

One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you  
at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and  
Turkey.

The United States has received from the Greek Government an  
urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary  
reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and  
reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the  
statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if  
Greece is to survive as a free nation.

I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to  
turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek Government.

Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources  
has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends  
meet. Since 1940, this industrious and peace-loving country has  
suffered invasion, 4 years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter  
internal strife.

When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the  
retreating Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads,

### 2 - RECOMMENDATION FOR ASSISTANCE TO GREECE AND TURKEY

port facilities, communications, and merchant marine. More than a  
thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five percent of the  
children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry, and draft animals had  
almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out practically all savings.

As a result of these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting  
human want and misery, was able to create political chaos which,  
until now, has made economic recovery impossible.

Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those  
goods which are essential to bare subsistence. Under these circum-  
stances the people of Greece cannot make progress in solving their  
problems of reconstruction. Greece is in desperate need of financial  
and economic assistance to enable it to resume purchases of food,  
clothing, fuel, and seeds. These are indispensable for the subsistence  
of its people and are obtainable only from abroad. Greece must have  
help to import the goods necessary to restore internal order and  
security so essential for economic and political recovery.

The Greek Government has also asked for the assistance of experi-  
enced American administrators, economists, and technicians to insure  
that the financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively  
in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its  
public administration.

The very existence of the Greek State is today threatened by the  
terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Com-  
munists, who defy the Government's authority at a number of points,  
particularly along the northern boundaries. A Commission, ap-  
pointed by the United Nations Security Council is at present investi-  
gating disturbed conditions in northern Greece, and alleged border  
violations along the frontier between Greece on the one hand and  
Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other.

Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the  
situation. The Greek Army is small and poorly equipped. It needs  
supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the Govern-  
ment throughout Greek territory.

Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and  
self-respecting democracy.

The United States must supply that assistance. We have already  
extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid, but these  
are inadequate.

There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn.

No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support  
for a democratic Greek Government.

The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can give  
no further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain  
finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commit-  
ments in several parts of the world, including Greece.

We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this  
crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action,  
and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a  
position to extend help of the kind that is required.

It is important to note that the Greek Government has asked for  
our aid in utilizing effectively the financial and other assistance we  
may give to Greece, and in improving its public administration. It is  
of the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made  
available to Greece, in such a manner that each dollar spent will count

<sup>75</sup> Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum

toward making Greece self-supporting, and will help to build an economy in which a healthy democracy can flourish.

No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its defects are always visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected. The government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless it represents 85 percent of the members of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign observers, including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of the views of the Greek people.

The Greek Government has been operating in an atmosphere of chaos and extremism. It has made mistakes. The extension of aid by this country does not mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek Government has done or will do. We have condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist measures of the right or the left. We have in the past advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now.

Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention.

The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece; and, during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support.

Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity.

That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.

The British Government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey.

As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.

I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.

To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.

Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.

It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence.

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East.

We must take immediate and resolute action.

I, therefore, ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into

consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the \$350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.

Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized.

If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this subject the executive and legislative branches of the Government must work together.

This is a serious course upon which we embark.

I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious.

The United States contributed \$341,000,000,000 toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace.

The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than one-tenth of 1 percent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died.

We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation.

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events.

I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *March 12, 1947.*

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## TRAITÉ

entre la Belgique, la France,  
le Luxembourg, les Pays-Bas  
et le Royaume-Uni de  
Grande - Bretagne et  
d'Irlande du Nord.

Son Altesse Royale le Prince Régent de Belgique, Monsieur le Président de la République Française, Président de l'Union Française, Son Altesse Royale Madame la Grande-Duchesse de Luxembourg, Sa Majesté la Reine des Pays-Bas et Sa Majesté le Roi de Grande-Bretagne, d'Irlande et des Territoires Britanniques au-delà des Mers,

Étant résolus

A affirmer leur foi dans les droits fondamentaux de l'homme, dans la dignité et la valeur de la personne humaine, ainsi que dans les autres principes proclamés par la Charte des Nations Unies;

A confirmer et à défendre les principes démocratiques, les libertés civiques et individuelles, les traditions constitutionnelles et le respect de la loi, qui forment leur patrimoine commun;

A resserrer, dans cet esprit, les liens économiques, sociaux et culturels qui les unissent déjà;

A coopérer loyalement et à coordonner leurs efforts pour constituer en Europe occidentale une base solide pour la reconstruction de l'économie européenne;

A se prêter mutuellement assistance, conformément à la Charte des Nations Unies, pour assurer la paix et la sécurité internationales et faire obstacle à toute politique d'agression;

A prendre les mesures jugées nécessaires en cas de reprise d'une politique d'agression de la part de l'Allemagne;

A associer progressivement à leurs efforts d'autres États s'inspirant des mêmes principes et animés des mêmes résolutions;

Désireux de conclure à cet effet un Traité réglant leur collaboration en matières économique, sociale et culturelle, et leur légitime défense collective;

## TREATY

between Belgium, France,  
Luxembourg, the Nether-  
lands and the United King-  
dom of Great Britain and  
Northern Ireland.

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Belgium, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas,

Resolved

To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations;

To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage;

To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united;

To cooperate loyally and to coordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery;

To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression;

To take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression;

To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other States inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination;

Desiring for these purposes to conclude a treaty for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defence;

<sup>76</sup> [www.cvce.eu](http://www.cvce.eu)

## No 4 – Resolution of Hague Congress (1948)<sup>77</sup>

### Political Resolution (The Hague Congress, 7-10 May 1948)

The ravages wrought by six years of war and by the occupation, the diminution of world food production, the destruction of industrial capacity, the creation of huge debts, the maintenance of military expenditure out of all proportion to the resources of the people, the shifting of economic power, the rancours left by war, the progressive evils of nationalism and the absence, despite the work of U.N.O., of an international authority sufficiently strong to provide law and order, constitute an unprecedented menace to the well-being and the security of the peoples of Europe and threaten them with ruin.

In accordance with the principles and objectives set out in the Political Report submitted by the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity:

#### THE CONGRESS:

(1) RECOGNISES that it is the urgent duty of the nations of Europe to create an economic and political union in order to assure security and social progress.

(2) NOTES with approval the recent steps which have been taken by some European Governments in the direction of economic and political co-operation, but believes that in the present emergency the organisations created are by themselves insufficient to provide any lasting remedy.

#### Sovereign Rights

(3) DECLARES that the time has come when the European nations must transfer and merge some portion of their sovereign rights so as to secure common political and economic action for the integration and proper development of their common resources.

(4) CONSIDERS that any Union or Federation of Europe should be designed to protect the security of its constituent peoples, should be free from outside control, and should not be directed against any other nation.

(5) ASSIGNS to a United Europe the immediate task of establishing progressively a democratic social system, the aim of which shall be to free men from all types of slavery and economic insecurity, just as political democracy aims at protecting them against the exercise of arbitrary power.

(6) AFFIRMS that the integration of Germany in a United or Federated Europe alone provides a solution to both the economic and political aspects of the German problem.

(7) DECLARES that the Union or Federation must assist in assuring the economic, political and cultural advancement of the populations of the overseas territories associated with it, without prejudice to the special ties which now link these territories to European countries.

#### European Assembly

(8) DEMANDS the convening, as a matter of real urgency, of a European Assembly chosen by the Parliaments of the participating nations, from among their members or others, designed

(a) to stimulate and give expression to European public opinion;

(b) to advise upon immediate practical measures designed progressively to bring about the necessary economic and political union of Europe;

(c) to examine the juridical and constitutional implications arising out of the creation of such a Union or Federation and their economic and social consequences;

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<sup>77</sup> [www.cvce.eu](http://www.cvce.eu)

(d) to prepare the necessary plans for the above purposes.

### **Charter of Human Rights**

(9) CONSIDERS that the resultant Union or Federation should be open to all European nations democratically governed and which undertake to respect a Charter of Human Rights.

(10) RESOLVES that a Commission should be set up to undertake immediately the double task of drafting such a Charter and of laying down standards to which a State must conform if it is to deserve the name of a democracy.

(11) DECLARES that in no circumstances shall a State be entitled to be called a democracy unless it does, in fact as well as in law, guarantee to its citizens liberty of thought, assembly and expression, as well as the right to form a political opposition.

(12) REQUESTS that this Commission should report within three months on its labours.

### **Supreme Court**

(13) IS CONVINCED that in the interests of human values and human liberty, the Assembly should make proposals for the establishment of a Court of Justice with adequate sanctions for the implementation of this Charter, and to this end any citizen of the associated countries shall have redress before the court, at any time and with the least possible delay, of any violation of his rights as formulated in the Charter.

### **World Unity**

(14) DECLARES that the creation of a United Europe is an essential element in the creation of a united world.

## No 5 – Coal and Steel Agreement<sup>78</sup>

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC, HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE ROYAL OF BELGIUM, THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC, HER ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUCHESS OF LUXEMBOURG, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF THE NETHERLANDS,

CONSIDERING that world peace may be safeguarded only by creative efforts equal to the dangers which menace it;

CONVINCED that the contribution which an organized and vital Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations;

CONSCIOUS of the fact that Europe can be built only by concrete actions which create a real solidarity and by the establishment of common bases for economic development;

DESIROUS of assisting through the expansion of their basic production in raising the standard of living and in furthering the works of peace;

RESOLVED to substitute for historic rivalries a fusion of their essential interests; to establish, by creating an economic community, the foundation of a broad and independent community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the bases of institutions capable of giving direction to their future common destiny;

HAVE DECIDED to create a European Coal and Steel Community and to this end have designated as plenipotentiaries:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC:  
DR. Konrad ADENAUER, Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs;

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE ROYAL OF BELGIUM:  
MR. Paul VAN ZEELAND, Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
MR. Joseph MEURICE, Minister for Foreign Trade;

THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC:  
MR. Robert SCHUMAN, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

THE PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC:  
MR. Carlo SFORZA, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

HER ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUCHESS OF LUXEMBOURG:  
MR. Joseph BECH, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

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<sup>78</sup> [www.cvce.eu](http://www.cvce.eu)